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The ecologically and culturally rich Amazonian border zones are increasingly 
targeted for development and the exploitation of natural resources, even as these zones 
often double as existing or proposed sites for the conservation of biodiversity and 
protection of indigenous lands.  Governmental and Non-Governmental Organizations 
alike project their goals from central offices onto borderland landscapes assumed to be 
empty of local people but full of valuable resources, biodiversity or development 
potential.  Simultaneously, loggers, miners, drug traffickers, and others operate illegally 
or quasi-legally within these border zones and, in the absence of a strong governmental 
presence, cultivate the borderland’s reputation as a violent hinterland.  Within this 
complex borderland reality, the local people (indigenous and non-indigenous), largely 
invisible to authorities, struggle to survive with subsistence strategies while either 
negotiating with illegal interlopers to supplement their income or resisting them for their 
very survival.  The resulting landscape is a tangle of overlapping and competing 
 ix
concessions, conservation units, and indigenous territories whose contestation and 
resulting confusion advances the agenda of illegal extractivists and drug traffickers.  
This study highlights the continued importance of fieldwork in geography.  Here, 
field-based research provides insight into the poorly understood borderlands of Peru and 
Brazil.  Research used a combination of participatory methods, Geographic Information 
Systems, ethnography, document research, and remote sensing to analyze mapping, 
logging, and coca cultivation within four borderland watersheds.  These data were 
combined with regional data on coca eradication, resource concessions, conservation 
units, and indigenous territories from both Brazil and Peru.  Field-based results 
demonstrate these borderlands to be highly contested and poorly mapped with an 
exploitative and poorly managed timber industry and a dynamic front of coca cultivation 
contributing to social disruption and environmental degradation.  More fieldwork is 
needed to generate the geographic information necessary for sustainable development and 
conservation planning and to help local people defend their territory from illegal 
operators and the imposition of state resource concessions.  Ecological Economic Zoning 
is recommended as a participatory policy framework to improve geographic information 
and long term planning. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation focuses on contested resource management in the Amazon 
borderlands shared by Peru and Brazil.  My three studies of resource mapping, logging, 
and coca demonstrate the surprisingly high level of resource extraction and conflict, and 
highlight the importance of improved geographic information for conservation, 
development, and the self determination efforts of local people.  Local people are at the 
heart of this research as their detailed knowledge of place and resources stands in stark 
contrast to the limited geographic information available to decision makers in Lima and 
Brasilia.  The local level focus also provides an opportunity to document how local 
people are coping with the challenges of competing resource extraction initiatives led by 
outsiders. 
In this first chapter, I broadly situate the dissertation within theoretical, historical, 
and geographical space.  The first section briefly describes my personal history with the 
Amazon borderlands and the discipline of geography.  The following section introduces 
the dissertation’s basis in empirical fieldwork, and cultural and political ecology with 
three brief sub-sections devoted to the chapter themes of mapping, timber, and coca.  The 
third section underscores the importance of the Amazon borderlands and the relatively 
small amount of fieldwork that has been undertaken in these areas.  The next section 
outlines the specific borderland research site, its inhabitants, and the methodologies used 
 2
in this dissertation.   Finally, the introduction concludes with a recent history of the 
Brazil-Peru border, useful to identify historical antecedents to the current borderland 
situation. 
II. BACKGROUND TO A FRONTIER FIELD STUDY 
Since childhood I have been fascinated with exploration, discovery, and the 
frontier regions of the world.  As a boy, I ate at a kitchen table surrounded by framed 
maps of the world.  My best friend and I used to kneel on the kitchen chairs and point out 
all the places we were going to explore.  My own favorites were the Northwest 
Territories of Canada, the Congo, Franz Josef Land, and the Amazon.  Years later, in 
1997, I finally saved enough money and traveled to the Amazon to visit my uncle, an 
ecologist in Rio Branco, Acre.  Once there, I became interested in the cultural dynamics 
of resource management in this Brazilian frontier state bordering both Bolivia and Peru.   
Three years later I returned to Acre to conduct fieldwork for my Master’s thesis in 
a small rubber tapper community in the Brazilian Amazon borderlands.  Borderlands are 
territorial regions surrounding state1 boundaries with the Amazon borderlands including 
boundary regions of the nine nation states of Amazonia2.   This fieldwork opened my 
eyes to both the dynamism of borderland livelihoods and the state’s3 inadequate 
geographic information (Salisbury 2002).  One of my personal goals while in the area 
was to travel to the Peruvian border and explore the Serra do Divisor National Park.  
Unfortunately, time constraints prevented me from getting there.  Two years later, in 
2002, I did receive an opportunity to investigate the Peruvian side, although initially not 
along the Sierra del Divisor.  My pre-dissertation fieldwork plans in Madre de Dios, Peru, 
were thwarted when loggers went on strike, blocking roads, burning the offices of Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and making any sort of ethnographic fieldwork 
impossible.  Giving up Madre de Dios, I traveled to the neighboring region of Ucayali 
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where I was able to join a scientific expedition headed by a cadre of conservation 
biologists.  The next day we dropped into the Alto Purús watershed by propeller plane, 
and eventually boated into headwaters populated only by indigenous people in voluntary 
isolation and illegal loggers.  This month long voyage retraced the boundary delimiting 
expedition of Euclides da Cunha (Comisión Mixta Purús y Yuruá 1906) complete with 
my own solo exit downriver into Brazil.  On my return to the United States I wrote about 
the livelihood choices available to the local borderland inhabitants (Fagan and Salisbury 
2003).   
Based on my contributions on the Purús, I was asked by the Field Museum to join 
them in their October, 2002 helicopter overflights of the Sierra del Divisor.  Their goal 
was to use the cartographic and ecological data generated by these overflights to 
influence the Peruvian state to declare a national park.  While this was a rewarding 
experience, our methods were primarily remote sensing and not on-the-ground fieldwork.  
My bird’s eye views left me hungering for the opportunity to walk the landscape and talk 
to the people in the forests below.  To this end I began thinking about a longer term, 
field-based study of the Sierra del Divisor as my dissertation project. 
III. FRAMEWORK TO A BORDERLAND FIELD STUDY 
The goal of this dissertation is to improve our understanding of this poorly 
understood borderland and its people through inductive research and on-the-ground 
fieldwork.  My twelve years of experience traveling and researching in Latin America 
taught me to be flexible in the field and wary of adhering too closely to overarching 
theories.  Likewise, in Amazonia, plans can change quickly and often do, making a total 
commitment to the testing or proving of any one theory a risky proposition.  This may be 
nowhere more true than the borderlands.  Thus, my borderland research emphasizes 
cultural geography’s long tradition of field-based inquiry (Sauer 1956), as well as cultural 
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ecology’s reliance on progressive contextualization (Vayda 1983) and participatory 
mapping (Herlihy and Knapp 2003). 
I understand human-environment relationships as a cultural ecology of three 
complementary forms: functional, behavioral, and structuralist (Butzer 1994, Butzer 
2001).  Each form interplays with the others with the latest form, structuralist cultural 
ecology, an alternate name for the more popular term, political ecology (Butzer 2001).  I 
use behavioral cultural ecology’s emphasis on person-to-person field investigation to 
discover explanations through progressive contextualization: an inductive approach 
prioritizing causal explanation of human-environment interaction and events4.  Cultural 
ecology’s emphasis on local knowledge allowed access to the community sphere where 
formerly hidden borderland narratives are heard, geographic knowledge is constructed 
and contested, and conflicts over resource access, property rights, and coca eradication 
are played out.  The contributions of activist political ecology are also critical to the 
research, given my focus on counter maps and counter narratives.  Counter maps are an 
alternative or protest to established notions or official representations of a landscape 
(Peluso 1995: 387). 
My goal in this dissertation was to explore the Amazon borderlands and 
experience the most remote areas (perhaps the least understood) of the Amazon region 
through observation and ethnographic study of local resource users.  I strongly agree with 
Sauer, Parsons, Butzer, Doolittle and other geographers on the importance of fieldwork to 
geographical research (Butzer 1989, DeLyser and Starrs 2001, Doolittle 2001, Parsons 
1977, Sauer 1956, West 1979); indeed, fieldwork is why I became a geographer.  Thus, I 
eagerly entered the Amazon borderlands to practice my geographical craft through 
exploration and discovery (Parsons 1977), direct observation (Sauer 1956), and 
interviews with local people (West 1979), all with maps and documents in hand (Sauer 
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1941).  While I knew this fieldwork would contribute valuable baseline data currently 
unavailable, I continued to entertain multiple theories the data might inform (Chamberlin 
1890).  For example, Schmink and Wood’s (1992: 19) study of the Southeastern 
Brazilian Amazon (Southern Pará) argues Amazonian frontiers to be contested among 
groups capable of assembling varying degrees of power while Santos-Granero and 
Barclay’s (2000: 308, 321) study of the Northern Peruvian Amazon (greater Loreto) finds 
their Amazonian frontier tamed given state intervention has suppressed the negative traits 
characteristic of Amazonian frontier economies.  In addition, McSweeney (2004: 638, 
656) has shown how empirical research in remote locations, in her case the dynamic 
nature of rural trade networks, can provide insight into unanticipated processes at work in 
localities.  Similar insight could prove useful in Amazonia, where development has more 
often been projected from the outside rather than informed from within the region 
(Bunker 1983, Hecht 2004, Schmink and Wood 1992).  What is the dialectic between 
local borderlanders and the goals outsiders project?  I was also curious how the existing 
maps of the areas might or might not reflect the physical and human landscapes of the 
borderlands.  How does the geographic knowledge of borderlanders compare with the 
existing maps of their borderlands?  
In seeking to answer these questions I talked to a borderland people whose local 
knowledge5 of place and ecology has proved critical to detect and extract valuable natural 
resources such as rubber, mahogany, and cinchona (Coomes 1995), locate unique species 
and habitats (da Cunha and Almeida 2002), show colonists how to live in these new 
environments (Moran 1993), and demarcate political boundaries (López 1925, Tastevin 
1926).  Despite these contributions, I also found a people marginalized by state 
indifference6.  Historically, nation state knowledge of the physical and human geography 
of the borderlands has been limited.  This state indifference or even deliberate neglect 
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was acceptable to borderlanders fleeing from slave raids, debt peonage, and even 
genocide.  More recently, however, both state and non-state interest in borderland 
resources and territory increased while state indifference or convenient neglect of local 
residents continued.  The state’s lack of geographic knowledge of, and interest in the 
borderlanders facilitated the projection of state resource concessions on local homelands 
and the arrival of illegal operators such as coca farmers and loggers seeking to exploit 
local resources and labor.  
This is the latest chapter in a long history of Amazonian exploitation of resources 
ranging from drogas do sertão, brazilwood, spices, rosewood, cinchona, vegetable ivory, 
jute, petroleum, mahogany, gold, skins, aquarium fish, butterflies, and coca to even 
humans (Cleary 2001, Coomes 1995, Hemming 1978).  This study follows a research 
tradition of cultural and political ecologists investigating the exploitation of Amazonian 
resources (Bunker 1985, Sweet 1974), the exploitation of Amazonian labor (Barham and 
Coomes 1996, Romanoff 1992), and local resistance to exploitation (Hecht and Cockburn 
1990, Schmink and Wood 1992).  In the following three sub-sections I will address 
previous contributions to this research tradition through the borderland study of mapping, 
timber, and coca.  Mapping is a critical component of frontier resource exploitation and a 
logical subject for this field-based inquiry.  Among the many Amazonian resources, I 
have chosen to focus on the cultural and political ecology of timber and coca due to their 
economic and ecological importance to both the borderlands and borderland livelihoods.  
While geographers have conducted research on both Amazonian timber (Arima et al. 
2005, Asner et al. 2006, Hoy 1946, White 1978) and coca (Henkel 1971, 1995, Young 
1996, 2004a, 2004b), the nature and degree of exploitation of these resources remains 
understudied in a borderland characterized by inadequate geographic information. 
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A. Mapping 
Inadequate geographic information is not unique to this Amazonian research site.  
Brown et al. (1995) points out that the basic maps in many developing countries are out-
of-date, inaccurate, inadequate in detail, or all three.  Similarly, Herlihy and Knapp’s 
(2003: 306) discussion of participatory mapping in Latin America found existing maps of 
indigenous lands in Latin America to have poor cartographic coverage.  Small and 
medium scale maps lack detail while large scale topographic maps are outdated or 
incorrect (Herlihy and Knapp: 306).  These findings echoed research in the Peruvian 
Amazonia where Smith et al. (1999) found the 1:250,000 scale official maps contained 
on-the-ground errors greater than 500 meters (1999: 12), with the majority of indigenous 
community land title maps difficult to find (1999: 16) and not georeferenced (1999: 12).  
Given the lack of an official digital map of the Peruvian Amazon, the Instituto del Bien 
Común7 is currently digitizing Peru’s higher quality 1:100,000 topographic sheets (cartas 
nacionales) in order to incorporate and update indigenous territories (Smith et al. 2003: 
361).  Despite the higher quality of the cartas nacionales, the Instituto del Bien Común’s 
fieldwork has begun to find the location and name of settlements to be of dubious 
reliability on these large scale topographic maps (Smith et al. 2003: 362).  While Herlihy 
and Knapp (2003: 306) declare Latin American government census maps more reliable 
than topographic maps for up-to-date settlement data, they also recognize census workers 
to be notoriously unreliable in remote areas often placing misinformation or blank spaces 
on census maps of these regions. 
Herlihy and Knapp (2003: 306) propose that blank spaces on official maps could 
represent a state strategy of ignoring resident indigenous populations in order to maintain 
remote lands for national resource exploitation.  If true, this cartographic strategy of 
imposing blankness repeats colonial efforts silencing native presence in the Americas 
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(Harley 1992: 531) and Africa (Bassett 1994: 324).  The documentation of such a 
deliberate strategy would provide a cartographic manifestation of Hecht’s Amazonian 
tabula rasa (2004).  In a similar vein, Almeida’s book, Carajás: a Guerra dos Mapas, 
contends that the Brazilian state’s unwillingness to update base data, disinterest in local 
level studies, and corresponding disdain for their own official maps and inventories 
served as a deliberate strategy of marginalization and social control in Brazil’s Legal 
Amazon (1993: 328-9).  The confusion caused by this cartographic vacuum resulted in 
overlapping claims, territorial invasions, and resource exploitation favoring colonists and 
illegal operators over traditional populations (Almeida 1993: 328, Monteiro 1994: 6).  
While my field-based research lacks the institutional ethnographies necessary to uncover 
such a convoluted state strategy, the comparison of maps with field data can verify the 
maps’ degree of accuracy in representing populations (both traditional and colonist), 
governmental and non-governmental projects, and the natural landscape.  In the next 
chapter I analyze national topographic maps, national resource maps, national census 
maps, municipal maps, maps of the Instituto del Bien Común, and locally informed 
participatory maps to evaluate the accuracy of these cartographic representations of the 
landscape.  Is the geographic information inadequate?  If so, what might be some of the 
reasons and what are the consequences of inadequate information on the ground?   
Participatory mapping is a term used to refer to a broad range of community-
based research and development approaches that incorporate local people to map their 
own lands (Herlihy and Knapp 2003: 306).  Other terms used are community mapping, 
and counter mapping when these participatory maps are created as an alternative or 
protest to established notions or official representations of a landscape (Peluso 1995: 
387).  Participatory mapping aligns closely with the concerns of cultural and political 
ecology through their shared goals of understanding complex and mutable human-
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environment relationships (Herlihy and Knapp 2003: 308).  The participatory mapping 
process can progressively contextualize and construct geographical knowledge at 
multiple scales (Herlihy and Knapp 2003: 308).  This bottom up methodology favors 
behavioral cultural ecology more than a structuralist political ecology approach due to its 
emphasis on local empirical knowledge over deductivist approaches for explanation.  
Nevertheless, the results of counter mapping, namely empirically based counter 
narratives, have potential to be powerful weapons against the hegemonic discourses and 
structural constraints commonly addressed by activist political ecology.   
Sletto (n.d.: 30) captured local counter narratives to the tabula rasa through 
Pemón counter maps.  Antonio, a Pemón elder, recounted in 2003, “the e’ne (outsiders) 
have forced indigenous people to live in small sites, … when they see all that empty 
space (where indigenous people don’t live), they say, ‘Why do indigenous people need 
these lands, since they don’t live in these empty spaces?” (Sletto n.d.: 30).  Similary, 
Rafael, another Pemón elder said in 2002, “We need to put down everything, because in 
the future, if we leave spaces open, the people who work in tourism might take them from 
us.” (Sletto n.d.: 29).  Thus, Sletto (n.d.) has captured the dialectic between local 
geographic knowledge and the tabula rasa meta-narrative through a participatory 
mapping process.  Indeed, ironically, he records the Pemón choosing to cartographically 
silence signs of state domination in their map through the non-representation of power 
plants, park structures, and military posts (Sletto n.d.: 46). 
The power, popularity, and potential of participatory mapping is reflected in the 
number of participatory mapping endeavors extant and the growing body of literature 
analyzing its strengths and weaknesses.  King’s (2002) comparison of ten case studies in 
the developing world, Herlihy and Knapp’s (2003) discussion of participatory mapping 
endeavors in Latin America, and Hodgson and Schroeder’s (2002) review of four 
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counter-mapping projects in Tanzania are just a few recent examples.  This introduction 
points out some of the major strengths and weaknesses of the participatory mapping 
genre.   
Participatory mapping validates local geographical knowledge and potentially 
makes it accessible to everyone from the most marginalized local resident to the 
Presidents of nation-states.  According to Smith et al. (2003: 341), these maps based on 
local knowledge have the potential to be some of this century’s best research on both the 
cultural and natural landscape.  The cartographic products can have “scientific value” 
(Chapin at al. 1995: 33), and are thus increasingly accepted by policy makers (Herlihy 
and Knapp 2003: 310), scientists (Herlihy 2003: 328, Saragoussi et al. 1999: 4; Stocks 
2003: 354), and international courts (MacDonald 2002: 66).  The map products serve to 
improve dialogue between communities and outsiders even as the process empowers 
communities and educates both researchers and community members (Herlihy and Knapp 
2003: 309).  Indeed, the mapping process can not only empower local communities 
(Nietschmann 1995: 37, Poole 1995), but also marginalized fractions within those 
communities (Dana 1998: 41, Rocheleau 1995).       
Over the years, researchers (Herlihy and Knapp 2003, Hodgson and Schroeder 
2002, King 2002, Poole 1995) have documented a variety of uses of the participatory 
mapping approach including, for example: 1) gaining recognition of land rights; 2) 
designing conservation plans; 3) gathering and guarding traditional knowledge; 4) 
surveying biodiversity; 5) protecting and managing conservation units and indigenous 
reserves; 6) building consensus and promoting conflict resolution; 7) providing baseline 
geographic data; 8) demarcating land claims and titles; 9) empowering and educating 
communities; and 9) promoting and protecting cultural diversity.  Herlihy and Knapp 
recognize the range of uses for participatory mapping and divide it into two variants with 
 11
Participatory Action Research Mapping focusing on social action and the mapping 
process and Participatory Research Mapping focusing on research and the map product 
(2003: 307).  The line separating these variants is a fuzzy one, if a boundary exists at all, 
given the inherently subjective nature of maps (Wright 1942) and the indivisibility of 
cultural context and cartographic technique (Harley 1988, Harley 1989) regardless of 
goals of “…Western-style accuracy, validity, and standardization…” (Herlihy and Knapp 
2003: 307).  Indeed, Fox (2002: 76) finds striking similarities in how indigenous 
perceptions of space in 19th century Siam and a late 20th century Cambodian village are 
altered by the Western spatial paradigm though modern mapping exercises.  Regardless 
of goals, uses, or methodology, mapping is an inherently political and cultural process 
(Harley 1988, 1989, 1992).  As such, the process should be weighed equally with the map 
product (Sletto n.d.: 48). 
Given the complex nature of the mapping enterprise, it is not surprising that 
researchers have found a number of limitations and negative impacts associated with 
participatory mapping.  Some of these critiques have centered on community reliance on 
external funding, “experts”, agendas, and Western spatial paradigms, epistemologies, and 
worldviews (Dana 1998: 34, Fox 2002: 66, King 2002: 50, Kosek 1998: 5, Peluso 1995, 
384, Poole 1995, Rundstrom 1995: 45, 1998: 7).  The resulting maps can freeze 
indigenous conceptions of resource and land tenure, replacing open, inclusive, and 
dynamic systems with networks of static and divisive boundaries (Fox 2002: 66, Peluso 
1995: 400, Rundstrom 1995: 52).  These fixed and visible boundaries can stoke tensions 
previously mitigated by cognitive maps characterized by blurred and fuzzy boundaries 
(Dana 1998: 34, Fox 1998: 3, Peluso 1995: 401).  In some cases, researchers have 
addressed this issue through cartographic representations of boundary uncertainty (Dana 
1998: 40; Salisbury 2002: 114, 161) or the choice of low accuracy GPS technology (Dana 
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1998: 34).  Place names, sacred sites, and even the physical geography of place, often 
fluid and ambiguous in indigenous conceptions of space, can also be frozen in the final 
product (Rundstrom 1995: 49, 52, Rundstrom 1998: 8).  
While the map product can create friction among communities and community 
members, the process itself can also be divisive.  The creation of a mapper class can upset 
the long standing social and political dynamics of communities as younger, more 
educated and, in some cases, urbanized community members gain power through the 
mapping process (Dana 1998: 41, Flavelle 1995: 73, Peluso 1995: 387, 399).  Indeed, just 
as the mapping process can be a means to include, it can also consolidate power in the 
hands of the dominant members of a community (Kosek 1998: 5) and exacerbate power 
divisions by overlooking the claims of women, the elderly and other vulnerable members 
of society (Edmunds et al. 1995, Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997).  A central question is 
who is engaged in the mapping process?  Community participation does not necessarily 
equate to a participatory process (Chambers 1994) and availability of mapping 
technology to disempowered groups in a community does not necessarily equate to their 
utility by those groups (King 2002: 46).  Both inter- and intra-community frictions 
brought about by the participatory mapping process are often a result of the mapping 
organization’s simplistic notions of the community as a homogenous, bounded entity 
rather than a complex collection of individuals with ties to both each other and the 
outside world (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Kosek 1998: 5).  The community map, like all 
maps, also takes on a life of its own after its creation.  The cultural relevance of the map 
decreases as it moves farther away, in both space and time, from the landscape mapped.  
“…when these maps enter the international flows of ideas and knowledges they have 
moved beyond the grasp of marginalized peoples…” (Sletto n.d.: 47).  Gordon et al. 
(2003: 378-9) stress the fluid and constructed nature of identity that, while delicately 
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balanced with a particular participatory mapping process, will continue evolving as the 
static map remains the same.  Who controls the map, the updating process, and the data 
within is thus, a critical factor in the balance of power of participatory mapping (Chapin 
1998: 7, Fox 2002: 77).  This can be particularly important if the local knowledge 
embedded in these maps is merely a “resource” for the global development project rather 
than a valued contribution from a long overlooked but now validated alternative 
information source (Sletto 2005: 90). 
Despite these critiques, participatory mapping is here to stay as is its capacity to 
simultaneously empower and marginalize (Harris and Weiner 1998, 69).  Both mapping 
process and map product are too powerful and accessible to be ignored in a world of 
inequality where the choice often comes down to whether to be recognized or obscured 
(Peluso 1995: 403), to map or be mapped (Stone 1998: 54).  If then, as Fox (2002: 76) 
contends, there is no choice but to map, the mappers must face the responsibility that 
comes with an improved understanding of the inherently political and cultural nature of 
both the participatory mapping process and map product.  One of these responsibilities is 
to maintain in perpetuam the participatory mapping project as these maps must be 
updated and dynamic to reflect the changing cultures, use, resources, and landscape.  In 
Latin America, where mapping has usually been a state enterprise (Herlihy and Knapp 
2003: 310) a carefully crafted participatory mapping process may be the only effective 
counter narrative to the “imagined countrysides” of the nation state (Orlove 1991: 31-2).  
Nevertheless, the process must address these structural forces specifically as the full 
emancipatory potential of participatory mapping can only be reached if the process is 
accompanied by legal and political strategies (Hodgson and Schroeder 2002: 96) capable 
of engaging policy makers (King 2002: 49).  Without a larger political will, participatory 
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mapping may be of limited utility even in a remote borderlands characterized by 
inadequate geographic information, exploitation, and marginalization. 
B. Timber 
Scientists investigating the nature and impact of the Amazon timber industry are 
increasingly aware of the complex human-environment dynamics necessary for 
sustainable forest management (Blundell and Gullison 2003, Lima et al. 2006, Zarin et al. 
2004).  Researchers grapple with these dynamics through a wide range of debates 
including the appropriate methodologies for research (Peres et al. 2005), the role of 
indigenous reserves in halting deforestation (Nepstad et al. 2006), and the effectiveness 
of new legislation in slowing illegal logging (Blundell and Gullison 2003, Smith et al. 
2006) among others.  This study’s analysis of the cultural ecology of the borderland 
timber industry informs these debates with empirically grounded data from one of the 
least studied portions of the Amazon basin.    
Hoy’s 1946 description of the mahogany industry of Peru’s Iquitos region found 
the hardwood already extirpated from the most accessible rivers and the industry 
constrained both by a lack of shipping and a shortage of labor despite healthy wartime 
markets (Hoy 1946: 9, 13).  Upriver, on the Ucayali, the timber industry boomed when 
the 1943 completion of the Pucallpa-Lima road improved access to international markets 
(Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000: 194).  The Brazilian Amazon timber trade also 
responded favorably to improved infrastructure.  In Brazil, extraction was largely limited 
to the banks of major rivers until the 1970s when improved roads and favorable 
governmental policies improved access to markets (Lima et al. 2006, Scholz 2001).  
Increased accessibility, access to labor and growing demand led to a surge in selective 
logging and logging associated deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon from the 1970s to 
the mid-1990s (Lima et al. 2006).  This surge reached to the Brazilian border with Peru 
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where loggers illegally removed thousands of trees from the Asháninka8 homelands of 
Apiwtxa between 1982 and 1990 (CEDI 1993).  These invasions galvanized the 
Asháninka to obtain title to their lands to resist further incursions (Pimenta 2002).  Since 
the mid-1990s, the Brazilian Amazon’s timber frontier has consolidated along older 
fronts with some renewed expansion along younger more remote fronts where high value 
hardwoods such as mahogany and tropical cedar remain (Lima et al. 2006).  The 
continued illegal logging of mahogany and other hardwoods led Brazil to ban the 
mahogany trade in 2001 (Kometter et al. 2004: 8), reject all forest management plans on 
lands without property rights in 2003 (Lima et al. 2006: 30), and create new forest 
legislation and concessions in 2005 (Asner et al. 2006, ITTO 2005).  These measures and 
the dwindling stock of mahogany in both Brazil and Bolivia led Peru to become the 
world’s largest exporter of mahogany (Kometter et al. 2004). 
Despite being the largest exporter of mahogany, Peru’s stock of commercially 
viable mahogany (trees > 60 cm diameter at breast height) was also in decline as of 2004 
(Kometter et al. 2004).  With commercially viable mahogany and other high value 
species largely inaccessible, loggers penetrated into the borderlands, indigenous reserves, 
and national parks for the last large trees.  Due to the inaccessibility of these areas the 
loggers’ methods remain remarkably similar to those observed in the mid-1970s (White 
1978).  White’s (1978) study of cedar and mahogany extraction in Amazonian Peru 
revealed a rudimentary and selective logging system with minimal environmental impacts 
given the limited external demand at the time.  With both external and internal demand 
for tropical timber now high, geographers and ecologists focused less on the cultural 
ecology of Amazonian timber extraction and more on the larger scale impacts of logging 
and logging associated practices (Arima et al. 2005, Asner et al. 2005, Asner et al. 2006, 
Nepstad et al. 1999).  These large scale studies use GIS and remote sensing modeling 
 16
techniques to demonstrate the widespread degradation caused by logging (Asner et al. 
2005, Nepstad et al. 1999) including the logging related expansion of road networks 
(Arima et al. 2005, Asner et al. 2006).  Meanwhile, Peres et al. (2006: 229) warn that 
while improved techniques and imagery are producing quantifiable results of forest 
degradation, anthropogenic disturbance of Amazonian forests continues to be 
underestimated.  Perhaps also underestimated are the impacts logging and other forms of 
forest degradation have on the indigenous inhabitants of the forest (Veríssimo et al. 1995, 
Watson 1996).  What are the relationships between indigenous people, their homelands, 
and logging in the borderlands?  Faced with continued forest degradation by loggers, 
some ecologists even argue that funding for ecological studies of timber and timber 
management should be refocused towards interdisciplinary studies that could improve the 
regulation of logging and forest use (Blundell and Gullison 2003: 402).  This study’s 
cultural ecology approach to Peru’s tropical timber industry provides the grounded 
empirical information at the source of extraction that is necessary to complement large 
scale quantitative studies in poorly understood regions.  
Arima et al. (2005) and Asner et al. (2006) among others find Amazonian logging 
to be positively correlated with road creation and deforestation.  Meanwhile, Nepstad et 
al. (2006: 65) argue that indigenous reserves are “the most important barrier to Amazon 
deforestation.  Studies of logging within indigenous reserves may then shed light on just 
how strong a barrier these reserves are.  Chapter Two’s analysis of the tropical timber 
industry’s interface with the borderland Asháninka provides an opportunity to compare 
logging within an indigenous reserve and a neighboring untitled indigenous homeland.  Is 
the indigenous reserve more effective than the untitled homeland in preventing logging 
and potentially logging related deforestation?   
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Both timber researchers and South American policy makers are trying to decide 
whether logging and conservation can be reconciled in Amazonia (Zarin et al. 2004).  
Despite continued disagreement between researchers over whether selective logging is 
simply forest degradation or a strategic means to protect standing forest (Putz 2004), 
Amazonian policy makers have largely opted for selective logging.  This is reflected in 
recent forest legislation in Bolivia (1996 Forestry Law), Peru (2001 Forestry and Wildlife 
Law), and Brazil (2005 Law for the Sustainable Management and Production of Public 
Forests) (Putz et al. 2004, Paniagua 2001, ITTO 2005).  Each of these laws designates 
large tracts of Amazonian forests as timber concessions and national forests, relying on 
historically weak government institutions for monitoring and enforcement of sustainable 
forest stewardship (Smith et al. 2006).  Peru’s previous forestry law failed to improve 
logging practices due in part to the disconnect between governance and norms (Smith et 
al. 2006).  Can the new Peruvian forestry law overcome the existing history of 
governance failures or does the new legislation merely mask pervasive problems in 
Peruvian logging practices?   This study’s analysis of the logging practices at the source 
of production promises useful data to evaluate the long term potential of selective logging 
in remote Amazonian forests. 
C. Coca 
Extensive research exists on the global drug trade, drug use and drug eradication 
(Allen 2005, Menzel 1996, Thoumi 2003), but few studies analyze the social and 
environmental complexities taking place at the source of cultivation and production.  
Steinberg et al.’s (2004) edited volume, Dangerous Harvest, is a notable exception and 
examines the transformation of indigenous landscapes by the drug trade and the complex 
ties that exist between local farmers and their drug crops.  My analysis of coca follows in 
this geographic tradition, seeking to provide insight into coca cultivation in Amazonia. 
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Young (2004b: 366) calls on geographers to join the search for explanation of the 
environmental degradation and social disruption caused by the cultivation and traffic of 
coca and coca derivatives.  Allen (2005) notes the need for geographic analysis to 
overcome the scarcity of meaningful quantitative and qualitative data (117) and interpret 
the disparate facts and relationships influencing the cocaine trade (131).  Here, I answer 
these calls for coca-related geographic research, using empirical data to examine the 
environmental and social impacts of coca cultivation in the Amazon borderlands. 
This examination builds on the geographical research of Young (1995, 2004a, 
2004b) and Henkel (1971, 1986, 1993) who have investigated the impacts of coca 
cultivation in two of the world’s largest coca growing areas: Peru’s Huallaga Valley and 
Bolivia’s Chaparé province, repectively.  In contrast, my fieldwork involved an area 
where coca cultivation was unrecognized by both historical ethnobotanical surveys 
(Plowman 1984) and recent maps by the United Nation’s Office of Drug Control (2005c).  
Given the almost total absence of information, this study provides meaningful data 
concerning the characteristics, distribution, and impacts of borderland coca cultivation.  
For example, are the characteristics of borderland coca cultivation dissimilar from those 
documented in the Andean foothills of Peru?  What is the distribution and chronology of 
coca cultivation in the borderlands? 
The empirical nature of the data also allows a substantive treatment of the social 
and environmental impacts of coca cultivation.  Understanding these impacts is of 
particular importance in an area of high cultural and ecological diversity where social and 
environmental conditions are distinct from those documented in Colombia (Fjeldsa et al. 
2005), Peru (Young 2004a) and Bolivia (Henkel 1993).  In addition to understanding 
social and environmental conditions, a cultural ecological analysis of coca cultivation 
must also include a treatment of larger political and economic forces.  The political, 
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economic, and military forces supporting the war on drugs have enormous influence on 
the decisions of local coca farmers.  Coca eradication is just one, albeit tangible, facet of 
these forces that cannot be disaggregated from the impacts of coca cultivation.  My coca 
chapter’s hypothesis is: coca eradication increases rather than mitigates the negative 
social and environmental impacts of coca cultivation in the Amazon borderlands. 
IV. AMAZON BORDERLANDS: EXTENSIVE ENIGMAS 
The Amazon borderlands are of increasing importance to national security, 
development, and conservation9 efforts as agricultural, extractive, and settlement 
activities advance towards nation state boundaries.  While Amazonian political 
boundaries10, like the rivers and ridgelines that help define them, defy precise 
measurement11, these borders extend for roughly 12,000 kilometers (as measured at 1:1 
Million scale) (Figure 1).  Since 1499, the desire for natural resources, and the associated 
ebb and flow of economic booms and busts, not only defined these lengthy borders, but 
also made their surrounding boundary lands12 repositories of cultural and biological 
diversity, as indigenous groups sought refuge from correrías (slave raids) or were 
abandoned by patrones (exploitative bosses) and species avoided detection or had a 
chance to escape and recover from exploitation in these distant boundary havens.  Figure 
2 shows the extent of these remote borderlands13.  This dissertation uses the 150 km wide 
Brazilian legal designation of faixa de fronteira (Direito & Justiça Informática Ltda 
2006) to define the borderlands in Figure 2.  This definition results in an estimate of 23 
million square kilometers; a web of borderlands larger than the combined area of 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Norway, and the United Kingdom.  The amount of these 
borderlands protected by indigenous territories and conservation units, as seen in Figure 
2, underscores the region’s rich cultural and biological diversity.  While others may  
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Figure 1. The Amazonian political boundaries cross 12,000 km of lowland Amazon rainforest.
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Figure 2.  The 23 million km² Amazon Borderlands include some of the earth’s areas richest in ecological and cultural diversity.
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define borderlands differently, there is no denying the borderlands’ wealth of cultural and 
biological diversity and their great importance to conservation. 
In spite of this importance, and rapidly increasing interest in transboundary road 
building and development in Amazonia (Brown et al. 2002, Conover 2003, IIRSA 2006, 
Madre de Dios 2006), these borderlands remain enigmatic.  While research abounds on 
Amazonian frontiers (Becker 1999, Hecht and Cockburn 1990, Santos-Granero and 
Barclay 2000, Schmink and Wood 1992) and Latin American borders (Augelli 1980, 
Arreola and Curtis 1993, Dana 1992, Girot and Nietschmann 1992, Herzog 1992, Herzog 
2000, House 1982, Liverman et al. 1999), Amazonian borders themselves have received 
scant attention (Chaumeil 1992, Elbow 1996, Radcliffe 1998, Roux 2001, Seiler-
Baldinger 1981, St. John 1999).  This is likely, in part, due to their remote nature, lack of 
basic geographical information, challenging field conditions, and the difficulty 
ofconstructing a theoretical framework for their study.  It was only as recently as 1978 
that the Amazonian countries (Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, 
Guyana, and Suriname) signed the Amazon Treaty of Cooperation to “undertake joint 
actions and efforts to promote the harmonious development of their respective 
Amazonian territories in such a way that these joint actions produce equitable and 
mutually beneficial results and also achieve the preservation of the environment, and the 
conservation and rational use of the natural resources of these territories.” (TCA 
Secretaria 2002: 15).  Following establishment, the Organization of the Amazon Treaty 
of Cooperation (OTCA) met frequently, but it is only since the twelve South American 
presidents met in 2000 and created the Initiative for the Integration of Regional 
Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA) that the OTCA gained weight within the central 
governments.   
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IIRSA’s goal is to integrate the continent of South America with transportation, 
energy, and telecommunications networks in order to achieve sustainable development 
while establishing the continent as a geo-economic territory capable of competing within 
the new globalized economic order (IIRSA 2006).  To reach these goals IIRSA prioritizes 
ten transboundary integration hubs, four of which include a portion of the Amazon basin.  
Work has moved quickly on these Amazonian hubs, in some cases with mixed reactions 
by borderland peoples unused to huge infrastructure projects in their homelands.  The 
best example here is the tri-national/transboundary Madre de Dios, Acre, Pando (MAP) 
Initiative whose fifth MAP forum in 2004 registered 1,200 participants concerned about 
their rights of participation and equal access to information in IIRSA’s road building, 
energy and telecommunications projects (Madre de Dios 2006).  While the degree of 
participation and mobilization in the MAP region is impressive, participants in this 
relatively developed transboundary initiative declared the lack of information about 
neighboring countries of primary importance (Brown et al. 2002).  However, the 
following chapters argue that there is also a lack of information within each nation about 
the nature of their own frontiers. 
Through their book, Fronteras Domesticadas, Santos-Granero and Barclay (2000) 
have introduced a debate over Amazonian settlement frontiers as contested (Schmink and 
Wood 1992), or tamed (Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000).  Based on their study of 
Peru’s Loreto (and by extension Ucayali) region, they contend that Amazonian regional 
economies need not incessantly repeat a “violent and transient frontier character” 
(Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000: 5).  They find scholars (Bunker 1985, Foweraker 
1981, Ribeiro 1970, Schmink and Wood 1992) focusing on areas recently opened or 
reopened to colonization in the Brazilian Amazon to emphasize five features not present 
in the contemporary economies of Loreto and Ucayali (Santos-Granero and Barclay 
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2000: 4).  Santos-Granero and Barclay (2000) argue the following five negative frontier 
traits to have been “tamed” in Loreto and Ucayali and thus potentially suppressed or 
contained14 within other regions of the Amazon basin: 1) economies dependent on 
external capital and demand, 2) lack of local capital accumulation and emergence of a 
bourgeoisie, 3) presence of precapitalist social relations of production and exchange, 4) 
inability to generate permanent demographic fronts due to extractive character of 
economies, and 5) weak state presence or state subservience to private economic interests 
in frontier areas.  While my study has neither the longitudinal depth nor the economic 
emphasis of Fronteras Domesticadas it does take place within the Santos-Granero and 
Barclay study region and promises contemporary insight15 into the degree of 
domestication of four of the five traits above. 
Even as I analyze the possibility of my borderland research site being “tamed” 
(Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000) so must I also entertain the possibility of a contested 
borderlands (Schmink and Wood 1992).  Schmink and Wood (1992: 344) relied on field-
based methods to analyze fifteen years of frontier change (1976-1991) in Southern Pará, 
Brazil before coming to the conclusion that these changes were the net result of a contest 
for resources between social groups capable of marshalling varying forms and degrees of 
power.  Their multi-scalar analysis outlines the complexity of frontier power struggles 
contingent upon a dynamic alignment of economic, political, and social factors (Schmink 
and Wood: 344-5).  Schmink and Wood (1992) find both natives and newcomers (rubber 
tappers, ranchers, miners, and others) in the maelstrom of the many contradictory 
agendas of both state and federal agencies.  This vortex represents a multiplicity of 
simultaneous and overlapping contested frontiers with highly varied outcomes (Schmink 
and Wood 1992: 13, 19).  Within this complex contest for resources, Schmink and Wood 
argue for cautious optimism given the very complexity offers not only surprising and 
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unintended consequences (1992: 345, 349) for the ill-conceived project or policy (1992: 
346), but also opportunities for formerly marginalized groups to find common ground, 
mobilize power, and make strides towards the democratization of development and 
conservation (1992: 349, 353).  My own research lacks the multi-scalar scope and 
repeated field observations of Schmink and Wood, but does provide an opportunity to 
investigate the possibility of multiple contested frontiers given the range of resources and 
resource users studied in the borderland research site.      
V. THE CENTRAL BORDERLANDS OF PERU AND BRAZIL: RESEARCH SITE 
AND METHODOLOGY 
The central borderland research site lies along the ridgeline dividing the Ucayali 
and Juruá Rivers.  This ridge, called the Sierra del Divisor or Serra do Divisor is south of 
the geographically important and historically hard to locate origin of the Javarí River and 
north of the 09°24’42” geodesic parallel slicing off the headwaters of the Juruá River 
(Figure 3).   
Peru’s Ucayali region16 (102,000 km)17 contains an estimated 402,000 residents  
(INEI 2005) with over half living in the capital of Pucallpa.   Created in 1980 from a 
portion of Loreto department, this Amazonian region shares over 1,000 kilometers of 
border with Brazil with about half of this political boundary formed by the watershed 
divide between the Ucayali and Juruá Rivers.  Most of the Ucayali region lies east of the 
Ucayali River, and is the least understood portion.  This borderland area, similar to other 
frontiers in Amazonian Peru, has experienced, and continues to experience, intermittent 
economic booms centered around products like Panama hats, rubber, vegetable ivory, 
rosewood and, more recently, timber, gold, and coca (Coomes 1995, Santos-Granero and 
Barclay 2000), but has a weak government presence.  Violence is common with 
indigenous people, ribereños (riverside dwellers), colonists, coca farmers, loggers, 
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miners, drug traffickers, smugglers, and others largely following the frontier code 
observed by Colonel Portillo (1905a: 506) a century before: “there are no laws, there are 
no authorities…He who is strongest, who has the most rifles, is master of justice.”  
Similarly, in 1884, the Franciscan explorer, José Samanez y Ocampo (1980 [1885]: 78) 
observed of the Ucayali River, “In this virgin and beautiful region, disorder, apathy, and 
disdain for the law, have already established their disgraceful dominion.”   
Within these violent borderlands lies the study site: four right bank Ucayali 
tributaries with headwaters along the Brazilian boundary and Sierra del Divisor: the 
Callería, Utiquinía, Abujao, and Tamaya Rivers (Figure 3).  These rivers were chosen 
because they are neighbors, have their headwaters at the border, are poorly understood, 
are contained or adjacent to the Sierra del Divisor, and were of interest to a variety of 
institutions interested in the conservation and development of the area.  The land cover of 
the area is dominated by a dense terra firme humid tropical forest with várzea (seasonal 
floodplains) being the other principal land-cover (ONERN 1978).  The area’s climate is 
hot and humid, with a mean temperature of 25º Celsius and precipitation ranging between 
1,600 and 2,000 millimeters a year with a pronounced dry season falling between July 
and October.  The geology of the four watersheds is primarily made up of sedimentary 
formations, including Quaternary deposits in the floodplains, and Cretaceous rocks in the 
low mountain ranges forming the political boundary with Brazil (ONERN 1978).  
However, several igneous cones rise out of these sedimentary deposits.  These unusual 
and visually arresting volcanoes range in height from 500 meters to over 900 meters 
above sea level and date to about 5 million years ago (ONERN 1978) (Figure 4).  
The cultural geography of the study region is also very unusual given the presence 
of a diversity of cultures with a high degree of mobility.  The patchwork of ethnicities
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Figure 3.  The Central Borderlands between Peru and Brazil contains a great deal of cultural and biological diversity both inside and 
outside its protected areas.
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Figure 4.  A rare lowland volcano rises out of the rainforest near the Sierra del Divisor.  Photo: Pro Naturaleza.
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impacted by a range of settlement frontiers and allochthonous peoples is a microcosm of 
the Peruvian cultural diversity encapsulated in Knapp’s cultural map of Peru (Knapp 
1988).  In the borderlands, however, cultural influences cross international boundaries to 
blur and blend as Brazilians, Peruvians, and indigenous people penetrate the Sierra del 
Divisor and international boundary via varaderos (portage trails) bridging headwaters.  
Thus, as seen in Figure 3, the Kampa/Asháninka reside on both sides of the border.  Less 
obvious are other transboundary cultural groups such as the nomadic Isconahua18, an 
indigenous group in voluntary isolation, straddling the Sierra del Divisor.  Further 
downstream, in the more accessible Ucayali floodplains, lie numerous indigenous 
territories, primarily of the Shipibo Conibo19.  Brazilians are also well represented in 
towns along the middle and upper portions of the Tamaya, Abujao, Utiquinía, and 
Callería Rivers where they have worked for decades as loggers, hunters, miners, and 
farmers among other occupations.  One example is the Tamaya River town of Puerto 
Alegre whose largely Brazilian population was critical in the expulsion of the Sendero 
Luminoso, Shining Path, from the Peruvian borderlands (Comisión de la Verdad 2004a).  
Another example is the Military Rural Settlement Project three (UMAR 3).20  This small, 
extremely isolated frontier army post was established in the 1970s to expel Brazilian 
seringueiros (rubber tappers) tapping Peruvian trees and to bring Peruvians in as a 
frontera viva, or living border.  In 2004, only sixteen colonist families were present and 
one was a Brazilian family being recruited to become Peruvian.   
This is the only organized Military Settlement Project in the region, although the 
rivers are lightly populated with ribereños, indigenous people and colonists.  Settlements 
are usually small linear villages or isolated homesteads along riverbank bluffs or 
floodplain levees, mimicking pre-contact habitation (Denevan 1996).  Outside of the 
indigenous territories, inhabitants are a combination of longtime Amazonian residents 
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with a tradition of subsistence livelihoods, coca farmers who arrived since the 1970s, 
Brazilian settlers from Acre, and the occasional Asháninka or Shipibo household21.  I 
talked to many people in this area as I traveled up and down these rivers with my field 
assistants, but our most intensive field work took place within nine communities: four 
Asháninka, two Shipibo, two coca farmer, and one military settlement. 
The economy of the people living in the four watersheds is largely driven by 
extraction, particularly logging, with most agriculture devoted to subsistence with the 
notable, and lucrative, exception of coca cultivation.  The main market for timber, fish, 
game meat, palm fibers, agriculture and other products is the regional capital of Pucallpa, 
a city of over 300,000 connected by road with Lima.  Conservation, given the extremely 
high levels of biodiversity (Government of Acre 2000), is also of increasing interest, in 
part due to the nascent transboundary protected area mosaic formed by the Serra do 
Divisor National Park and the recently created Zona Reservada Sierra del Divisor22.  
These biodiversity conservation efforts complement the high levels of cultural and 
biological diversity represented in the indigenous territories of the Isconahua, Asháninka, 
and Shipibo Conibo peoples.  
This dissertation’s range of methodologies reflects the diversity present in the 
field site.  Overall, methods were necessarily based on the principle of progressive 
contextualization (Vayda 1983).  The initial funded proposal targeted a comparison of 
two Kaxinawá villages along the Purús River: one community in Brazil and one in Peru.  
This research was never realized as my application for research in Brazil was never fully 
processed.  The application was accepted contingent on the approval of the Conselho de 
Defesa Nacional according to the terms of article 4º, item I, of Decreto nº 98.830/90.  
This Conselho’s approval was required given that my research statement professed 
interest within Brazil’s boundary zone, faixa da fronteira, defined as a 150 km zone next 
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to the border.  However, only the President of the Republic can call the Conselho de 
Defesa Nacional, over which he presides, to session.  It is unlikely that a research 
proposal would ever fit into the agenda of such a session, and to date there has been no 
progress on the approval of field research on the Brazilian frontier. 
This research was initially funded with the Fulbright-Hays DDRA grant through 
both the offices of Brazil and Peru.  Fortunately I was able to work in Peru when the 
Brazilian approval failed to materialize.  Research consisted of ten months in the field 
between February and November of 2004.  After spending the first month in Brazil, 
doing archival work, I returned to Peru to conduct fieldwork.  Given the transboundary 
fieldwork was no longer possible, I redefined my research project in the field.  Luckily, I 
had developed contacts in Peru from 2002 pre-dissertation fieldwork.  My first action on 
returning to Peru23, was to travel to Pucallpa to attend the First Bi-National Meeting 
between Ucayali and Acre.  There, I was fortunate to informally24 present a 
transboundary map to the Peruvian Minister of Foreign Relations.  I never saw the map 
again, but later I found out it was used in a June, 2004, South American Regional 
Integration Initiative (IIRSA) presentation in Buenos Aires25.  This First Bi-National 
Meeting between Peru and Brazil demonstrated the need for transboundary research on 
the border between Ucayali and Acre and particularly across the Sierra del Divisor given 
Pucallpa, the capital of Ucayali’s, proximity to the Sierra del Divisor and desire to 
connect to Cruzeiro do Sul (Figure 3).  In order to capitalize on the interest generated by 
this meeting, my knowledge of the Brazilian side26, and my friend, Jorge Vela, Vice-
President of the Universidad Nacional de Ucayali (UNU), I presented a talk at the 
University entitled “Acre: Who is our Neighbor?”  This and other presentations in 
Pucallpa, Lima, and Brazil27 generated attention to the research and eventually led to 
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additional financing from the Nature Conservancy, Pronaturaleza, and the Universidad 
Nacional de Ucayali28. 
This interest led to signed agreements with UNU, Instituto del Bien Común, and 
the Regional Government of Ucayali29.  While, nothing came of the latter except strong 
friendships and useful contacts, Jorge Vela and I were able to found the Amazon 
Borderlands Research Center (CIFA) at the UNU, and the University provided me with 
four undergraduate research assistants, with me hiring one, to make five total.  While 
these developments added greatly to the scope of the work they also presented some 
immediate challenges.  Most significantly was how to transition the study from a 
community-level transboundary comparison with one investigator to a study 
encompassing four different Peruvian watersheds, six investigators, and the vested 
interests of four different institutions: the Nature Conservancy, Pronaturaleza, UNU, and 
the University of Texas-Austin. 
Research questions were adapted to satisfy all of the constituents and the new 
study site.  After some key informant interviews with government officials, conservation 
NGOs, and knowledgeable individuals, the most apparent problem concerning the central 
borderlands of Peru was the lack of geographical knowledge available to generate 
research topics and locally grounded conservation and development projects.  Therefore, 
the central research goal was to generate basic geographic information on livelihoods, 
resource, and land use using participatory methods grounded in political/cultural ecology.  
This would identify the conservation threats to and status of selected species for the 
Nature Conservancy and Pronaturaleza, provide a basic first step for Economic and 
Ecological Zoning for UNU (giving five students the opportunity to conduct fieldwork 
for their undergraduate theses), while providing data to write a dissertation. 
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The greatest difficulty at the conclusion of the fieldwork was which dissertation to 
write given the abundance of data generated.  Indeed, fieldwork provided so much data it 
was impossible to organize, catalog, and analyze all of it for one dissertation.  Here, I will 
briefly describe the general methods used in the general fieldwork30 before addressing the 
specific methods utilized primarily for the individual chapters of this dissertation.  This 
includes methods used in Peru and Brazil, but also research conducted upon my return to 
the United States.   
My initial research emphasis was on how livelihoods, land use, and resource use 
might be changing (from 1994 to 2014) and how this change might affect resources, 
landscape, and local people in the present and near future.  The majority of field research 
was carried out in nine borderland communities.  In order to capture changing land and 
resource use I studied each community in three rough periods of time: recalling the past 
10 years before fieldwork, the year of the fieldwork (2004), and forecasting 10 years after 
fieldwork.  These time horizons had proved useful for measuring change in my previous 
research (Salisbury 2002, Salisbury and Schmink n.d.), and the three day stay with each 
family allowed the researcher to gain the confidence of residents, and understand the 
respective households through their participation in household mapping, matrices of 
resources, historical timelines, and land use walks (Colfer et al. 1999; Salisbury 2002; 
Slocum et al. 1995).  Research also included the measuring of fields and the identification 
of all the crops they grew or sold.  The exception to this rule was coca, which was grown 
and sold in some communities, but never asked about directly to protect the safety of the 
investigators.   Additional efforts were spent understanding the community’s relation 
with other borderland residents or visitors, understanding the migratory history of 
residents, and understanding their income sources.  The combination of these methods 
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with ethnography, key informant interviews, and point collection allowed the researcher 
to overcome instrumentation effects common to the application of just one methodology. 
Each of the five research assistants was assigned one watershed with two assigned 
to the Abujao River.  Within every watershed each research assistant was assigned an 
initial community to study.  The first communities worked in were indigenous, given our 
strong contacts with the regional indigenous leaders and the fear, later well justified, that 
many of the non-indigenous communities were primarily dedicated to coca farming.  
After working in the first community, all but one assistant31 was assigned a second 
community to live in and study based on the information they were able to gain from 
their first community and the goals of the overall project.  Community choices were 
dictated by logistical concerns, such as accessibility and safety, but our goal was to 
research as close to the border as possible.  Within communities, research primarily took 
place at the household level.  Household selection was purposive rather than random, 
choosing specific households, in order to capture the diversity of geographical 
distribution, length of residence, gender and age of the community’s residents and 
households.  Most obviously research took place in households interested in opening up 
their homes to myself and my assistants.  My role as project manager was to train each of 
the investigators in our methodology before accompanying them in the field as lead 
investigator and ethnographer.  Before entering the field, I trained every assistant in 
ethnography, photography, point collection with a Global Positioning System (GPS), 
participant observation, and participatory methods: these included household mapping, 
matrices of resources, historical timelines, and land use walks32.  In addition, before 
entering the field preliminary analyses were conducted using remote sensing, 
documentary research, archival research, key informant interviews, and Geographic 
Information Science (GIS) in the urban centers of Pucallpa, Lima and Rio Branco. 
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This dissertation focuses on the three most provocative and important themes in 
this broad study of borderland livelihoods, land use, and resource use.  These themes are 
the inadequacy of existing geographical information, the social and environmental 
impacts of coca cultivation, and the complex relationship between illegal logging, the 
borderland Asháninka, and the political boundary.  The methods outlined in the previous 
paragraphs provided essential background information on these topics, but additional 
methods proved of even more importance.  These include the field methods described 
below by chapter and the computer and archival-based methods used on my return to the 
University of Texas’ Geography Department and Benson Latin American Collection.  
The Benson Latin American collection proved useful in tracking down historical records 
of explorers, anthropologists, indigenous groups, and boundary commissions.  In 
addition, ESRI’s ArcGIS 8.3 was used to analyze the length of Amazonian borders, the 
area of Amazon borderlands, logging, and coca cultivation. 
Chapter Two’s analysis of regional scale mapping and geographic information 
incorporated both field methods and documentary research conducted in Peru, and 
documentary research and cartography conducted on my return.  The most common way 
to get to the research sites consisted of round trip boat travel with some one way legs 
taking as long as seven consecutive days on the river.   During these boat trips, both 
upriver and downriver, the main course of each river, the mouths of important tributaries, 
and the larger population centers were mapped.  Researchers used Garmin Etrex Legend 
Global Positioning System receivers to record coordinate data and notebooks to 
document attribute information.  The team worked with community members in order to 
obtain local knowledge and cultural attribute information (such as logging sites, drug 
trafficking trails, population centers, and graveyards) to link to the GPS coordinates.  
Because of the small size of the boats and the time commitments needed for these 
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mapping expeditions, community participation was limited to just a few community 
representatives for each river.  Longer term residents who actively traveled the rivers 
were selected whenever possible to take advantage of their greater knowledge.  Despite 
this, the geographical data and maps in this dissertation are snapshots in time biased by 
the cartographers and fieldworkers involved.  I look forward to returning this dissertation, 
and the latest incarnation of the maps within, to the communities to update the maps, 
correct any errors, and actualize the local ownership of this information.  
In order to make the maps, researchers entered the locally informed data into an 
ArcGIS 8.3 Geographic Information System already containing unclassified 2002 ETM+ 
Landsat images, the digitized Peruvian national maps, digitized data on population 
centers, data on eradicated coca fields, data on indigenous territories, geographic data on 
forestry concessions, data on mining concessions, and data of conservation proposals.  I 
then analyzed this geographic database in conjunction with paper documents, websites, 
and key informant interviews to understand the regional complexity of the four watershed 
borderland region.  The result is Chapter Two’s analysis of the existing geographic 
information for the four watersheds.                    
Chapter Three’s investigation of the relationship between the tropical timber 
industry, the borderland Asháninka, and the international boundary required information 
from both Brazil and Peru.  Fortunately, the ethnographic and participatory fieldwork 
with the borderland Asháninka in Peru was complemented with data provided by 
counterparts in Brazil.  This was also enriched by interviews with Brazilian Asháninka, 
IBAMA, and IMAC in the urban center of Rio Branco.  Finally, a close reading of 
Brazilian periodicals from Acre and regular consultation with contacts in Brazil 
corroborated the information on illegal logging from the Peruvian side.  Of particular use 
to this chapter was fieldwork dedicated to mahogany, tropical cedar, copaiba, lupuna, and 
 37
bolaina.  Also important were counter-mapping methods used to map the homelands of 
Alto Tamaya.  Some ethnographic information was recorded using video cameras: 
transcripts of these interviews are available via the DVD Interviews with the Asháninka.  
Abbreviated versions of these interviews are available on the web in three languages 
(www.map-amazonia.net)33.  Also useful were key informant interviews with members of 
the tropical timber industry and individuals working with the Asháninka.  An 
understanding of the Asháninka people, the tropical timber industry, and their labor 
relations was enriched on my return with documentary research of the Peruvian forestry 
law, the international tropical timber industry, the history of the Asháninka, and the 
history of the Brazil-Peru boundary.  The combination of all of these resulted in Chapter 
Three’s analysis of the relationship of the borderland Asháninka, the tropical timber 
industry, and the political border. 
While each of the aforementioned chapters presented unique methodological 
challenges, the most challenging by far was Chapter Four’s analysis of the social and 
environmental impacts of coca cultivation.  The challenges revolved around the illegal 
nature of coca cultivation, my status as a United States citizen34, and the safety concerns 
related to asking direct questions about this borderland product.  Key informant 
interviews conducted before entering the field revealed coca cultivation to be present in 
all four watersheds and Peruvian authorities to be actively eradicating the crop.  For these 
reasons, and my own ties to the United States, the primary source of funding for coca 
eradication, direct investigation of coca created safety concerns for all researchers.  My 
strategy was thus, to initially avoid pursuing research in communities cultivating coca.  
However, given the importance of the product to the borderland economy and culture, 
researchers recorded details about commercial coca cultivation and traditional coca use 
gained from direct observation and from informants offering unsolicited information 
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about this important regional crop.  During the course of fieldwork it was determined that 
two of the nine community research sites were primarily dedicated to coca cultivation 
while two others had coca eradicated within their community limits and all communities 
had direct or indirect ties with the crop. 
Detailed field observation and interviews were supplemented by a 2003-2004 
eradication dataset of the four watershed study area from the special project Control and 
Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Alto Huallaga (CORAH) of the Peruvian Ministry 
of the Interior.  This dataset and key informant interviews with CORAH personnel 
confirmed the extent and impact of coca cultivation in the study area.  The combination 
of this dataset with the fieldwork on livelihoods and land use provided a unique look at 
the real and potential social and environmental impacts of coca cultivation in this 
borderland site.  This fieldwork was enhanced by archival and documentary research, and 
GIScience analysis on returning to the United States.  While this review of the study site 
and methodologies is brief, each of the chapters will also contain a summarized version 
of the methods. 
VI. A HISTORY OF BORDER CONFLICT, CREATION, AND CHARACTER:  THE 
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY-ECOLOGY OF THE JURUÁ-UCAYALI DIVIDE 
Disputes over New World boundaries began only a year after the 1493 creation of 
a longitudinal boundary between Spanish and Portuguese territory (Porras and Wagner 
1981).  This boundary 100 leagues west of the Azores was set by Pope Alexander VI and 
frustrated Portuguese designs on the eastern coast of South America (Roux 2001).  A 
year later, in response to Portuguese entreaties, the Pope facilitated the 1494 Treaty of 
Tordesillas between the two powers and adjusted the line of demarcation westward by 
270 leagues (Porras and Wagner 1981: 22).  However, the inaccuracy of existing maps 
and the imprecise language of the treaty allowed this meridian to be identified in a 
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number of different locations with Harrisse (1897: 152-4) finding six different 
interpretations between 1495 and 1545. Unsatisfied with even the most generous of these 
interpretations, the Portuguese expanded aggressively into the interior of the South 
American continent, notably with Captain Teixeira traveling up the Amazon River and 
over the Andes to reach Quito in 1639 (Smith 1990), while the Spanish expansion 
eastward was slowed in part by the Andes mountains35.   
In 1750, with the Treaty of Madrid, the two empires dissolved the Treaty of 
Tordesillas, replacing the various interpretations of the Tordesillas meridian with new 
complex boundaries ostensibly recognizing actual settlement and control through a de 
facto (actual possession) definition of uti possidetis36: “Each one of the parties shall keep 
the lands now possessed, with the exception of mutual agreements permitting an 
interchange of disputed territories”  (Roux 2001: 515).  The delimitation of the treaty’s 
boundaries was impossible at the time given that the huge expanses of largely unexplored 
territory appeared as little more than an imaginative cartography on official maps.  
Nevertheless, the treaty floundered less on these cartographic challenges than the internal 
politics of Spain, as both the Jesuits and the Spanish public reacted strongly to provisions 
giving up control of missions and territory to the Portuguese (Ireland 1938).    
The Jesuit mission issue and the entire Treaty of Madrid was amended by the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso in 1777 where the disputed missions and their territory remained 
Spanish (Prescott 1987, Roux 2001).  This last treaty again recognized uti possidetis de 
facto, or the current settlement of the region, and more than doubled the South American 
territory under Portuguese control according to the Treaty of Tordesillas (Ireland 1938).  
The Treaty of San Ildefonso’s approximately 7,000 kilometer boundary was largely 
accepted for some 150 years despite never being surveyed as stipulated in the treaty text 
(Ireland 1938).  Due to the lack of surveying, later difficulties arose over river 
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identification, river source selection, and the determination of the correct watersheds, 
ridgelines, locations or names (Roux 2001).  Not surprisingly, the resulting disputes often 
revolved around the right to exploit natural resources such as gold, timber, and spices.   
The independence of Amazonian nations simply brought new names to the same 
tensions as the newly formed nation-states largely accepted the boundary line of the 
Treaty of San Ildefonso.  The newly independent Spanish-speaking nations agreed to 
abide by the concept of the uti possidetis de jure of 1810, where the nations would take as 
their own boundaries the administrative divisions of the Spanish empire in 181037 (Porras 
and Wagner 1981).  The uti possidetis of 181038 made the continent of South America 
appear wholly occupied thus reducing the amount of territory European states could 
aspire to.  As Ireland (1938: 327) said, “the first juntas seemed to recognize the general 
frontiers39 of their jurisdiction at the boundaries of the former governments in whose 
capitals they were functioning, and tacitly to recognize the mutual advantages of such 
limitations, which the vacant and usually non-vital border territory40 made it easy to 
observe.”  Thus, it was relatively easy for the Spanish-speaking states to accept these 
well-defined41 former divisions because of the large and uncontested borderlands 
perceived of as empty, although in reality inhabited by “unassigned” indigenous peoples, 
and to a lesser degree missionaries, and adventurers.  Brazilian adventurers and 
entrepreneurs took advantage of the lack of state presence and accurate cartography to 
push into these border areas in search of resources (Hemming 1978).  Indeed, many of 
these “empty” Amazonian borderlands would be found to be rich in Hevea rubber, a fact 
soon to increase tensions over boundary delimitations. 
Also pushing into the Amazon were missionaries in search of souls to save.  The 
central borderlands of this dissertation differ from some other Amazonian sites in the 
relative lack of a historical (or current) missionary presence.  This appears to be in part 
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due to these borderlands serving as the slaving grounds of Shipibo and Conibo Indians 
seeking to satisfy the growing labor and slave markets of the region in order to satisfy 
their own thirst for European products.  The missionaries struggled to establish missions 
in the face of repeated slave raids and interference by entrepreneurs.  Despite this Padre 
Calvo founded San Miguel de Callaría in 1859 bringing twelve families from Sarayacu to 
help organize some fifty families of Shipibo and Remo Indians interested in settling in 
the mission (Pallares y Calvo 1907: 68, 93-95).   However, San Miguel de Callaría was 
“born mortally wounded” (Pallares y Calvo 1907: 95) with Remo and Shipibo Indians 
already being seduced by patrones to fight and slave amongst themselves.  In 1884 only 
25 indigenous families remained in San Miguel de Callaría (Samanez y Ocampo 1980 
[1885]: 77).  This mission remained but became primarily the residence of Shipibo as by 
1870 the Remo had almost been exterminated by Shipibo, Conibo and Cashibo Indians 
(Steward 1946: 583).     
The missionary experience on the Tamaya was worse.  Before Padre Calvo’s 
chose Callaría, he failed to establish a mission among the Amahuaca of the Tamaya 
(Pallares y Calvo 1907: 93).  In 1877 after twenty years of frustration and failure to 
convert the Remos of Callaría (Pallares y Calvo 1907: 189), the missionary prefect 
Hermoso sent emissaries to again try and convert and form a mission among the 
Amahuaca living on the Tamaya. Eight different voyages to create a permanent mission 
among the Tamaya Amahuaca ended in failure, and included the death of Father Tapia 
(Pallares y Calvo 1907: 195).  Eventually repeated slave raids drove the Amahuaca to 
flee from their Tamaya headwater home for more remote lands farther south.     
The flight and extermination of the Remo and Amahuaca has created a reduced 
interest by missionaries in the area up to the present, an exception being the South 
American Mission efforts with the Remo remnants, the Isco (Momsen 1964, Whiton et al. 
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1964).  The region’s relative lack of an Indigenous and mestizo population has since been 
filled by Shipibo-Conibo, Asháninka, colonists, and extractivists interested in the natural 
resources of the borderland region.       
Not surprisingly, in the 1850s, the United States also had a strong interest in the 
natural resources of the Amazon: actively lobbying for international steamship navigation 
up the Amazon on the basis of a “policy of commerce” (Maury 1853: 5) and when Brazil 
rejected her interest, sending two reconnaissance missions over the Andes from Peru and 
Bolivia all the way down the river to the Atlantic (Herndon et al. 1853).  The impetus 
behind these reconnaissance missions was the influential Oceanographer and United 
States Naval Officer, Matthew Fontaine Maury, whose obsession with the scientific, 
commercial, and political potential of the Amazon ran deep (Maury 1948 [1850]).  
Sternberg (1987: 27) has pointed out that Maury’s ability to connect the Amazon River to 
the Mississippi River through rhetoric centered on oceanography, economic 
complementarity, and geographic predestination broadened an already existent “doctrine 
of the appendage” used by President Monroe and Secretary of State Adams to incorporate 
Cuba, Florida, and Puerto Rico within the mouth of the Mississippi, the North American 
continent, and the manifest destiny of the United States.  While Maury’s attempt to spark 
a chain of events resulting in the U.S. annexation of the Amazon failed, his political 
connections did get his brother-in-law, William Herndon, appointed to reconnoiter the 
basin ( Herndon et al. 1853, Maury 1948 [1850]).  In addition, as Sternberg (1987: 32) 
contends, Maury’s published rhetoric may have helped kindle Brazil’s growing number 
of conspiratorial theories42 regarding foreign designs on, and the internationalization of, 
the Amazon basin. 
The most pertinent historical and geographical precursor to the borderland threats 
and conflicts outlined in this dissertation revolves around the struggle for control of the 
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rubber rich territory of Acre by Brazil, Peru and Bolivia.  According to the Treaty of San 
Ildefonso, the division between Portugal and Spain in the Acre region relied on a line 
drawn from a point on the Madeira River equidistant from the mouth of the Mamoré and 
the Amazon River and a point on the east bank of the Javarí43 River (da Cunha 1907, 
Porras and Wagner 1981).  Unfortunately, geographical knowledge of the area was 
uncertain with “Complete early ignorance of the course and source of one river (the 
Javarí) and the uppermost extent of the basins of two others (the Purús and the Juruá)” 
(Ireland 1938: 130), in addition to confusion surrounding the location of the border 
between Bolivia and Peru.  Peru’s scant knowledge of its Amazonian territory led to a 
diplomatic and geopolitical blunder made by acting Minister of Foreign Relations, 
Bartolomé Herrera in the 1851 Convention on Commerce and River Navigation with 
Brazil.  Article seven of the signed document treated boundaries and, without reference to 
the Treaty of San Ildefonso, called the Javarí River the southern dividing line between the 
countries despite the north-south orientation of the river course (Porras and Wagner 1981: 
119).  In 1874 the two governments’ joint commission failed to exactly locate the Javarí’s 
origin, traveling only far enough up the headwaters of the Javarí to get an estimate (Black 
1905).  This estimate was then corrected in 1877 and finally rectified in 1898 by Cunha 
Gomes (da Cunha 1907, Ganzert 1934).  A sampling of some of the competing claims 
and the mystery of the origins of the Javarí River are represented in Figures 5 and 6. 
Unbeknownst to Peru, Brazil was simultaneously treating with Bolivia, finally 
arriving at the 1867 Treaty in La Paz which recognized the uti possidetis de facto as the 
rationality behind the new border.  This treaty dissolved the Treaty of San Ildefonso and 
declared the new regional border between Brazil and Bolivia to be from the mouth of the 
Bení, where the Madeira River obstensibly begins, on the parallel  10˚ 20’ S44 to the 
headwaters of the Javarí (Figure 6) (Ganzert 1934, Ireland 1938, Roux 2001).  Of course 
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Figure 5.  A historic map of the boundary confusion and disputes of the border between Brazil, Bolivia and Peru. 
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Figure 6.  Poor geographic knowledge of the southwestern Amazon led to disputes between Brazil, Peru, and Bolivia in the 1800s and 
1900s.
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the headwaters of the Javarí River were still undetermined in 1867, in fact lying three 
degrees to the north, leading to conflict over the rubber rich territory located between the 
parallel and the headwaters (Roux 2001).  Peru protested this 1867 treaty but was ignored 
by both Bolivia and Brazil (Ganzert 1934).  While these treaties were being deliberated, 
Brazilian and foreign entrepeneurs penetrated up the Amazonian tributaries to harvest the 
increasingly valuable Hevea rubber latex.  Much of the Brazilian labor force penetrating 
and occupying these territories were of Afro-Brazilian and indigenous origin.  The 
importance of these marginal peoples in nation building cannot be overestimated.  Those 
indigenous people not interested in joining the grueling working conditions of this 
economic (and political) project sought refuge along distant rivers and interfluvial zones 
where the Hevea stands thinned out along with economic interest.  According to 
Tastevin, the Brazilian ascent up the Juruá was rapid with rubber tappers reaching the 
Tarauacá in 1880, the Ipixuna in 1888 (Tastevin 1920).  By 1900 there was no part of the 
Juruá basin that had not been explored (Figure 6) (Tastevin 1920) although they did not 
stay upriver of the mouth of the Breu River because Hevea rubber stands were sparse 
(Tastevin 1926).  The ascent up the Purús was equally rapid, but in 1898 Bolivia 
established a customs house on the Acre River, a tributary of the Purús, in Porto Alonso, 
now Porto Acre, to tax rubber revenue from Bolivian forests upriver (Figure 6).   
The Brazilian and foreign rubber tappers who made up almost all of the non-
indigenous population rejected Bolivian authorities and seized the area under the 
leadership of the Spaniard Luís Galvez, who subsequently proclaimed Acre an 
independent nation (Tocantins 1961).  After much bloodshed the Bolivian army took 
back control and in 1901, following the fixing of the source of the Javarí (through the 
tributary Jaquerana) by the Cruls-Ballivián bi-national commission (Figure 5), agreed to 
sell part or all of the territory to a U.S. backed corporation called the Bolivian Syndicate.  
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Peru and Brazil protested this act and in 1903 Brazilian colonists in the territory took up 
arms under Plácido de Castro.  The Bolivian President José Manuel Pando led the 
Bolivian army to quash the revolt but after failing to rout the rubber tappers agreed to 
have Brazilian forces pacify the region and buy out the Bolivian Syndicate.  In 1903 
Brazil and Bolivia signed the Treaty of Petrópolis giving the Acre territory to Brazil for 
two million pounds, a sliver of territory south of the Abuná River and a 200 mile railway 
from the Beni and Mamoré valleys to the cataract free lower Madeira River (Ireland 
1938). 
Peru protested the Treaty of Petrópolis as it ignored Peruvian claims to Acre 
territory and existing Peruvian disputes with both Brazil and Bolivia.  In 1904 Brazil and 
Peru signed a Modus Vivendi to leave the disputed territories of the headwaters of the 
Javarí, Juruá and Purús Rivers neutral until a boundary could be decided through 
exploration and diplomacy.  In order to investigate and delimit the boundaries, the two 
countries formed a bi-national commission to investigate the headwaters of the Purús and 
Juruá Rivers.  The Brazilian side of the commission was led by two Brazilians of note.  
Euclides da Cunha, the famous writer, engineer, and proto-political ecologist (Hecht 
2004), explored the Purús River (Comisión Mixta Purús y Yuruá 1906, da Cunha 1967) 
before becoming one of Brazilian literature’s iconic figures.  General Belarmino 
Mendonça, largely unknown outside of Brazil, also demonstrated a keen and sensitive 
eye in his observations of the physical and human geography of the Juruá River 
(Commissão Mixta and Mendonça 1907).  The Peruvian counterparts for the Purús and 
Juruá Rivers, Captain Pedro Alexandre Buenaño and  First Lieutenant Numa Pompilio 
León respectively, wrote less detailed descriptions, but showed equal courage in 
exploring the limits of the two watersheds (Comisión Mixta Purús y Yuruá 1906). 
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While Brazil’s rubber tappers successfully repulsed the Bolivan army in the Acre 
River Valley (Tocantins 1961), Peruvian representatives attempted to lay claim to large 
portions of the upper Purús and Juruá watersheds.  Peruvian caucheros45 (rubber 
collectors) based on the Ucayali River used varaderos to access the headwaters of these 
rivers and fell the Castilloa ulei trees to extract their valuable caucho (latex).  The 
caucheros did not come alone as the grueling work required labor best filled by Indian 
slaves and allies from the Ucayali basin (da Cunha 1967).  Euclides da Cunha (1976: 
264) observed, “In general there are five Peruvians…per 100 Piros, Campas46, 
Amahuaca, Conibos, Shipibos, Samas, Coronahuas, and Yaminahuas, which one 
stumbles across in various states of bondage and indolence, all conquered by the shotgun, 
all deluded by extravagant contracts, all now yoked to the most complete slavery”47.  Yet, 
da Cunha contradicts himself, also finding indigenous agency in the borderlands, 
particularly in his encounter on the Purús with the Asháninka leader Venancio (Santos-
Granero and Barclay 2000), whom he calls, “the Curaca Vinésio or Vicenzio, who there 
dominates, his influence and empire radiating over all the other headmen of the region” 
(da Cunha 1976: 199).  Da Cunha’s Juruá counterpart Colonel Mendonça also finds 
agency among the indigenous people, but of a helpful rather than dominating or 
subservient nature, “They were the guides and helpers of the pioneers; those that were the 
first to use caucho…they taught the civilized medicinal and other virtues of many plants; 
on the Juruá they are multidimensional cultivators of both soils and fields having 
repeatedly given food to those who have come to usurp their lands, women and children” 
(Mendonça 1907: 141).  To Mendonça these borderland people deserved, “humanitarian 
and sympathetic compensation” (Mendonça 1907: 141).  Mendonça also realized their 
strategic importance for these remote frontiers and sought to incorporate them into his 
geopolitical project, “…the most efficient and perhaps least costly, to submit them to a 
 49
brand of military regime, administered without severity in villages alongside the 
boundary lines that so suit us to garrison, without destroying their family ties…” 
(Mendonça 1907: 142).  While ultimately, these borderland people slipped into obscurity 
after the fall of rubber and the delimitation of the border and certainly were never given 
neither compensation nor military employment, they are still policing the border a 
hundred years after Mendonça’s anticipatory comments. 
The Campa, who call themselves the Asháninka, were one of many indigenous 
groups brought by patrones to work these resource frontiers (da Cunha 1967).  Unlike 
some imported peoples, the Asháninka were feared and respected in the borderlands for 
their bellicose disposition and authoritative headmen.  At the beginning of the 20th 
century Euclides da Cunha (da Cunha 1967: 58) recited a long list of indigenous peoples 
inhabiting the borderlands before ending with, “above all, supplanting the rest in fame 
and courage, the warlike Campa of the Urubamba”.  The Peruvian diplomat and spy 
Manuel Pablo Villanueva (Villanueva and Sociedad Geográfica de Lima 1902: 67) also 
extolled the Asháninka, but due to their superior economic value as slaves, “A boy of 10-
12 years is worth, normally, 500 soles, unless he is a Campa, then they are worth much 
more”.  This stereotype continues more recently with Clark (1954: 101) comparing the 
Asháninka to other indigenous groups, “The Campas are superior fighters, utterly 
relentless….”.  The Asháninka’s warlike ways are historically documented with 
Franciscans suffering heavy losses to establish missions in the Asháninka/Ashéninka 
homelands in the selva central48 (Varese 1968, Weiss 1975).  However this earlier 
resistance to the missionaries paled in comparison to their revolt in 1742, punctuated by 
the expulsion of all missionaries from their territory and the annihilation of two Spanish 
military companies, followed by over a century of resistance and independence despite 
Spanish and Peruvian attempts to reopen their homelands (Varese 1968; Weiss 1975).  
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Among those military men who failed to penetrate their territory numbers the intrepid 
Lieutenant Herndon of the United States (Herndon et al. 1853).  Nevertheless, the 
Asháninka also turned their warlike ways on themselves, raiding and enslaving their 
cousins to sell as rubber tappers, servants and bodyguards to Brazilian and Peruvian alike 
(ACONADIYSH 2004, Bodley 1972, Clark 1954, Varese 1968, Weiss 1975). 
During and after the rubber boom, rubber patrones, slavers, and others, scattered a 
portion of the Asháninka nation far and wide.  Asháninka slaves and workers reached 
Madre de Dios, Loreto, Lima, Brazil, and Bolivia, and left their descendants (Figure 7) 
(Bodley 1972, Clark 1953, da Cunha 1976, Varese 1968, Von Hassel 1905, Weiss 1975). 
Sometimes traded by their parents for tools (Velarde 1905), sometimes enslaved by other 
Asháninka (Clark 1953, Fry 1907, Samanez y Ocampo 1980 [1885], Varese 1968), 
sometimes led by their own strong men (da Cunha 1976, Portillo 1905a, Santos-Granero 
and Barclay 2000), and sometimes enslaved or coerced by patrones ( Bodley 1972, Clark 
1953, Varese 1968), the borderland Asháninka addressed in this dissertation are likely 
remnants of these dispersed Asháninka.  However, some confusion remains as to when 
they came to occupy the Brazilian and Peruvian borderlands.  
The Asháninka are a highly mobile people (Denevan 1971, Varese 1968), which 
complicates defining their historical permanence in any place outside their long 
established homelands in the selva central.  There is little published support for the 
assertion of Castello Branco (1950), based on traveler and explorer’s accounts, that the 
Asháninka were present in the upper Juruá as early as the beginning of the 18th century.  
Castello Branco ( 1922: 597) himself says in an earlier writing: 
In summary, we have a total of around 1,000 indians inhabiting the federal zone 
of the Juruá, many residing between the Breu and Tarauacá and between the 
Amônia49 and Tamaya, are in lands outside of the Juruá.  Close to Brazil, in 
Peruvian territory wander a great number of Amahuacas and other groups,  
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Figure 7.  The Asháninka spread throughout the Peru/Brazil borderlands as laborers and protection during the rubber boom.
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appearing accidentally along the Brazilian boundary are the Campas 
(Asháninka)50, Shamas (Chamas), and Remo. (emphasis added by author)   
His meaning in using the term accidentally is unclear in this case, as is the 
relationship between this statement and his later declaration of an Asháninka presence 
200 years earlier.  Castello Branco’s contemporary, the French geographer Tastevin 
recognizes the presence of the Campa in the foothills of the Sierra del Divisor and along 
the headwaters of the Juruá Mirim in 1920 (Tastevin 1920).  This assertion along with 
Castello’s 1922 reference make sense given their congruence with the rubber labor 
system’s use of indigenous groups dispersed from the Ucayali basin to neighboring 
watersheds like the Juruá (Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000).  Similarly, da Cunha 
encountered numerous Campa along the adjacent Purús watershed in 1904-5 (da Cunha 
1967, da Cunha 1976).  Other accounts also place the arrival of the Asháninka during the 
rubber period (ACONADIYSH 2004) or acknowledge their presence shortly thereafter 
(López 1925).  Figure 7 shows the migratory routes and varaderos used by the 
Ashaáninka to access the borderlands during the rubber boom and later.  Interestingly, 
both Peruvian and Brazilian sources cite the neighboring country’s rubber patrones as 
responsible for bringing the Asháninka to the borderlands (ACONADIYSH 2004, da 
Cunha 1967, da Cunha 1976, Pimenta 2002).  Following the collapse of the rubber boom 
in the early 20th century and the exit of the patrones some Asháninka returned to their 
homelands in the selva central while others remained in the borderlands 
(ACONADIYSH 2004, López 1925).  
The arrival of the current borderland Asháninka populations along the central 
border of Brazil can be traced back to the 1930s through oral interviews (Figure 8) 
(Pimenta 2002).  Figure 8 shows the location of the borderland Asháninka in 2004.  In 
Brazil there were less than 900 Asháninka in five indigenous territories51 diffused along 
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Figure 8.  The borderland Asháninka now reside on both sides of the border in the Peruvian and Brazilian borderlands, although many 
communities still remain unrecognized and untitled by the Peruvian state.
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the effluents of the Juruá River (Pimenta 2005).   In Peru, along the Alto Juruá and its 
tributaries, 900 Asháninka lived in eight borderland communities, outnumbering the 
Amahuaca and Yaminahua native to the region in 2004 (ACONADIYSH 2004).  The 
borderland Asháninka situation on the Tamaya and Abujao Rivers of the Peruvian 
borderlands is similar, as their residence can be traced back to the 1940s.  While there are 
no published accounts of their location or population, fieldwork shows their numbers are 
also low with only 403 living along the Tamaya in four untitled communities and one 
titled community52 (Richey 2005), and about 50 living along the Abujao in one titled and 
one untitled community.  These Peruvian borderland groups are related to many of the 
Brazilian Asháninka, having passed through Brazil as either residents of the Juruá, 
Amônia, Envira or Purús Rivers (Figure 7).  The Peruvian Asháninka of the central 
border of Brazil and Peru were unmapped until the twenty first century when the Instituto 
del Bien Común (IBC) and the Centro de Investigación de Fronteras Amazonicas (CIFA) 
first arrived on the Tamaya River.  CIFA also mapped the Asháninka of the Alto Abujao 
River in 2004.  Figure 8 represents the first attempt to map the borderland Asháninka, 
since the majority of the Asháninka of the Peruvian borderlands appear neither on the 
historical maps of Tessmann (1930) nor other maps of indigenous territories in Peru.53   
These borderland Asháninka arrived from a variety of locations and through a 
succession of migrations (Figure 7).  Many of those currently on the Alto Tamaya River 
passed through the Asháninka territories on the Amônia River in Brazil.  The majority of 
these traveled up the Sheshea River, settled briefly on the Amônia, before crossing back 
into Peru to reside on the Tamaya River.  Other Asháninka still living on the Amônia 
River crossed into Brazil using the varaderos linking the Sheshea or Tamaya Rivers to 
the Alto Juruá and Amônia Rivers.  Finally, some Amônia Asháninka migrated from 
other Brazilian Asháninka populations on the Envira and Breu Rivers (Pimenta 2002).  
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These populations are likely remnants from the rubber tapping days of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century.  Other borderland Asháninka populations may be descended 
from Asháninka who worked the borderlands during the rubber epoch as tappers, food 
producers, bodyguards, or slavers, and then returned to their homelands in the selva 
central. Their descendants may have taken advantage of this expanded geographic 
knowledge to return to the area in search of relief from slaving parties of the selva 
central, the violence of the Sendero Luminoso54 or such mundane reasons as better 
hunting or more space.  Those Tamaya Asháninka not related to the Brazilian populations 
on the Amônia were mostly either brought as slaves, by patrones to log the forests, or 
traveled with logging outfits as independent workers.  Many of the Asháninka on the Alto 
Abujao River also originally worked in Brazil on the Envira, Breu, and Juruá Rivers but 
left that area with the patrón Cristóbal Fuchs Colón who according to one informant 
exclaimed one day, “we are Peruvian, we should live in Peru,” and led them back to Peru 
and to the lower Abujao via the Sheshea River.  From there they gradually migrated up 
the Abujao River with some even crossing back into Brazil via varaderos to work on the 
Juruá River as rubber tappers before returning to Peru.  Regardless of their location or 
country of residence, the borderland Asháninka are aware of their origins in the selva 
central, have kinsmen both in the borderlands and the selva central, and still travel back 
and forth for reasons of family or commerce. 
The Asháninka who lived along the border at the turn of twentieth century were 
seen by the Brazilian leaders of the Joint Reconnaissance Commission, Mendonça and da 
Cunha, as part of an invading force of caucheros and their indigenous allies and slaves 
that was threatening Brazilian territory with its mobility and avarice (Commissão Mixta 
and Mendonça 1907, da Cunha 1976, da Cunha 1967).  The harvesting of caucho from 
Castilloa trees required “painful crossings by foot through the interior of the forest” and 
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“constant movement” to fell tree after tree and harvest the latex before moving on to the 
next stand (Commissão Mixta and Mendonça 1907: 24-5).  This nomadic lifestyle, 
constant exploration, and requisite felling55 of the Castilloa trees contrasted with the 
sedentary and sustainable harvesting of Hevea rubber characterized by an isolated 
tapper’s cyclical tapping of a few rubber trails without killing the trees.  Brazilian 
seringueiros continue to tap Hevea trees today albeit on a much more limited scale while 
caucheros and the felling of Castilloa trees is mostly a thing of the past.  Nomadic 
caucheros forshadowed the illegal loggers of 2004 with their constant movement, the 
felling of trees, and the use of varaderos to access and remove their product.  Varaderos, 
used for thousands of years by indigenous peoples before contact, became heavily 
trafficked by spies, smugglers, caucheros, and even soldiers from Peru during the rubber 
era and in 2004 continued to be used by drug traffickers, illegal loggers, smugglers, 
indigenous people, and a few adventurous travelers. 
Of particular interest, given its importance to Chapter Three, is the history of the 
varadero56 connecting the headwaters of the Tamaya River, a right bank tributary of the 
Ucayali, and the Amônia River, a left bank tributary of the Alto Juruá: a varadero much 
traveled at the turn of the last century and used by Peruvians to claim control of the upper 
Juruá River.  Figure 9 shows the location of the main varaderos used historically and 
today in the central borderlands.  According to the Brazilian Coronel Mendonça 
(Commissão Mixta and Mendonça 1907: 199), it was the Tamaya varadero that 
accidentally57 brought the first Peruvian caucheros to Brazil in 1897.  The same year, 
after his reconnaissance of the Juruá, Peruvian Captain Enrique Espinar returned to Peru 
by this varadero58 “much used by caucheros and Peruvian businessmen…” (Espinar 
1905: 415).  At the headwaters of the Tamaya, he showed the awaiting Navy Colonel 
Vizcarra where his midshipmen should open up a more direct trail59 to the Juruá.  A few 
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Figure 9.  Varaderos served as crucial links between the Ucayali and Juruá basins in the early 1900s and continue to do so today.
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years later, in 1902, Peruvian diplomat and spy Manuel Pablo Villanueva arrived via this 
varadero to investigate the degree of Brazilian influence along the upper Juruá before 
returning to Peru by the Juruá-Mirim-Abujao varadero (Villanueva and Sociedad 
Geográfica de Lima 1902).  Other explorers such as Von Hassel and Stiglich underscored 
the importance of varaderos and the riches of the Juruá and Purús basins arguing for the 
establishment of ports, roads, and railroads (Stiglich 1905, Von Hassel 1905). Stiglich 
(1905: 298) argued, “We are obligated to defend our borders, later we can dedicate 
ourselves to less urgent tasks…”  Based on these exploratory trips, the Peruvian army 
established a base, customs office, and town named Nuevo Iquitos at the mouth of the 
Amônia in 1902 exacting tribute from all river craft on the Upper Juruá, despite the 
protestations of the Brazilian government and local authorities (Commissão Mixta and 
Mendonça 1907: 122).  In 1902 Coronel Pedro Portillo reinforced this base with twenty 
Peruvian soldiers brought in via the Tamaya varadero (Portillo 1905b).  On the 12th of 
July, 1904 a modus vivendi was signed between Brazil and Peru neutralizing conflict in 
the disputed areas and creating a mixed commission to ascertain the boundaries. 
However, with news traveling slowly, in November of 1904, a delegation of 
Brazilian soldiers and seringueiro volunteers attacked Nuevo Iquitos by foot.  After 48 
hours of battle, they forced the surrender of the Peruvian forces, who subsequently 
retreated up the Juruá to the Peruvian town of Puerto Pardo at the mouth of the Breu 
River (Commissão Mixta and Mendonça 1907).  This was the last battle fought between 
Peruvian and Brazilian forces, unless one counts the 2006 skirmish between Peruvian 
loggers and the Brazilian navy described in Chapter Three. 
In the two years following the 1904 conflict, the joint commissions of the Purús 
and Juruá explored their respective rivers to the headwaters with considerable help from 
the local residents and reported their findings (Comisión Mixta Purús y Yuruá 1906; 
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Commissão Mixta and Mendonça 1907).  Finally, the controversy came to a close with 
the Peruvian minister Velarde and the Baron of Rio Branco signing a treaty of 
boundaries, commerce, and navigation in September of 1909, defining the boundary limit 
from the Bolivian border to the Javarí River.   
The actual demarcation of the boundaries took fourteen years (1913-1927) due to 
bureaucratic delay, the remote nature of the border, the challenging terrain, and World 
War I (PCDL 2006).  In 1924 Tastevin (1943: 92) found the commission working at the 
headwaters of the Tarauacá River and noted the importance of local knowledge in the 
process of boundary demarcation:  
the heavy work was done by the seringueiros who knew the region throroughly 
and had blazed four paths (1943: 87)… He (Felizardo) and his Indian comrades 
(Kaxinawá) did the work without incident and it is at present completed.  This 
year he intends to open a path from between the mouth of the Breu and the 
Contamana mountains which form the frontier between Peru and Brazil.  Next 
summer the commission will come to verify, complete and rectify his work, erect 
boundary posts and draw up a map” (Tastevin 1943: 92).   
Similarly, Lieutanant Colonel Roberto López, chief of the Peruvian Boundary 
Commission, also noted the importance of local people in the demarcation efforts: 
“Cashinaguas (Kaxinawá) Indians helped the demarcation sub-commissions acting on the 
Jordán and Alto Tarahuacá Rivers in 1924, in exchange for glass beads, mirrors and 
scissors” (López 1925: 55).  López’s photographs and captions demonstrate the 
importance of the resident Kaxinawá60 in opening trails, hunting for food, and hauling 
loads for the bi-national commission (López 1925). 
The border largely followed lines of rivers, watershed divides and the less defined 
biogeographical line between where Hevea trees grew in numbers, thus occupied by 
seringueiros from downstream, and those areas where the trees were scarce, temporarily 
occupied by Peruvian caucheros.  The Joint Reconaissance Commission of the Alto Juruá 
(Comisión Mixta Purús y Yuruá 1906: 274) noted this Hevea line in their observations of 
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the upper Juruá and the Breu river which eventually became part of the boundary line, 
“On both sides of the Breu they extract latex.  From there to the headwaters the Hevea 
thins out until it disappears; leaving only caucho that is exploited exclusively by the 
Peruvians”.  The commissions relied heavily on the local knowledge of borderland 
residents to understand the physical and human geography around them and thus the 
whereabouts of the political boundary.  Local knowledge played an even greater role in 
the demarcation phase where things would have proved impossible without the help of 
the indigenous and rubber tapping residents as sources of geographic information and 
labor.     
In total the commission established 86 monuments on the 2,995 kilometer border, 
with 2,003 km defined by bodies of water, 283 km by geodesic lines, and 709 km in 
watershed divides (PCDL 2006).  Although the commission formally terminated the 
demarcation process on the thirteenth of September, 1927, the crash of the rubber boom 
caused this borderland to be neglected by the two nation-states for about fifty years 
before the Peruvian and Brazilian governments agreed to inspect and update the 
monuments at a meeting in 1975 (PCDL 2006).  Although the Mixed Commission for the 
Inspection of the Peru-Brazil Border Monuments has met at least five times between 
1975 and 2006, it is unclear how much inspecting or updating actually took place on the 
border itself.  In 2004, I attempted to locate three border monuments (60, 61 and 62) at 
the headwaters of the Abujao.  With the help of the Peruvian military, I was able to locate 
only monuments 60 and 61, one of which, 60, had been lost to the Peruvian military for 
years (Figure 10).  The two monuments were made of iron and cement with the date 1925 
engraved in the concrete base (Figure 11).  However, during our 2004 fieldwork, the 
missing monument, 62 (Figure 12) was placed on the border by Brazilian forces.  The 
Brazilians arrived by helicopter and placed the monument only 360 meters from 
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Figure 10.  Like many borderland communities, Cantagallo is surrounded by a network of trails.  Some of these are varaderos that lead 
to or pass by the monuments placed to demarcate the Brazil/Peru boundary.
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Figure 12.  Three soldiers and CIFA field assistant Carlos Lenin Pérez Alván pose next to the new monument #62 found on 
October 10, 2004.  A few paces away is the clearing made by Brazilian soldiers to land their helicopter and 
construct the concrete monument. Photo: UMAR 3.
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monument 61.  This distance on the ground corresponds62 closely to the distance between 
the official written coordinates for the monuments (PCDL 2006).  This updating of the 
border reflected the increased presence and interest of Brazilian authorities in the 
borderlands following the continued trespassing of Peruvian loggers.  The officers of the 
local Peruvian military base and the local Peruvians were surprised by the unannounced  
arrival of the monument. They had thought the 360 meters of territory between 61 and the 
new 62 to be Peruvian territory. 
This brief account of the border history between Brazil and Peru is characterized 
primarily by the paucity of geographic information available to the 
respectivegovernments.  The governments have traditionally seen the Amazon 
borderlands, like much of the Amazon rainforest, as an empty landscape devoid of people 
and importance, except when the quest for valuable natural resources captured the 
attention of the nation-state.  The lack of commercial and strategic interest in the 
borderlands is reflected in part by the lack of geographic information and state 
indifference to the borderland region and people.  With the end of the rubber boom and 
the demarcation phase the borderland people drifted out of the national consciousness 
until the border tensions and conflicts involving valuable timber and coca made them 
useful to the state again.  Chapter Two describes how local people are silenced by 
inadequate geographic information and how this combines with state indifference to 
increase overlapping claims and resource conflicts in the borderlands.  Chapter three 
discusses the relationship between the borderland Asháninka63 indigenous people of 
Brazil and Peru and the tropical timber industry.  Chapter Four describes how illicit coca 
farmers have taken advantage of the lack of geographic information and state indifference 
to expand coca cultivation and bring new social and environmental impacts to the 
borderlands.  Lastly, the conclusion summarizes the contributions of each chapter before 
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Chapter Two: Local People, Inadequate Maps, and Overlapping Claims 
in the "Empty" Amazon Borderlands of Peru 
While in search of vital information on the regions ahead, I talked to Professor 
Cesar Garcia Rosell, head of… the Sociedad de Geografía.  Together Rosell and I 
studied his mouldy old Jesuit maps of the tierra incognita, the unbroken jungle 
lying east of the Andean Cordilleras…   
“Then, what are all these names on the maps?” I asked. 
“Señor, please!  They are only names!  Sometimes an abandoned thatched hut on 
a main river bank…Only names, to fill the great white spaces. 
 
Leonard Clark, from The Rivers Ran East (1954: 23)    
 
Leonard Clark’s embellished accounts of his numerous explorations (Clark 1954, 
1955, 1959) should be read with some skepticism, but this 1946 conversation with the 
geographer García Rosell frames a geographic question of some importance.  How valid 
is the existing cartographic information of Amazonia?  Consequently, if of limited value, 
what ramifications does this have on the ground?  Finally, if needed, how can information 
best be improved? 
These are questions I have wrestled with since the summer of 2000, when as a 
Master’s student conducting fieldwork in Brazil’s western Amazon I found myself trying 
to explain to a creek side community why their creek was not on the map (Salisbury 
2002).  This phantom creek (Figure 13) and the mutable Acre state line threatened their
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Figure 13.  Three residents paddle along on the unmapped phantom creek in Brazil’s borderlands. 
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inclusion on the map and thus their ability to gain a land title through a new sustainable 
settlement project (Salisbury 2002).  Their interest in getting their creek and themselves 
on the map drove us through the rainforest to georeference their own locally grounded 
community limits.  Eventually, the mapping of their local knowledge of place and 
environment not only improved existing official maps but found their settlement to be the 
largest community in the project. 
Two years later I again found myself sitting in a small boat under the hot western 
Amazon sun with a map in my lap, a running GPS64 in hand, and a local person telling 
me just how wrong I was (Figure 14)65.  In this case, there was no land title to be gained, 
as I was merely a last minute addition to a scientific expedition evaluating the 
conservation status of Perú’s remote Alto Purús River (Fagan and Salisbury 2003, Leite-
Pitman et al. 2003).  We spent day after day in the boat ascending the Alto Purús and its 
main arm, the Curanja, and I had ample time to compare the Peruvian National 
Geographic Institute’s maps66 with the local geographic knowledge of our Cashinahua, 
Sharanahua, and Asháninka guides (Figure 15).  I witnessed their unabashed excitement 
when I placed a point on the map and wrote down their village name.  In talking to them 
about their homes and the maps’ toponyms, I came to understand the mobility of the 
Purús residents and how they could quickly make a good map obsolete with their 
migrations.  When Alberto Sharanahua67 told me we had just passed the last village and 
that ahead we would see only forest until the headwaters, I showed him the map that 
although dominated by white space, still had a village with the exciting name of Alerta.  
Alberto laughed and said, “I’ve been to the headwaters and beyond, there is nothing at 
Alerta but the meeting of the Cújar and the Curiuja Rivers.”  Years later, reading 
historical accounts, I learned Alerta had been a rubber tapping outpost of the patrón 
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Figure 14.  The author, GPS in hand, heads down the Alto Purús into Brazil with two young Kulina men.  Photo: Chris Fagan.
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Figure 15.  The expedition advanced up the Curanja and Alto Purús Rivers with difficulty, menaced by snags and a relentless 
tropical sun. 
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Carlos Sharff (Sharff 1907) and that in 1905 Euclides da Cunha had stayed with him 
there in his palm hut (da Cunha 1976: 200, 265).  But what remains of Alerta now?  No 
thatched hut can weather a century of abandonment in the rainforest.  Is it only an 
isolated name to fill the map’s great white spaces?  
During my 2004 fieldwork these thoughts and experiences motivated me to unfurl 
the maps and run the GPS up and down the rivers of the central borderlands.  With nine 
research sites on four rivers it took twenty-four days of travel just to visit all the sites by 
boat (Figure 16).  This meant sitting in the blinding sun deafened by the roar of the peke 
peke68 motor from dawn to dusk, only to sleep on the beach as the buzzing mosquitoes 
tried to burrow their way through the mosquito net.  During these long days, my 
assistants and I would ask our local guides about the names of the villages and creeks that 
lined these rivers.  Their answers I recorded with GPS points, and jotted down in my 
notebooks and along the margins of the rivers on our maps.  This allowed me to 
simultaneously fill the great white spaces69 and to erase the abandoned names of the 
central borderlands (Harley 1988a, 1988b, 1989).  More often than not I found these 
maps in error, but what impact does this have on the local people and landscape? 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter demonstrates how the lack or erroneous nature of existing 
geographic information creates conflict between different user groups and negatively 
impacts state70 and NGO planning goals.  Surveys of four Ucayali tributary watersheds 
along the Brazilian border show current maps to be contradictory, incorrect, and 
outdated, resulting in a tangle of overlapping and competing concessions, conservation 
units, and indigenous territories that facilitates the agenda of illegal extractivists and drug 
traffickers at the expense of traditional residents and governmental and non-governmental 
organizations.  Conflict could be reduced by the creation of an actualized and dynamic 
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Figure 16.  Traveling up the Tamaya with the borderland Asháninka, one of the CIFA field assistants watches from the roof for 
both landmarks and snags.
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geographic information system informed by the local geographic knowledge of the 
current and traditional residents. 
In order to support this argument I start by briefly introducing the methods in the 
first section of this chapter.  Then, in section two, I use examples to demonstrate the 
dynamism of the physical environment of Amazonia and some of the challenges to 
mapping it.  In the following section, I also find dynamism in the human geography of 
the region and critique the existing cartographic information of resident populations on a 
watershed by watershed basis.  Section four demonstrates how plans have failed due to 
the lack of reliable and accurate geographic information and explores the consequences 
on the ground.  Finally, I conclude with an argument to improve cartography and 
geographic information through the incorporation of local knowledge. 
II. METHODS 
Research for this chapter was conducted in four watersheds in the Peruvian 
borderland region of Ucayali over eight months in 2004 (Figure 3).  The first step in 
fieldwork was obtaining published and unpublished geographic information of the four 
watershed study area through remotely sensed images, documents, maps, and 
informational interviews.  A comparison of these data sources revealed a great deal of 
inconsistencies and unknowns, underscoring the need to collect base line geographic 
information during research.  
Within the Callería, Utiquinía, Abujao and Tamaya Rivers I and five field 
assistants mapped the main course of each river, the mouths of important tributaries, and 
the larger population centers.71  We used Garmin eTrex Legend Global Positioning 
System receivers to record coordinate data and notebooks to document attribute 
information.  GPS points were usually taken from the boat although some were taken on 
shore.  The team worked specifically with long time residents in order to obtain local 
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knowledge and cultural attribute information to link to the GPS coordinates.  The most 
difficult aspect of the fieldwork was maintaining concentration in the boat during the 
long hours under the tropical sun.  An additional challenge was communicating clearly 
with our guides and motorist over the roar of the peke peke (Figure 17).  While repeated 
shouts and gestures allowed me to obtain basic attribute information, these difficult 
conditions made a more textured ethnography impossible (Figure 18).  The recording of 
information was more successful going upriver rather than down as more time was 
available for both informants and researcher to engage approaching landmarks or points 
of interest (Figure 19). 
On my return from the field, I used ArcGIS 8.3 to enter this locally informed data 
into a Geographic Information System already containing 2002 ETM+ unclassified 
Landsat images, the digitized Peruvian national maps from IGN72, digitized data on 
population centers from INEI73, data on eradicated coca fields from CORAH74, data on 
indigenous territories from various sources75, data on forestry concessions from the 
Peruvian Institute of Natural Resources (INRENA)76, data on mining concessions 
digitized from the Ministerio de Energía y Minas (MINEM)77 concession coordinates, 
and data of conservation proposals78 from Non-Governmental Organizations and the 
regional government.  I then analyzed this geographic database in conjunction with paper 
documents, websites, and key informant interviews to understand the regional complexity 
of the four watershed borderland region. 
III. A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT 
Amazonia’s landscape poses considerable challenges to cartographers and 
planners interested in actualizing older maps, obtaining up-to-date geographic 
information, and representing seasonal variability.  The two challenges outlined in this 
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Figure 17.  Communicating with the motorista was difficult over the roar of the motor.  Here, Pablito, an Asháninka, wears an 
application of achiote, Bixa orellana, on his face to protect his skin from the tropical sun. 
 76
 
Figure 18.  Rodrigo makes an emphatic point, but he is drowned out by the motor and the giggles of the Asháninka children 
laughing at the gringo fumbling simultaneously with GPS, maps, and camera. 
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Figure 19.  At times I was lucky enough to get the input of other informants such as this woman and child of the Shipibo 
Conibo, who shared their knowledge while getting a lift upstream.
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section include the highly dynamic hydrological systems and the difficulty in obtaining 
and analyzing high quality satellite imagery.  
The high levels of water volume and low gradient of most Amazonian rivers 
combine with an elevated sediment load and other suspended material to develop 
anextremely dynamic landscape characterized by the annual formation of new 
depressions, lakes, levees, beaches, islands, and river channels (Irion et al. 1995, 
Wittmann et al. 2004)(Figure 20).  Each year human, plant, and animal populations are at 
the mercy of these mercurial Amazonian rivers whose changing courses routinely 
undercut slopes to wash out hectare sized chunks of forest or strand formerly riverine 
populations on newly formed oxbow lakes (Goulding et al. 2003, Kalliola et al. 
1991)(Figure 21).   
The Ucayali is considered among the most dynamic and actively meandering 
rivers in the Upper Amazon in part due to Andean tectonics and a particularly low 
gradient (Abizaid 2005, Pärssinen et al. 1996).  This dynamism led Abizaid to find six 
meander cutoffs along the middle section of the Ucayali (Abizaid 2005) in the last ten 
years.  In the most dramatic example, Ucayali River carved a new channel in 1997, 
captured the main course of the river, and stranded the district capital of Masisea79 
(Abizaid 2005).  Figure 22 shows the Ucayali River from just upstream of the district 
capital of Masisea downriver to Pucallpa.  This map is digitized from four of the National 
Geographic Institute’s80 (IGN) 1:100,000 official maps called cartas nacionales.  The 
map delivers a somewhat antiquated view of the river as even though these cartas were 
printed in 1998 and 2000, the hydrography now looks much different (Figure 23). 
Figure 23 overlays the Ucayali course represented in the cartas nacionales on a 
satellite image from 2004.  Visual analysis clearly reveals the dynamism of the Ucayali 




Figure 20.  During the dry season, the low water levels on the Alto Purús expose alternate channels and significant deposits.  
This is a common feature of Amazonian white water rivers.  The riverine forest is secondary floodplain forest 
growing where the main channel might once have been. 
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Figure 21.  The Río Shesha, a tributary of the Abujao River, is a dynamic river with numerous oxbow lakes.  As seen here, 
local people adjust their agriculture to the dynamic Amazonian rivers.  This shot was possible because it was 
taken in the dry season through a break in the cloud cover. 
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Figure 22.  This detail of the Middle Ucayali River digitized from the cartas nacionales of the Instituto Geográfico Nacional is 
now a historical map due to the changing nature of this aggressively meandering river. 
 82
 
Figure 23.  Overlaying the IGN maps (in black) on top of the Ucayali River reveals the degree of dynamism with multiple new 
meanders and the stranding of Masisea on a huge oxbow lake.
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large new meanders in this short section of the river.  One of these shifts is the new eight 
kilometer long channel which shortened the Ucayali River by over 60 km, marooning a 
number of communities and Masisea on a 68 kilometer long oxbow lake (Figure 23).  
These shifts are not unique to the Ucayali proper, but are also common among its 
tributaries, including the four watersheds in the study area. 
While a shift of the magnitude described above is uncommon, the floodplain- 
dwelling Shipibo Conibo indigenous people are accustomed to relocating their villages 
according to the vicissitudes of the Ucayali. These moves are increasingly costly, 
however, with their entry into the market economy and a less flexible land tenure system 
(Bergman 1974, Pärssinen et al. 1996, Tournon 2002).  These river shifts81 frequently 
force a Shipibo Conibo village to transfer their valuable land title to an unflooded piece 
of land elsewhere, thus perhaps requiring a protracted negotiation process and another 
update to the map of indigenous territories (AIDESEP 1996)(Figure 24).  Over time, 
lesser shifts already call for an extensive update to this map as the titled lands of the 
Shipibo Conibo, largely demarcated in accordance with river banks in the 1970s, no 
longer coincide with the modern river course.  A quick look at remotely sensed images of 
the Ucayali floodplain show why this is the case with scars of former river channels, 
lakes, and newly formed beaches clearly visible ten kilometers away from the current 
river course (Figure 23). 
Unfortunately, in order to get a quick look at a remotely sensed image in 
Amazonia, one is usually confined to the dry season, as pervasive humidity largely 
obscures images with dense cloud cover for 75% of the year82 (Asner 2001)(Figure 21), 
and even cloudless dry season imagery is increasingly compromised by smoke from slash 
and burn agriculture (I. Foster Brown personal communication).  While cloud and smoke 
free imagery provides valuable baseline information on larger physiographic features like 
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Figure 24.  The Shipibo Conibo community of Nueva Esperanza is one such community forced to move from the floodplains 
of the Ucayali to an upland area on the lower Utiqunía River.  Photo: Wuild Párraga Pérez.
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rivers and floodplains, 10-30 meter resolution is still not good enough to identify locally 
important streams often obscured by canopy.  In addition, although remote sensing 
analysis can differentiate pasture, agriculture, secondary forest, and to a lesser degree 
classes within upland and floodplain forest (Brondizio et al. 1996, Foody and Hill 1996, 
Hill 1999, Mausel et al. 1993, Moran et al. 1994, Moran et al. 1996), the determination of 
cultural boundaries and population centers usually requires ancillary data informed by 
local knowledge. 
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF EXISTING CARTOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
While the dynamic physical landscape, and the difficulties of obtaining and 
analyzing clear imagery challenge map makers and census takers to render the 
geographic reality of a region, other factors also contribute.  My focus in this section will 
be on the human geography of the region, particularly the cartographic representation of 
local populations.  First I briefly introduce some of the challenges of mapping frontier 
communities before describing some of the efforts of national and regional organizations 
who have worked in the four watershed area.  These organizations include the National 
Geographic Institute (IGN), The National Office of Natural Resource Evaluation 
(ONERN), the Rural Settlement Research Center of the National Agrarian University- La 
Molina, the District of Masisea’s Strategic Development Planning Committee and the 
Instituto del Bien Comun’s Native Communities Information System Team.  The final 
portion of this section uses tables organized according to watershed to compare the 
population centers represented cartographically by these organizations.  Findings 
demonstrate the current cartographic information available on human settlement to be 
either outdated, incorrectly georeferenced, or lacking representation of indigenous 
peoples. 
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Amazonian settlements in road-less forested frontier zones are characterized by 
households and fields dispersed linearly along floodplains and riverside bluffs83 making it 
often difficult to determine cultural boundaries such as where one community might end 
and another begin, much less how to map the town with point data in these often 
contiguous linear communities (Figure 25).  Once identified, these population centers 
must be constantly updated cartographically as boom towns centered on resources like 
rubber, logging, coca, and gold appear and disappear with startling suddenness.  If 
abandoned, the villages are scavenged for useful and durable objects (e.g. zinc roofing) 
while the remainder is swallowed: quickly decomposing within the rapidly regenerating 
tropical forest (Figure 26).  The ability of the tropical forest to disguise the trace of recent 
human occupation should come as no surprise given the hundreds of years researchers 
have severely underestimated both pre-Columbian population levels (Denevan 2003, 
Mann 2005), and the extent and degree of their landscape modification (Butzer 1992, 
Denevan 2001; Heckenberger et al. 2003; Mann 2005).  However, the lack of information 
on current frontier populations is surprising given the increasing interest in these areas 
and the availability of advanced mapping technologies such as GPS receivers, geographic 
information systems (GIS), and satellite imagery. 
A. The Organizations and Data Sources 
1.  The National Geographic Institute’s Cartas Nacionales 
The National Geographic Institute is the governmental organization in charge of 
constructing and updating the official maps of Peru.  This was underscored in 2000 when 
President Fujimori signed the National Geographic Institute Law (Ley N° 27292) 
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Figure 26.  This abandoned house on the Utiquinía River may soon be swallowed by secondary forest.
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obligating public and private entities to provide cartographic and geographic information 
within 30 days of concluding any study generating geographic, remotely sensed, or 
cartographic information.  Unfortunately, even with this law, such critical information is 
rarely shared and then usually through personal contacts or reciprocity rather than 
enforced policies.  Despite this lack of sharing, the IGN and its partners have generated 
detailed paper maps of the country.  Regrettably, for the modern interpreter, these 
cartographic instruments quickly become dated due to the dynamic nature of the 
Amazonian region’s physical and human geography. 
The official map of Peru consists of over 500 topographic maps84 (cartas 
nacionales) produced at a scale of 1:100,000.  These maps were not constructed 
systematically as data sources, time of data collection, and the lead institutions vary since 
1970.  The predecessor of the IGN, the Military Geographic Institute, used radar images, 
aerial photography and fieldwork to delineate the oldest maps (Smith et al. 2003).  Maps 
produced after 1980 also used radar images and aerial photography but were compiled by 
the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) of the U.S. Department of Defense in conjunction 
with the IGN.  These partners completed the first nationwide topographic map in 1983.  
In 1996 the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA85) absorbed the DMA but 
continued working with the IGN to produce topographic maps of Peru with some of these 
newer maps now based on images from optical satellite sensors rather than aerial 
photographs. 
An analysis of the 17 IGN maps86 required to cover the four watershed study area 
show their data sources to be primarily aerial photographs as old as 1956 but not newer 
than 1984.  The maps do not rely on photography from any one time period, with 
cartographers using photographs from multiple flight lines and time periods to compile 
the geographic information.  Ten of the maps have detailed legends indicating they were 
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not checked in the field.  In some cases, the legend indicates to the map reader that the 
IGN has updated the information, however the manner and extent of this updating is not 
specified.  Several of these updated maps include toponyms written in a different font 
that are not easily cartographically referenced as they are associated neither with points 
nor buildings on the map.  In short, the ten maps with detailed metadata are based on 
geographic information dated since at least 1984 and furthermore, lack ground truthing.  
This may in part explain the obsolete depiction of the Middle Ucayali river course 
described above and the outdated representation of settlements. 
2. The National Institute of Statistics and Computing 
The National Institute of Statistics and Informatics (INEI87) is the organization 
that plans, directs, coordinates, evaluates and supervises all official statistical and 
computing activities in Peru (INEI 2005b).  The best known product of INEI is the 
national census.  The last available official census of Peru was the 1993 National Census 
(9th Population and 4th Household Census).  Fieldwork for the 2005 National Census 
(10th Population and 5th Household Census) was conducted in July and August of 2005 
with preliminary results disseminated in November of the same year.  However, results 
from the National Census at the sub departmental level were still unavailable at the time 
of this writing.  One of INEI’s objectives with the 2005 National Census was to include 
every community.  In order to accomplish this objective INEI elaborated an exhaustive 
pre-census mapping exercise to obtain information on the total amount of households in 
the country (INEI 2005a).  In the absence of new data at the local level of analysis I 
analyzed the Peruvian Map of Population Centers available through the INEI national 
cartography website (www.desa.inei.gob.pe).  
The Peruvian map of population centers is a vector based digital map of 
population centers registered88 in 2001 by INEI (INEI 2001).  Each population center has 
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attribute information associated with it: a unique identifier, department, province, district, 
toponym/name, category, classification, and number of houses.  This geographic 
information was created from the INEI Spatial Data Base whose population center 
information is the result of the 1999 Ministry of Education’s Digital Cartography of 
Population Centers version 01, 2001 INEI fieldwork with GPS, and the 2001 Updated 
Cartography and Population Center Directory of the 1999-2000 Pre-Census.  INEI lists 
various limitations of this database including the oral transmission of data, discrepancies 
between source data, and the logistical difficulties faced by official organizations 
attempting to update and verify the cartography (INEI 2001).  These restrictions may 
explain in part the limitations of the cartographic data described below.   
3. The National Office of Natural Resource Evaluation 
The Peruvian National Office of Natural Resource Evaluation (ONERN89) 
conducted a series of natural resource inventories on different areas of the country in the 
1960s, 70s and 80s.  These studies primarily evaluated a region’s potential and degree of 
natural resource use and proposed recommendations to improve their use and/or 
conservation.  ONERN saw the need for integrated studies of natural resources to solve 
problems caused by the scarcity of agricultural land, the inadequate national policies of 
territorial occupation, and the uneven development in distinct regions.  In their 
borderland studies, ONERN provided baseline information on natural resource use that 
policy makers could utilize to plan economic/social development and settlement policy.    
ONERN justified their 1978 study of the region between the Ríos Callería and 
Tamaya because it “…constitutes the obligatory route of the Pucallpa-Brazilian border 
road, that will complete the Peruvian side of the great transcontinental highway between 
Lima and Brasilia…” (ONERN 1979: preface) and provided the information necessary to 
fulfill the fronteras vivas90 policy of establishing border settlements to consolidate 
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national sovereignty (ONERN 1979).  While the road construction has never been 
realized and planned frontier settlement has largely failed, the study did provide 
extensive information on physiography, ecology, geology, soils, forestry, transport, and 
agriculture.  This continues to be the best regional data set available91 on these topics and 
has subsequently been used again and again to support a variety of studies, including the 
recent creation of natural resource concessions in 2004. 
Of less importance to ONERN was the demography of the region at the time of 
study: the volume contains only five paragraphs and a table dedicated to demography.  
The table, a representation of the region’s population according to the 1972 census, 
contained 30 settlements, but half do not appear in ONERN’s portfolio of maps (ONERN 
1979).  Furthermore, of the 28 total settlements on the ONERN maps, twelve of these do 
not appear in the census.  This lack of continuity between data sources within one 
document demonstrates a fundamental weakness in the published cartography of the 
Peruvian Amazon: a lack of knowledge of the location and size of population centers92. 
4. Fronteras Vivas 
In 1981, the Rural Settlement Research Center of the National Agrarian 
University- La Molina finished a first approximation of the Cantagallo Rural Settlement 
Project for the Ministry of War’s National Development Office.  The principal objective 
of the study was to reestablish regional sovereignty and national security through the 
promotion of development and the economic integration of the region (Centro de 
UNALM 1981).  This classic fronteras vivas discourse reflected fears of Brazilian 
penetration in a region scarcely populated93, rich in resources, and as yet untouched by an 
economic frontier ending at the western bank of the Río Ucayali (Centro de UNALM 
1981).  The researchers apparently did not conduct fieldwork, instead leaning heavily on 
the work of ONERN, demographic studies in 1976 and 1979 by the Ministry of 
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Agriculture, and forestry studies from the development committee of the Coronel Portillo 
province.  The study area was confined only to the Abujao and Utiquinía Rivers with the 
detailed demographic data only available for the Abujao. 
5. The Strategic Development Plan 
In 2002, the Municipal District of Masisea’s District Coordination and Fight 
against Poverty Group finished the 2006 Strategic Plan for the Coordinated Institutional 
Development of Masisea.  This 62 page document included an excellent hand drawn map 
of the district in addition to a list of the 22 indigenous communities and the 69 caseríos94 
(Municipalidad Distrital de Masisea 2002).  The district of Masisea includes only two 
rivers from the study area, the Tamaya and Abujao, and the document displays a greater 
knowledge of the Tamaya than the Abujao, perhaps due to the district capital’s location at 
the mouth of the Tamaya and that only two of the 45 local authorities contributing were 
from the Abujao River.  Also noticeably absent from the plan is an acknowledgement of 
the resident Asháninka and Isconahua indigenous people and the existence of an 
Isconahua reserve.  The only indigenous group mentioned directly are the Shipibo 
Conibo whose more accessible titled lands lie along the floodplains of the Ucayali and its 
tributaries. 
6. The Institute of the Common Good (IBC) and the Native Communities 
Information System (SICNA) 
In 1996 the SICNA program began in Loreto, Peru’s largest department, as an 
attempt to georeference Peru’s indigenous communities and to clarify the confusion of 
related geographic data (Smith et al. 2003).  As of December 2004, SICNA, now part of 
the Instituto del Bien Común95, had georeferenced and gathered detailed tabular 
information on 933 native communities, 65% of the estimated 1,450 total communities 
(Instituto del Bien Común 2004).  In addition to updating and improving information on 
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native communities, SICNA also collects GPS location points and basic information on 
settlements surrounding these communities.  SICNA began this exercise once fieldwork 
showed location and place name data for Amazonian settlements to often be erroneous 
(Smith et al. 2003).  Ultimately, SICNA has the best and most up-to-date settlement data 
in Amazonian Peru due to a team of expert fieldworkers, excellent laboratory facilities, 
and strong direction.  However, as shown below, their task is enormously challenging and 
thus work is ongoing.  Unfortunately, of the four watersheds in the study site, SICNA has 
only visited the Tamaya96 where their study of non-native settlements lacks completion 
due to the hostility of illegal loggers and coca growers in the region.  This hostility is not 
surprising given SICNA’s objective of georeferencing untitled native communities 
threatens lands and resources already used by loggers and coca farmers. 
B. The Watersheds 
1.  The Callería River 
The name of this river, mission and district have fluctuated between Callaría, 
Cayaría, and Calléria for hundreds of years97 (Larrabure y Correa 1905-1909, Ortiz 1962, 
Samanez and Palacios 1980).  Indeed, this uncertainty still exists today with the local 
people calling the area Callaría, the district being named Callería, with two of the official 
IGN topographic sheets using Río Callería while a third uses Río Callaría98.  Not 
surprisingly the confusion of place names continues when addressing population centers 
on the river.  In 1967, Diamond and Terborgh (1967) found only three indigenous 
villages along the first 30 miles of what they called the Callaría River with informants 
denying the presence of settlements upriver except for ephemeral logging crews pursuing 
the extraction of tropical cedar (Figure 27).  These villages were likely the precursors to 
the current indigenous communities of Nuevo Saposoa, Patria Nueva and Callería.  In 
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Figure 27.  The Shipibo Conibo village of Conta, formerly a mission, was first founded in 1859 (Pallarés and Calvo 1907: 68).  
The riverbank location provides easy access to transportation and water, while the rectilinear organization of the 
village may be a relic of its missionary past.  The village women, like many indigenous women in Amazonian 
Peru, are enthusiastic soccer players.
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1969, shortly after the fieldwork of Diamond and Terborgh, the first colonists formed the 
caserío of Pueblo Viejo upriver of these villages. 
Table 1 compares four different data sources for the river basin: the 1978 ONERN 
studies map, the IGN’s official national maps, the INEI’s GIS website and our own 
fieldwork.  Those population centers are organized geographically by data source with 
those at the top of the table proximate to the headwaters before descending in order to 
those closest to the river’s mouth.  The table makes immediately apparent the lack of 
cartographic information available for the middle and upper portion of the river: nine of 
the population centers found in 2004 are not represented in any way by the official 
sources.  Confusing the issue are the multiple names for the current village of San Miguel 
de Callería (Pueblo Viejo, Contamanillo, San Miguel).  If the ONERN study ignores the 
existence of indigenous communities entirely, the IGN and INEI maps do a better job 
although IGN does omit one while the INEI database locates another community 
incorrectly.  The table makes clear the confusion between data sources concerning the 
amount, location, and names of population centers on the river. 
2.  The Utiquinía River 
A look at Table 2 reveals improved correlation of the population centers between 
cartographic data sources on the Utiquinía River than from the Callería River.  While the 
lack of ONERN toponyms likely reflect less settlement in the 1970s, the study also 
ignores the Utiquinía army fort founded in 1959 and burned in 1978 and the existence of 
the village of Contamanillo99 (now called San José).  The IGN data is better although 
lacking the population centers closest to the headwaters.  However, the table finds serious 
flaws in the INEI database with all but two toponyms either incorrectly located or 
unknown.  Indeed, although the known population centers are ordered correctly, their 
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Table 1.  A Comparison of Population Centers on the Callería River by Data Source 
Source ONERN 1978 IGN 1990-1998 INEI 2001 Ramírez Zumaeta 2004 
Type Map National Maps Digital Map Fieldwork w. GPS 
     
    Lucasa/Sr. de los Milagros 
    Colonia Sarita 
    San Juan 
    Esperanza 
    Primavera 
    Santa Fe 
    Huacamayo 
    Shiringal 
    Pamaya 
 Contamanillo°   Vista Alegre 
 Pueblo Viejo° Contamanillo°  San Miguel de Calleria° 
  Calleria▪ Calleria#▪ Calleria▪ 
  Chiringote^ Mediacion Calleria^  
  Patria Nueva▪ Patria Nueva de Calleria▪ Patria Nueva▪ 
   Nuevo Saposoa▪ Nuevo Saposoa▪ 
* misspelled 
# wrong location 
^ unknown 
° The village of Pueblo Viejo absorbed the farm of Contamanillo before changing the village name to San Miguel de Callería. 




Table 2.  A Comparison of Population Centers on the Utiquinía River 
Source ONERN 1978 IGN 1990-2000 INEI 2001 Párraga Pérez 2004 
Type Map National Maps Digital Map Fieldwork w. GPS 
     
   Sarita Colonia^  
   7 de Junio*# 7 de Julio 
    Jordán 
  Gilgal Gilgal# Gilgal 
  San José San Jose Alto Utiquinia# San José 
 Santa Sofía Santa Sofía Santa Sofia# Santa Sofía 
  José Olaya Jose Olaya# José Olaya 
 Nuevo Utiquinía Nueva Utiquinía* Nueva Utuquinia*# Nuevo Utiquinía 
  Flor de Ucayali▪ Flor de Ucayali#▪ Flor de Ucayali▪ 
  Ramal Ramal Ramal 
 Jerusalén Jerusalén Nuevo Jerusalen Nueva Jerusalén 
     
   San Martin^  
   Shanabaquia^  
   Utuquinia^  
   Nuevo San Martin^  
* misspelled 
# wrong location 
^ unknown 
▪ 2004 Indigenous Community
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Figure 28.  The villages of the Utiquinía River, like other riverine Amazonian settlements, are difficult to map due to their 
ephemeral and linear nature.  This house, with its elevated floor, demonstrates the owner’s respect for the variable 
levels of the river.  Investments in the construction of many of these houses are minimal, in part so they can be 
abandoned at little cost if the river’s floods or owner’s fortune changes.
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location in the map show not even an approximate knowledge of their location alongside 
the river (Figure 28).  This may be due to this information being passed orally without 
georeferencing as referred to in the INEI metadata (INEI 2001).  The unknowns could be 
entirely wrong or villages that have merely ceased to exist.  This is not uncommon in 
these frontier settlements, however, Sarita Colonia could be placed on the wrong river as 
the headwaters of the Callería River has a hamlet by that same name (Table 1). 
3.  The Abujao River 
Our analysis of the Abujao River starts with the middle portion as the river 
empties into an oxbow lake, dividing in two along its lower course.  In addition, I add 
three regional level data sources to enrich the comparison.  In 1976 a demographic study 
by the Ministry of Agriculture found 99 families of colonists living along the Río Abujao 
excluding the indigenous community of Santa Luz100 and the garrisons of Repolla and 
Cantagallo (Centro de UNALM 1981).  The majority of these families lived dispersed 
along the river with the only nucleated settlements occurring in the caseríos of Abujao 
(twelve families) and J.C. Mariátegui (four families).  The Ministry of Agriculture’s 
Pucallpa office undertook another settlement study of the lower Río Abujao in 1979 and 
added a newly formed caserío, San Martín, to Abujao and J.C. Mariátegui (Centro de 
UNALM 1981). 
A look at Table 3 reveals a number of former population centers to no longer be 
in existence.  The only surviving army or police outpost is Cantagallo (Figure 29) with 
Repolla abandoned and Nuevo Canaán burned by the Sendero Luminoso101.  The studies 
from the 1970s appear sound with the oldest showing the caserío of Santa Luz to 
originally have been settled by indigenous people.  Ethnographic fieldwork also revealed 
the village of Abujao to originally be settled by the Asháninka, although now it is thought 
of as a caserío.  
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Table 3.  A Comparison of Population Centers on the middle and upper Abujao River by Data Source 
Source M. Agricultura 1976 ONERN 1978 M. Agricultura 1979 Masisea 2002 IGN 1995-1998 INEI 2001 Paredes y Pérez 
Type Map Map Map Map National Maps Digital Map Fieldwork w. GPS 
        
        
 Cantagallo Cantagallo  Cantagallo Cantagallo Canta gallo*# Cantagallo 





(Guardia)   
Nuevo Canaán°  
(Guardia)   
    San Mateo▪  San Mateo#▪ San Mateo▪ 
     Nueva Galicia°  Camahua▪ 
   Study stopped at 28 de Julio 28 de Julio veintiocho de Julio# 28 de Julio 
       San Martin 24 de Setiembre   24 de Setiembre 
     Lobo°   
    Santa Rosa Santa Rosa Santa Rosa# Santa Rosa 
    Sargento Lores^ Sargento Lores^ Sargento Lores^  
    Bello Horizonte^  Bello Horizonte^  
 C. N. Santa Luz& Santa Luz  Santa Luz  Santa Luz# Santa Luz 
     Abujao Alto&   
   San Martin^ San Martin^  Ricardo Palma^  
    Ricardo Palma^  San Martin^  
   J.C. Mariategui J.C. Mariategui  J. C. Mariategui# J.C. Mariategui 
  Caserio Abujao   Abujao Abujao Abujao Abujao# Abujao 
* misspelled 
# wrong location 
^ unknown 
° No longer exists 
▪ 2004 Indigenous Community
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Figure 29.  Few visitors ever reach this isolated borderland military outpost and rural settlement project.
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The IGN data appears reasonably accurate except for the need to verify some 
population centers and include the titled Asháninka village of San Mateo and the town of 
Santa Luz.  The INEI data again reveals systematic inconsistencies as not a single known 
population center is correctly located in geographic space.  The Masisea data resembles 
the INEI database in order and name but the georeferencing cannot be critiqued due to 
the lack of tributaries needed to accurately analyze the hand drawn map.   
4. The Tamaya River 
Analysis of the Tamaya is restricted to the middle and upper portions due to the 
length of the river, the amount of river and lakeside populations on the lower course, and 
the dangers presented by drug trafficking on the lower river.  Table 4 shows IGN’s 
national map data to reflect an older vision of riverine settlement with the name of one 
and two family farms (fundos102) appearing as population centers.  The Tamaya, and the 
region, continues to change with some fundos disappearing, others maintaining 
themselves103, and some even growing to become villages.  Meanwhile, the resident 
Asháninka, whose labor (debt peonage and slave) supported many of these fundos are 
entirely absent from the IGN data and show up on the Masisea and INEI maps only at the 
titled community of San Miguel de Chambira.  The SICNA data, on the other hand, 
represents the Asháninka accurately given they received an invitation by the Asháninka 
to map their presence on the river.  While the Asháninka’s traditional dispersed 
settlement style is a challenge to represent cartographically, the late 1990s saw them 
move downstream from the headwaters into riverside nucleated villages in order to be 
recognized by Peruvian authorities to obtain schools and titling.  Indeed, University of 
Texas student Emory Richey104 identified four untitled Asháninka villages in the Tamaya 
watershed in addition to the titled community of San Miguel de Chambira: Alto Tamaya 
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Table 4.  A Comparison of Population Centers on the middle and upper Tamaya River by Data Source 
Source Masisea 2002 IGN 1995-1998 INEI 2001 IBC 2003 Borgo López 2004 
Type Map Cartas Nacionales Digital Map GIS Shapefile Fieldwork w. GPS 
      
 Cayanya  Cayanya  Cayanya 
 Putaya Puerto Putaya Puerto Putaya Puerto Putaya Puerto Putaya 
    Alto Tamaya▪  Alto Tamaya▪  
     Abraham Poza 
     Amazonas 
 Nuevo Cayanya   Santa Cruz de Capironal Capironal 
      
 Yucanillo Yucanillo Yucanillo#  Yucanillo 
  Baldomero    
  López    
 Jacaya Jacaya Jacaya# Jacaya Jacaya 
  Shatanya    
  Barión Poza    
 Nohaya Noaya Nohaya# Noaya Noaya 
 San Miguel de Chambira▪   San Miguel de Chambira#▪  San Miguel de Chambira▪  San Miguel de Chambira▪  
 Nuevo Paraiso     
   Suaya^ Nueva Amazonia de Tomajao▪ Nueva Amazonia de Tomajao▪ 
  Santa Rosa Mahia# Bahia* Santa Rosa de Mahia 
   Israelita^   
 Nueva Libertad" Libertad°" Nuevo Libertad"   
  Esperanza°    
 Nueva Esperanza Huarimán Nueva Esperanza (Huariman)  Nueva Esperanza 
    Cametsa Quipasi▪  Cametsari Quepatsi▪  
  Vinuncuro Vinoncuro* Vinoncuro*   Vinuncuro 
 * misspelled 
# wrong location 
^ unknown 
° No location point 
“ No longer exists 
▪ 2004 Indigenous Community
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(82 residents in 2005), Nueva California (55), Nueva Amazonia de Tomajao (57), and 
Cametsari Quepatsi (126) (Richey 2005).  While these four populous Asháninka 
communities demonstrate the strength of their presence in the region, they are invisible 
on the official maps (Figure 30).  
If Asháninka residents are largely invisible on the official maps, coca towns, 
commonly called caseríos cocaleros, are present despite their relatively recent formation 
in the last 20 years.  Some of these towns continue to exist even after coca eradication 
efforts surged between 1999 and 2004 although out migration from coca cultivation 
centers is growing.  Other towns, like Libertad (Table 4), formerly a vibrant coca caserío 
with bars and numerous houses, have disappeared entirely.  We found Libertad 
completely swallowed in secondary growth, resembling nothing more than an abandoned 
logging camp.  So much so, that the motorist, who had worked the middle Tamaya in the 
1980s, simply did not recognize it. 
The best of the four data sources for population centers, despite its lack of 
georeferencing, is that of Masisea.  Population centers are readily identified as being in 
the correct location as tributaries are delineated and named.  This map is clearly informed 
by local knowledge, correctly locating the distant and Brazilian settled towns of Cayanya 
(Figure 31), Puerto Putaya, and Nuevo Cayanya (also called Capironal). In comparison, 
the IGN maps are largely correct but outdated, the SICNA data remains incomplete until 
their subsequent visit while the INEI digital map continues to place towns incorrectly in 
geographic space. 
C. A Confusion of Cartographic Data 
This review of the cartographic representation of riverine settlement along these 
four rivers underscores the difficulties faced by policy makers seeking reliable 
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Figure 31. This caserío, founded by Brazilians, is one of the closest to the Brazilian border.  Residents are few, with only four 
occupied houses.  This was once a Peruvian fundo, but became populated by Brazilians from the Amônia River in 
the 1980s.  They left the Amônia River when the Brazilian Asháninka started organizing to title their lands.  
Locals said, “In Brazil all the land is claimed, but here in Peru there is free land.”  Photo José Borgo López.
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geographic information of the area.  Locally informed field work demonstrates the 
current cartographic information available on human settlement to be either outdated, 
incorrectly georeferenced, lacking representation of indigenous peoples, or in some cases 
all three.  Therefore, the existing maps do not represent the current human geography of 
the region and are inadequate base maps for policy makers creating any conservation or 
development plan with goals to include or avoid conflict with local and traditional 
populations.  What then are the consequences on the ground? 
V. OVERLAPPING CLAIMS 
Inadequate base maps do not stop individuals and organizations from claiming 
frontier land and resources, rather they facilitate claims as the emptiness and uncertainty 
encourages speculation in natural resources by risk-taking entrepreneurs operating both 
legally and illegally.  In this section I map the overlapping claims of various stakeholders 
and organizations onto these flawed base maps to demonstrate the conflict resulting from 
both recent competing claims to territory and the imposition of these claims on the local 
people.  I begin by focusing on the claims of the longest term residents, the indigenous 
peoples, including those titled, untitled, and in voluntary isolation.  Then I briefly address 
the claims of the non-indigenous residents.  Following this I introduce the national forests 
and forestry concessions projected on the landscape from central offices in Lima.  I also 
include an analysis of mining concessions, increasingly prominent in the region, that 
often overlap other claims.  Finally I conclude by projecting the conservation goals of 
both non-governmental and governmental organizations on this poorly understood 
landscape.  Results demonstrate an impressive amount of claims on land and resources 
given the poorly understood nature of the region.  Nevertheless, these claims overlap with 
both existing populations and each other due to the lack of geographic information, 
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dialogue between organizations, or interest in thinking beyond immediate needs, thus 
exacerbating conflict on the ground in an area already marked by a weak state presence. 
A. Indigenous Territories 
Amazonian indigenous groups are mobile populations who migrate for many 
reasons: opportunity, coercion, and evasion being a few examples.  This mobility, in 
many cases, allowed groups to survive the invasion of their homelands by outsiders; 
however, the same trait can work against groups attempting to claim territory based on 
traditional occupation.  Indeed, attempting to reconstruct the pre-Columbian mosaic of 
indigenous homelands is enormously difficult due to the relative absence of archeological 
or archival data (Mann 2005).  It is also exceedingly difficult to identify the location of 
indigenous lands in the recent past for the same reason: an absence of reliable accounts.  
Here I briefly describe the current groups inhabiting the region. 
The most well known indigenous group in the area is the floodplain dwelling 
Shipibo Conibo.  Their lands are largely titled, in part due to the relative accessibility of 
their territories along the floodplains of the Ucayali Rivers and its tributaries, and their 
comparatively high level of organization and education.  Although the Shipibo Conibo 
are relatively well off in terms of titled lands and education they continue to organize and 
expand their current territories based on growing populations, dwindling resources, and 
in reaction to their challenging and dynamic floodplain environment.  The territories 
along the Ucayali floodplain near Pucallpa and at the mouths of the four study site rivers 
are largely Shipibo Conibo (Figure 32). 
In contrast to the visibility of the Shipibo Conibo with their titled lands and high 
level of organization, the terra firme dwelling borderland Asháninka have until lately 
been largely invisible to both regional and national authorities with only two titled 
territories.  This also differs considerably from their Asháninka cousins whose titled 
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Figure 32.  Within the four watershed study site lie territories of Shipibo Conibo, Asháninka, and Isconahua indigenous people.  The 
Shipibo Conibo live near the Ucayali floodplain, while the Asháninka live closer to the border in untitled and titled 
territory with the Isconahua roaming a regional reserve.
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territories number over 60 in the traditional Asháninka homelands of the Apurimac, Ene, 
Tambo, Urubamba and Upper Ucayali Rivers105.  Even other borderland populations of 
Asháninka such as those along the Yuruá and Sheshea Rivers have received title to their 
lands.  The Asháninka in the four watershed study site largely arrived in the region in the 
last 60 years.   Since 2000, the creation of forestry concessions and the subsequent rush 
of loggers into their territory, forced these people to organize to ensure their right to 
territory, education, and natural resources.  In the last five years, the majority of 
borderland Asháninka have formed nucleated villages contrary to their customary 
settlement pattern of impermanent and isolated family dwellings.  They have clustered to 
obtain the schools and territorial rights they covet106.  Figure 32 shows the four untitled 
Asháninka communities and one titled community along the Tamaya River, and the one 
titled and one untitled community on the Abujao River. 
Even less visible than the Asháninka communities in these borderlands are the 
Isconahua: an indigenous group in voluntary isolation.  The Isconahua, also known as the 
Iskobakebu or Isco (from now on referred to as the Isco), may still roam the reserve set 
aside for their use despite the increasing incursions of illegal loggers and drug traffickers.  
The anthropologist Manuel Cuentas estimates the Isco to number 240 persons (Arbaiza 
Guzmán et al. 1995) not including the descendants of the Isco described in Momsen 
(1964) and Whiton et al. (1964), now living in the Shipibo Conibo community of 
Callería.  The Isco have been seen as recently as 2001 on the Peruvian side (Manuel 
Cuentas personal communication) and 1999 across the border in Brazil (Montagner 
2002).   
Their regional reserve parallels the Brazilian border (Figure 32), but 
perambulations of the Isco are unlikely to respect administrative or political lines.  
Momsen (1964) believes that the seventeen Isco who left the Sierra del Divisor in 1960 
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are the last descendents of a southern group of Remo.  Whiton et al. (1964) agrees and 
argues that the ten groups the Isco acknowledged as relatives and allies in 1960 no longer 
exist.  This view is heartily endorsed by certain sectors of the Ucayali government, whose 
President in 2004 (a sawmill owner) declared in a meeting in Acre with Brazilian 
governmental officials that there are no uncontacted people between Pucallpa and 
Cruzeiro do Sul, since everyone up there at least had shoes meaning they could not be 
uncontacted, and thus the reserve should not be a deterrent to the proposed Pucallpa-
Cruzeiro do Sul road (Figure 33).  Oral histories (Arbaiza Guzmán et al. 1995, 
Montagner 2002) confirm the continued existence of the Isco in the Sierra del Divisor.  
The Isconahua are of particular importance to this study as they represent some of the last 
groups living in voluntary isolation, not only in Peru and Amazonia, but around the 
world.  The Amazon borderlands are one of the last regions where indigenous people can 
still roam in voluntary isolation. 
B. Local People 
The recent sightings of the Isco are by long time non-indigenous residents who 
live in the surrounding area.  Without the local knowledge of these people even less 
would be known about this region, however, in some ways these residents are even more 
invisible than many of the indigenous residents.  While the historically marginalized 
indigenous residents at least capture the imaginations of outsiders trying to envision 
Amazonia, other local people such as colonists or ribereños107 are rarely described in an 
Amazonia imagined as an empty rainforest with a sprinkling of colorful native 
Amazonians (Slater 2002).  The growing number of organizations supporting indigenous 
efforts of self determination means that indigenous people can now be better represented 
in centers of power than their neighbors.  Representing non-Indians cartographically also 
presents challenges as unlike indigenous people who can have communal land, surveyed
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Figure 33.  The proposed Pucallpa-Cruzeiro do Sul road is of great interest to the businessmen of Ucayali, however, the Isco 
(among other forest dwelling people and fauna) appear to be missing from this schematic portrayal of the 
borderland forest bisected by the asphalted road to integration. 
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territories, and the associated polygons on the map, non-Indians are either represented 
poorly in population centers by largely outdated and erroneous official maps, or often not 
at all.  Thematic maps exist of indigenous peoples and their territories, but are extremely 
rare for the territories, plots, and population centers of individual non-Indian farmers.  
Both Indian and non-Indian land and resource use is not restricted to a point or land title 
polygon on the map: they fish over large distances, and often travel kilometers into the 
forest to hunt, extract useful plants, or to harvest timber, among other activities (Figure 
34).  Figure 35 only represents those population centers researchers identified along the 
four major rivers: more caseríos (both mapped and unmapped) lie along tributaries. 
Regardless of their extensive use of territory, even the minority with a legitimate 
land title will likely not be readily visible in any official database due to the Special 
Titling Program’s (PETT108) lack of organization and modern technology.  Although 
PETT received a 1995 loan from the Interamerican Development Bank to develop an 
agile and transparent rural land market by clarifying the state of existing rural parcels, 
modernizing the rural cadastral system, and creating a central computerized rural 
property registry, in the study area, PETT has struggled to accomplish these goals.  The 
disarray of the Ministry of Agriculture archives (Figure 36), the logistical and financial 
challenges of getting to the borderland sites, and the landholders’ disinterest in using 
scarce financial resources to formalize property claims are just a few of the reasons.  
Thus, frontier landholders have continued to transfer, subdivide, and establish properties 
without validation from governmental authorities.  However, the recent superimposition 
of concessions onto these frontier lands has led residents to PETT in an attempt to justify 
their historical entitlement to territory. 
One ribereña’s story touches on many of these themes.  I was lucky to give her 
and an Asháninka woman a ride to their caserío from a neighboring Asháninka 
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Figure 34.  This colonist has collected palm fronds, animals, and skins for years in the 
borderland forests.  He lives on a small property, but his intimate knowledge 
of place covers the many kilometers needed to harvest these rainforest 
products (peccary and ocelot skins and turtles are pictured).
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Figure 35.  Population centers identified along the main rivers in the study site are shown in yellow.  These centers might contain as 
few as 10 or as many as 300 people.  Towns and hamlets along the tributaries are not represented. 
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Figure 36.  The land tenure related archives in the Ministry of Agriculture in Pucallpa, Ucayali are several steps away from being in a 
form usable for updating in a GIS. Anything older than 1980 is likely warehoused in Iquitos further complicating long 
time residents’ efforts to formalize their land holdings.
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village (Figure 37).  The ribereña was born in Atalaya but claimed to have lived along 
the Tamaya River in a fundo called Fundo Samuela for over 30 years.  Her fundo, like 
many, had now become a caserío: this one with twenty-three houses.  She and her family 
were very concerned about keeping their property because the Asháninka to the south 
were organizing to claim their land, while three forestry concessions had also been 
imposed by the nation state directly on top of both the caserío and their 30 year old 
fundo.  According to her, years before, only three families of Asháninka lived on the 
nearby creek.  She listed them by name and said the current Asháninka leader was not 
even from this stretch of the river, but from upriver on the Putaya.  While she said this, 
the Asháninka woman sitting next to her, said nothing, even when I asked her.  Later, she 
did speak, and I discovered that while she lived with her family in the caserío, her son 
lived in the nearby Asháninka community. 
When we arrived at the caserío, the Asháninka left with her granddaughter, while 
my boat pilot and I were invited to sit out a sudden downpour over a couple coconuts of 
coconut water.  As I sipped the water from the coconut by straw, I looked around and saw 
only a handful of houses rather than the twenty-three she had mentioned earlier.  She 
explained, “There are nine houses united here, but there are twenty-three overall, with 
some nearby and others spread out up and down the riverside.”  She willingly shared her 
entire problem.  Although she had lived there for thirty years her documents did not go 
back that far.  Unfortunately, the guerillas109 had burned their original documents in 
1989.  This loss was increasingly unfortunate because, in addition to the Asháninka 
dispute, three forestry concessions had been projected by the state on top of both the 
caserío and their 30 year old fundo.  These forestry concessions had been superimposed 
on their lands and caserío even though their caserío’s school was administered by 
Ucayali.  In an ironic twist, she worried about the concessionaires claiming their land and  
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Figure 37.  Two neighbors reflect the diversity and interconnection of the longtime 
residents of the borderlands: the ribereña woman who has lived on a 
riverside fundo for 30 years and the Asháninka woman taken from her Gran 
Pajonal home to become a slave in Iquitos at the age of 10 before eventually 
ending up on the Tamaya River. 
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resources even though she well knew their immediate timber prospects were limited: 
“Now there is no more timber.  To work timber you’ve got to go oooohhhh far away.”  In 
retrospect, this is likely because she and her husband logged everything near their fundo 
over the last 30 years.   
At this point, her husband arrived from the fields, and quickly went inside to get 
the paperwork they did have.  One document was from the Peruvian National Institute of 
Natural Resources (INRENA) and was called a Certificate of Renewal110.  This certificate 
dated the 22nd of July, 2003 stated that they possessed a 90 hectare property called Fundo 
Samuela.  Another document, the Certificate of Special Possession of 1987111 said they 
had possession of Fundo Samuela since 1983.  The husband had gone recently to 
Pucallpa to declare their residency to precede 1983, but was told that all the documents to 
substantiate his case would be unavailable in Loreto.  While their date of arrival was 
variable in our conversation, gradually receding from 1973 to 1969, I saw no reason not 
to believe them, but unfortunately I was in no position to help obtain their title.  Indeed, 
my own presence there became a bit more precarious when she told me, “CORAH112 
came in July and August of last year and took out every bit of coca113.  Now there’s 
nothing.”  The rain stopped, I thanked them for the coconuts and the conversation, 
wished them good luck, and continued upriver.  
This field account brings together dilemmas shared by many of the longtime 
residents of the borderlands.  First, their documented claim to the land may not be strong 
despite years of permanence.  This is critical as their former Asháninka slaves, allies, 
friends, or workers may be claiming the same land they have lived on for a generation.  
In addition, forestry concessions are being drawn on their lands because of either their 
lack of legitimate title or the indifference or inadequacies of the national forestry and land 
tenure apparatus.  Finally, with markets for traditional crops distant and transportation  
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costs high, they may have joined the latest economic booms, coca cultivation or illegal 
logging, which while relatively lucrative, could complicate their economic and land 
tenure status further.            
Title or no title, these frontier people are of a variety of origins.  While some have 
ancestors from the region, a substantial number are Brazilian or of Brazilian descent who 
either came during the rubber tapper era or more recently by walking over the watershed 
divide on varaderos114.  Whole towns in the headwaters speak primarily Portuguese, with 
some of these towns being the best organized in the region.  Other residents have come 
from the eastern slopes of the Andes, with a particularly strong migration of coca farmers 
arriving in the region since the 1980s.  These coca farmers dramatically changed the 
economic landscape by employing the current residents in coca cultivation, improving 
transportation networks and drastically increasing inflation in local economies115.  The 
attractiveness of the region for coca farmers centered on well drained soils, the 
availability of unclaimed land, the absence of governmental authorities, and the 
proximity of the Brazilian market and transportation routes.   Thus, the “emptiness” or 
apparent “emptiness” was a major attraction for illegal drug traffickers and coca 
cultivators.  Figure 38 shows the areas where in 2003 and 2004, almost 3,000 coca fields 
were eradicated by Peruvian authorities.  As can be surmised from the map, many of the 
villages along the middle and upper courses of these rivers were characterized by coca 
cultivation.   Local people adapted to the new conditions, including the arrival of the 
Shining Path, with some becoming coca farmers and others resisting116. 
C. Forestry Concessions 
Chapter three will focus in more ethnographic detail on the conflict caused by 
overlapping claims between local people and forestry concessions.  However, these 
concessions and the national forests they belong to are key elements in the tangle of 
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Figure 38.  The arrival of the coca farmers from the eastern slopes of the Andes beginning in the mid-1980s brought economic 
opportunity to the borderlands, but also intensified violence in the region with the increase of drug traffickers, smugglers, 
and the arrival of the Shining Path.
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competing interests in the borderlands and deserve a brief summary here.  The creation of 
national forests117 (also called Primary Production Forests) in the region also centered 
around the concept of “emptiness” as these territories were thought to lack people but 
contain stands of mahogany and other coveted hardwoods.  The potential of these forests 
became increasingly important as the over harvest and increasing regulation of mahogany 
and other species in Brazil and Bolivia made Peru a leading exporter in Latin America 
(Kometter et al. 2004).  The increase in timber exports118 is a reflection of Peru’s 
commitment to growing its forest sector through increased and improved logging in 
Amazonian regions such as Ucayali, Loreto and Madre de Dios. 
INRENA ostensibly creates these Primary Production Forests on lands believed 
largely uninhabited and full of timber potential.  However, determining population and 
timber potential requires resource and geographic information not easily accessible from 
planning offices.  Loggers interviewed in the field found INRENA’s to have greatly 
overestimated the amount of export quality timber given that INRENA’s sources of 
information were outdated ONERN reports rather than field inventories.  Since the latest 
ONERN studies of the 1980s a great deal of logging has taken place in the region, both 
illegal and legal, with a recent surge since 2000.   
INRENA’s lack of fieldwork also impacts local populations. There is no 
systematic attempt to detect the untitled populations in the area; technicians consult with 
PETT to identify the few titled lands in the targeted forests, but even this is hampered by 
PETT’s lack of a digital database.  INRENA and PETT must then locate the correct paper 
map in the archives (Figure 36) before digitizing.  INRENA can also consult with other 
organizations attempting to update PETT files.  Several organizations dedicated to the 
empowerment of indigenous peoples are working to advance titling efforts: the IBC, the 
Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP119), 
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Cutivereni Conservation Association (ACPC120), and The Center for the Development of 
Indigenous Amazon Peoples (CEDIA121).  Unfortunately, although many of these 
organizations have valuable data, they are often in different formats due to the use of 
different software platforms, field methodologies, and criteria and thus require additional 
work to incorporate into INRENA’s GIS.  All of these efforts (national forests, 
indigenous lands, individual titles…) use the out of date cartas nacionales for reference 
due to their status as the official cartography of Peru (Smith et al. 2003).  Despite the 
issues described earlier, there are few alternatives.  Ultimately, INRENA’s forestry 
department is undermanned and under pressure to follow through with its mandate of 
improving timber production and thus has created three primary production forests in the 
lowland Peruvian Amazon but with too little field reconnaissance of the area and the 
archival issues described above, geographic information is often lacking, erroneous, 
outdated, or contradictory. 
These production forests are projected onto the out of date hydrography of the 
cartas nacionales and divided into concessions for individual logging outfits.  While this 
system and the associated 2000 forestry law (Ley 27308) are guided by the principle of 
sustainable use, their foundation is flawed due to a lack of detailed knowledge of the 
human and physical geography, adequate cadastral and public record systems, and 
accurate and up-to-date ecological data on targeted forests.  In the absence of the above 
and of local knowledge from the forests, logging concessions are mapped a priori in 
Lima offices onto lands containing illegal loggers, drug traffickers, settlers, indigenous 
people, and forests that do not contain the high value hardwoods outlined in the outdated 
concession survey122.  This has led to serious conflicts in the region between local 
populations (indigenous and non-indigenous) and concessionaires.  A cartographic 
analysis of the overlap between concessions, population centers and indigenous territories 
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can be seen in Figure 39.  This flawed geographic foundation undermines the entire 
system and coupled with extremely weak enforcement encourages loggers to practice 
illegal logging wherever high grade hardwoods remain123.  Indeed, in 2005, the 
stimulating effect of forestry concessions on illegal logging rates led the Amazonian 
department of San Martín to reject new forestry concessions designed by INRENA and 
contributed to their declaration of a department wide state of environmental emergency.  
Some of the areas hit hardest are the “emptiest” of the “empty” landscapes, the territories 
for indigenous people in voluntary isolation.  Reconnaissance of the Isconahua reserve 
found it full of illegal logging roads and camps (Figures 40-44) that extend to the 
Brazilian boundary and beyond (Figures 45-46).  To the south of the central border on the 
affluents of the Juruá, similar illegal logging efforts are underway, as Brazilians have 
noted mahogany planks floating downriver from other Peruvian reserves for indigenous 
people in voluntary isolation after extreme flood events (Piedrafita Iglesias 2006). 
D. Mining Concessions 
The gold mining rush in Ucayali began in 2002, although local people mined on a 
small scale in the Abujao watershed before then.  Between 2002 and 2004 the Peruvian 
Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) created over 140 gold mining concessions in 
Ucayali alone with the majority in the Abujao and Utiquinía watersheds.  These 
concessions, unlike the forestry concessions, occasionally bounded by ecological limits 
like rivers, are purely cartographic constructs rectilinearly framed in geographic space by 
kilometer vertices in UTM coordinates124 rounded to a thousand meters (Figure 47).  The 
concessions’ planners demonstrate a complete lack of or indifference to existing 
cartographic information as these concessions are superimposed on every other Peruvian 
claim represented in Figure 48: forestry concessions, indigenous territories, military 
bases, population centers, and, as seen in the next section, conservation proposals.
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Figure 39.  Forestry concessions projected from Lima offices on to outdated cartas nacionales superimpose indigenous and non-
indigenous communities, as well as coca cultivation.  Even those areas without concessions such as the Isconahua reserve 
and even the edge of the Serra do Divisor national park in Brazil are overrun by illegal loggers taking advantage of the 
lack of state presence.
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Figure 40.  The Isconahua Regional Reserve is not only transited by the Isco, but also by illegal loggers clearing ten meter 
wide paths such as these to roll valuable logs to creek-side staging areas.
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Figure 41.  Lined up next to a creek, forty illegally extracted tornillo, Cedrelinga catenaeformis, logs await the flood season 




Figure 42.  A CIFA researcher stands on top of a giant Lupuna tree, Chorisia integrifolia, 
recently felled by illegal loggers in the Isconahua reserve.  Lupuna is used 
exclusively for plywood manufacture and commands a ready domestic 
market.  Photo: J. Fuchs.
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Figure 43. Abandoned logging camps testify to the prolonged logging presence in the Isconahua Regional Reserve.
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Figure 45.  A logging road leads from Monument 67 into Brazil.  Loggers cut down timber in Brazil’s Serra do Divisor 
National Park and then roll the logs or carry the planks over the international boundary into the Isconahua 








Figure 47.  Mining concessions can create conflict when they overlap forestry concessions, indigenous territories, population centers, 
and even the military settlement unit.  The degree of overlap leads one to wonder whether the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy officials even looked at existing maps.  
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Indeed, their only apparent agreement with existing geographic information is their 
clustering over the region’s unique geological formations (Figure 4).  These are the same 
conical formations revered by local indigenous people and earmarked for preservation by 
conservation biologists due to their unique habitats and rare species (Benites Elorreaga 
2002, Stap 1990, Whitney et al. 2004). 
While subsurface rights in Peru are vested in the national domain, mining 
activities can be carried out by individuals125 and legal entities holding a concession 
granted by the Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM) (Gasón Roe 1998, Gurmendi 
2004).  The concession grants the owner the right to perform mining activities in the area 
determined by their concession.  The concession system includes mining concessions for 
exploration and exploitation, processing concessions, service concessions, and 
transportation concessions (Gasón Roe 1998).  Concessionaires must comply with 
environmental laws as regulated by MEM: the only governmental body in charge of the 
environmental regulations of mining in Peru.  Environmental regulations include 
environmental impact assessments (EIA) and controlling the environmental effects 
produced by activities on mining sites and their zone of influence126 (Gurmendi 2004).  
Supreme Decree 016-93 EM requires concessionaires to submit environmental impact 
assessments (EIA) when applying for a mining or processing concession (Gasón Roe 
1998).  MEM’s website provides detailed maps on territorial environmental 
evaluations127, programs of environmental management128 (PAMAs), and environmental 
impact assessments (EIAs)129 (Ministerio de Energía y Minas 2006).  However, an 
analysis of MEM’s maps demonstrates none of these environmental assessments, 
programs, or evaluations to have been carried out in the borderlands despite the presence 
of over 140 concessions.  
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These mining concessions flooded the region with entrepreneurs and miners.  
Some of the miners came from nearby and distant parts of Peru; while others arrived 
from Brazil, and a few from other more distant countries.  In one case over 22,000 
hectares of concessions between the Utiquinía and Abujao Rivers were under the name of 
one man.  Neither I nor my field assistants were able to confirm or deny rumors in the 
field that the company operating there was run by either South Africans or North 
Americans.  The influx of miners to the region, similar to coca farmers, radically changed 
the local economy and demography.  In the case of the village of 23 de Noviembre 
(Figure 48), all of the original residents except one abandoned the caserío in 2001 when 
threatened by a local mining company.  The company was unhappy their village 
overlapped the mining company’s concession.  Miners tolerate this last resident only 
because he provides them with game and fish.  
In 2004, the new mining town of 23 de Noviembre was made up of miners and 
merchants from elsewhere: most had lived there only two years.  This new 23 de 
Noviembre is entirely focused on servicing the mining industry and the miners with their 
ready cash or gold.  The price of a gram of gold during fieldwork in 2004 was eleven and 
a half U.S. dollars130.  Two grams could purchase a crate of twelve beers while one gram 
could buy a session with a prostitute.  Food was likewise expensive with a plate costing 
between a dollar and a half and three dollars.  The daily wage for local mine workers not 
directly working in mineral exploitation (porters, cooks…) was six U.S. dollars a day.  
Those involved directly in exploitation split 20% of the mine’s production.  This influx of 
cash has transformed 23 de Noviembre into a large commercial center with electricity, 
bars, stores, restaurants, hostels, service stations, radios, brothels, and even a medical 
post with a nurse (Figure 49).  However, there are no authorities: problems in town are 
settled there, often with violence.
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Figure 48.  The relatively high quality construction of fences and houses show 23 de Noviembre to be distinct from most 
villages in the area.
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Figure 49.  The row of restaurants and bars surrounding the main square demonstrate this to be a resource boom town.  This 
gold mining town is characterized by a surplus of currency, and unlike the more typical subsistence village where 
cash is difficult to come by. 
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About eight companies work immediately around 23 de Noviembre using labor 
primarily drawn from Pucallpa and Brazil.  Residents referred to many of the owners as 
Brazilian, although by law foreigners cannot hold property or resource rights within 50 
kilometers of the border131.  Miners operate out of camps: each has their own generator, a 
gas or wood stove, and is supplied with foodstuffs every 15 days.  The local miners use 
hydraulic mining techniques (Figure 50) to excavate huge holes in the creeks in their 
search for gold (Figure 51).  Water and mud accumulates at a pool in the bottom (Figure 
52).  This is then carried out and run through a filter with a special carpet-like fabric that 
catches the heavier deposits (Figure 53).  The fabric is washed before mercury is added to 
form an amalgam with the gold.  Finally, the gold is purified in small ovens.  According 
to the locals, with a good site one can obtain between 300 and 400 grams of gold a day 
and a 30 meter diameter pool lasts a month.  Similarly, if a 100 hectare concession had a 
good bit of gold it could be worked for two years.   
However, this technique takes a heavy toll on the local hydrology and ecosystems 
as creeks become huge sandpits with slow moving muddy water (Figure 54).  The mining 
operations working in the area import their own water since hydraulic mining and 
mercury make the creek water unfit for human consumption.  The local hunter and 
fisherman, the only pre-boom resident, said that this section of the Abujao no longer has 
fish.  Instead, he supplies the miners with the tiny fish he takes out of a lake 30 minutes 
upstream.  According to him the miners don’t care about the quality of the fish, since 
they’re not from the area.  Unfortunately, local people downriver are seeing their 
landscape, town, water, and protein sources altered by the imposition of mining 
concessions on the lands upriver (Figure 54).  Elsewhere in Amazonia gold mining is 
associated with impacts to the atmosphere (Artaxo et al. 2000), fish communities (Mol 
and Ouboter 2004), water systems (Kuramoto 2001), forests (Fostier et al. 2000), children 
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Figure 50.  Hydraulic pumps are used to blast water at great pressure and destabilize the earth thus freeing the gold to settle on 




Figure 51.  Gold miners near the Abujao River radically alter the geomorphology of the region using hydraulic excavators.  A 
mining company drove away most of the local residents on receiving the concession while downstream residents 
continue to suffer the impact of these invasive mining techniques.  Photo: Ronald Paredes del Águila.
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Figure 52.  This holding pond is strewn with mining machinery and ringed by wooden wall supports.  Notice the mining camp 
to the right.  Photo: Ronald Paredes del Águila.
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Figure 53.  This filter uses a carpet (not shown) to catch the gold as it comes through the sluice.  Behind the filter, palm fronds 
are used to separate the different holding ponds.  Photo: Ronald Paredes del Águila.
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Figure 54. This creek, a few years ago almost invisible at this altitude, is now a bloated silt, and sand filled creek polluting 
portions of the Abujao, the Ucayali, and further downstream.
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(Grandjean et al. 1999, Pinheiro et al. 2007), indigenous people (Bedoya 2004, Maurice-
Bourgoin et al. 2000, Maurice-Bourgoin et al. 1999, Sing et al. 2003), and livelihoods 
(Bedoya 2004, Heemskerk 2002) in the Amazon basin and neighboring watersheds.  
Related studies focused on mining related mercury contamination reveal 
anthropogenically released mercury may be localized (Lechler et al. 2000, Wasserman, 
Hacon, and Wasserman 2003) given the mercury rich nature of the basin.  While the 
immediate threats may be passing in this study site as miners appear to be exhausting 
their concessions, their potential relocation will only threaten the next “empty” lands and 
their residents. 
E. Conservation Units 
Local people rarely drive the creation of conservation units such as national parks 
and biosphere reserves132.  While exceptions exist (i.e. Brazil’s extractive reserves), most 
of these territories are created by national governments motivated in part by international 
pressure generated by conservation organizations.  Nevertheless, if conservation goals are 
to be reached, these newly created conservation units must engage the local people whose 
resource and land use takes place in and around the proposed protected areas.  This 
section will address the very real overlap of borderland protected area formation and 
local people. 
On April 11th, 2006 the creation of the Zona Reservada133 Sierra del Divisor 
along the border with Brazil was officially announced (Manrique Ugarte and Ministerio 
de Agricultura 2006).  This conservation unit covers almost a million and a half hectares, 
an area larger than Connecticut, including the Isconahua Regional Reserve.  The creation 
of the Sierra del Divisor reserve zone is of immediate benefit to the conservation of 
cultural and biological diversity.  The territory of the Isco, as documented earlier, is 
currently under siege by illegal loggers and unregulated miners.  If it is not too late, the 
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increased profile of the area, increased legal status of their reserve, and ideally, increased 
enforcement, might reduce the pressure on Isco resources and territory.   
The biological diversity of the Sierra del Divisor range has long been recognized 
as one of the highest in the world (Scarcello et al. 1998) with a recent biological survey in 
the reserved zone finding eighteen different species of primates, the highest ever recorded 
in one place in South America (The Nature Conservancy 2006).   Bird diversity is also 
unusually high with at least 300 species found in the Sierra del Divisor region (Scarcello 
et al. 1998) including a recently discovered new species of ant shrike (Whitney et al. 
2004).  The scenic beauty of the area is also highly unusual for the lowland Amazon with 
visually arresting extinct volcanoes rising out of the surrounding rainforest (Figure 4).  
The extraordinary and isolated igneous cones and ridgelines harbor rare ecosystems 
unique to the lowland Amazon region such as dwarf woodlands (Whitney et al. 2004).  
The landscape level importance of the new reserved zone is also critical as it provides a 
key link in an international conservation corridor of protected areas stretching hundreds 
of kilometers into both Peru and Brazil.  More immediately, the reserved zone provides a 
large potential buffer to the Parque Nacional Serra do Divisor, although as I noted earlier 
in reference to logging, much damage has already been done.  
What is interesting given the elevated conservation importance of the Sierra del Divisor 
is why it took so long to be created.  Having been associated with efforts to protect the 
Sierra del Divisor since 2002, I can relate some of the challenges to its creation.  
Scientific interest in the Sierra del Divisor region can at least be traced back to the mid 
1980s (Benites Elorreaga 2002; Stap 1990), but efforts to assign the Sierra del Divisor a 
conservation designation began only in the late 1990s with the labors of the Peruvian 
NGO Pro Naturaleza (Benites Elorreaga 2002).  Pro Naturaleza conducted two biological 
studies in different parts of the Sierra del Divisor, but their proposal for national park 
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creation was rebuffed.  In October of 2002, I joined the Field Museum of Chicago in their 
helicopter overflights of the region (Figure 55).  At the conclusion of the overflights we 
submitted a proposal for the park’s creation, including new ecologically grounded 
boundaries, to the Peruvian government.  Again, the proposal was not embraced, 
probably for political reasons related to unrest incited by the creation of logging 
concessions.  Continued efforts to advance the conservation of the region followed from 
2003 to 2006 under the leadership of The Nature Conservancy134 and Pro Naturaleza135.  
At the same time, the regional government of Ucayali136 submitted a parallel set of 
proposals to the Ministry of Agriculture for two borderland conservation units to be 
administered at the regional level (GOREU 2004).  This proposal was partly driven by 
the regional government’s interest in mollifying the Acre government of Brazil in regards 
to repeated invasions of the Parque Nacional Serra do Divisor by Peruvian loggers.  The 
regional government thought the creation of a boundary reserve would improve relations 
with Acre enough to build a road from Pucallpa to Cruzeiro do Sul.  Ultimately, the 
Nature Conservancy proposal for a reserved zone137 was accepted on April 3, 2006 and 
published in El Peruano on April 11 (Manrique Ugarte and Ministerio de Agricultura 
2006).  While this victory is due primarily to the hard work of conservationists who 
steadily built an impressive body of ecological and political evidence, the actual creation 
was likely sparked by the gunfight on April 2 between Peruvian loggers and the Brazilian 
military in Brazil’s Serra do Divisor National Park (Brasileiro 2006).  Chapter Three will 
describe in more detail how the political and economic goodwill between these 
Amazonian neighbors was being increasingly and negatively affected by the repeated 
trespassing of Peruvian loggers into Brazilian territory. 
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Figure 55.  Taking coordinates with a handheld GPS in a military helicopter required hanging your arm out the door while you 
held on with the other as you screamed attribute information at your stenographer partner over the roar of the 
blades.  Photo: Lily Rodríguez.
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The Sierra del Divisor Reserved Zone’s creation was delayed most likely due to 
the parallel creation of the highly contentious primary production forests and their 
concessions.  As noted earlier, one of the great threats to the sustainability of these 
concessions is the lack of adequate geographic information.  Similarly, this also holds 
true for the conservation of the Sierra del Divisor.  While we carried remotely sensed 
images, cartas nacionales, and GPS on the Field Museum overflights in 2002, we had 
very little idea what was on the ground.   This ignorance was particulary true with regards 
to the location of local populations, given that they can be difficult to find in imagery, 
and, as noted earlier, are often incorrectly located, absent, or outdated on official maps.  
Because of the lack of ground-truthed field knowledge, the Nature Conservancy and Pro 
Naturaleza contributed to my field-based research project in 2004.   
Nonetheless, as Figure 56 demonstrates, some overlaps exist with both local 
people and competing administrative claims in the Sierra del Divisor Reserved Zone and 
in the Murunahua-Tamaya Ucayali government conservation proposal.  First, the Zona 
Reservada Sierra del Divisor does include a number of caserío cocaleros138 on the 
Callería River.  This presents both opportunities and challenges.  As described in the 
following chapter, many of these cocaleros139 may be leaving the area, thus enabling a 
well organized and funded conservation project to influence land use change in the zona 
reservada and its buffer zone.  However, any still present cocaleros not interested in 
environmental protection could present a localized challenge to the conservation of the 
headwaters of the Callería.  This could arise through their coca cultivation, but more 
likely through the trafficking of drugs across this border.  Continued drug trafficking 
across this border is inevitable given its rainforested expanse, accidental topography, and 
the presence of coca source (Peru) and coca derivative market (Brazil and beyond) on 
either side of the border.  The regional government’s proposal to the south faces similar 
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Figure 56.  Conservation proposals provide another overlapping claim on the territory of the central borderlands of Peru and Brazil.
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trafficking challenges at the headwaters of the Abujao and Tamaya although coca 
cultivation appears to not be recently active along the border140.  These borderland 
conservation units must keep their primary objectives in mind if they are to succeed.  Any 
concerted attempt to control drug trafficking with park ranger stations will only lead to 
dead rangers.  It would be preferable for conservation organizations to turn a blind eye to 
limited trafficking of coca derivatives along the varaderos than to put the larger goal of 
cultural and biological conservation in jeopardy through confrontation.  Brazil has had 
limited success in controlling the trafficking through their Serra do Divisor National Park 
despite much greater military and conservation resources than those presently on hand in 
the Peruvian borderlands. 
The regional government’s strategy of conservation unit creation is distinct from 
that of the Sierra del Divisor.  Where the Sierra del Divisor tried to avoid overlap with 
recognized population centers, the regional government felt obligated to overlay their 
proposal on top of forestry concessions and local residents.  Their analysis of the 
borderland forestry concessions within their proposal found revealed most borderland 
concessionaires to be behind in their mandatory concession payments, leaving their 
concessions vulnerable to appropriation by the nation (they hoped to buy out the 
remaining concesssions).  As for the local people, they anticipated that the untitled 
Asháninka would want to be part of a conservation unit and had no detailed knowledge of 
caseríos, although at least one exists.  
While, in the short term, the Iscos of the Sierra del Divisor and Asháninka of Alto 
Tamaya might welcome any measure able to stop the flood of illegal loggers into their 
territory, they and other residents will likely find any management plan a serious 
constraint in the long term.  This will be particularly problematic if large numbers of Isco 
are found to inhabit the Sierra del Divisor.  More immediately, the Zona Reservada Sierra 
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del Divisor, and potentially the Murunahua-Tamaya unit, will need to figure out how to 
expel the illegal loggers and then keep them out.  Continued illegal logging would be 
disastrous to the cultural and biological conservation goals of these units, and could also 
increase coca trafficking141.  Perhaps even more disastrous, given the legality of the 
concessions are the over 100 mining concessions within the Zona Reservada Sierra del 
Divisor.  Their ecosystem altering extraction and processing methods are completely 
anathema to the conservation goals of the Sierra del Divisor, but their legal right to rent 
subsurface rights presents a legal challenge to overcome.  Nevertheless, as identified in 
localized fieldwork in 23 de Noviembre, mining may already be exhausting accessible 
gold deposits in the area.  If the most virulent forms of mining, logging, and coca 
cultivation can be prevented in the Sierra del Divisor, conservation goals may be 
attainable despite the continued presence of varaderos dedicated to coca trafficking.  In 
addition, the neighboring communities at the headwaters of the Abujao may have long 
term potential as centers of cultural and ecological tourism.  This could prove to be an 
economic boon given the current depressed economies of these isolated population 
centers.  At the same time, resident’s resource and land use could also challenge 
conservation goals.  The Isco overlap remains a critical issue, however, that can only be 
solved with improved information concerning their numbers, location, and goals.  Their 
evasive tactics are doomed to fail in face of the gradual reduction and parceling of the 
borderlands, so it is important to allocate them territory now. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The borderlands of Amazonia present unique challenges to researchers and 
planners interested in understanding and mapping their varied physical and human 
geography.  Those outlined here include dynamic fluvial systems, the ability of tropical 
forests to disguise current and recent settlement, and the migratory character of local 
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populations negotiating boom and bust frontier economies.  Add to this the isolated 
nature of these borderlands and the financial and logistical challenges of obtaining and 
field checking remotely sensed data and existing cartography, and it is not surprising to 
find these maps wanting. 
Results here show the existing maps of Amazonian Peru to be out of date and 
inadequate with a poor representation of local people.  A tabular comparison of locally 
informed participatory maps with the official maps of governmental and non-
governmental organizations (Tables 1-4) finds local geographic knowledge to be more 
accurate and up-to-date in regards to the human geography of the region.  The lack of 
adequate base maps and reliable information on population centers and titled lands 
echoes the political ecology theme of the empty Amazonian landscape (the tropical tabula 
rasa) (Hecht 2004).  Here, however, the slate is not entirely blank, but rather poorly 
drawn.  Thus, desk bound planners knowingly project their external agenda on a scrawled 
slate, and thus the landscape, since “nobody knows what is really out there anyway.”  In 
those cases where planners put in a good faith effort to assemble existing information, the 
task often proves Herculean, leading to similar outcomes: the creation of resource 
concessions whose resources, inhabitants and limits are based on outdated studies, 
inadequate geographic data, and flawed hydrography respectively.  
The social ramifications on the ground are serious as local residents now must 
contend with miners and loggers with official claims to their lands and resources.  This 
takes place in an already contested landscape riddled with illegal extractors (loggers, 
fishermen…) and coca farmers.  These findings echo the “multiplicity of simultaneous 
and overlapping contested frontiers” of Schmink and Wood (1992: 19).  Local people fall 
within the vortex of contestation, and must negotiate to survive.  Some, lacking 
alternatives, work for loggers, miners or drug traffickers, while others practice resistance, 
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seeking help from authorities despite the hurdles of bureaucratic inertia, corruption, and 
indifference.  Officially sanctioned concessionaires are not much better off; their 
concessions often contain unexpected residents and lack valuable resources.  In order to 
recoup costs they often must follow the resource and operate illegally, or sell their 
logging quotas to other loggers seeking to launder illegal timber.  Ultimately, the only 
clear winners in the confusion created by inadequate geographical information and 
overlapping claims are the illegal resource extractors and drug traffickers who can thrive 
in a confusing and poorly understood frontier. 
The key word is understand.  The conservation of the cultural and ecological 
diversity and the promotion of social justice and sustainable development in these 
borderlands require an improved understanding of the region’s geography.  An improved 
understanding will involve exploration (Parsons 1977) and direct observation (Sauer 
1956) to penetrate “…the great white spaces” (Clark 1954: 23) and update the deficient 
information present on existing maps.  All parties need detailed, updated, and accessible 
geographic information.  The information must be official to guarantee acceptance by all 
organizations, but dynamic to reflect the constantly changing frontier landscape and to 
incorporate feedback processes.  Most importantly the information must be informed by 
local knowledge to ensure robust data at a variety of scales.  While the logistical and 
financial obstacles to producing this information are formidable, they are likely less 
costly than failed projects based on flawed geographic information and the attendant loss 
of cultural and ecological riches.  These issues will be discussed at greater length with 









Chapter Three:  The Transboundary Cultural Ecology of Tropical 
Timber and Traditional Populations 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Peruvian timber exports grew 25% in 2004 (Peru Forestal 2005) even as 
accessible stocks of mahogany and tropical cedar dwindled in the Peruvian Amazon 
(Kometter et al. 2004) forcing Peruvian loggers to penetrate to the Brazilian border and 
beyond.  In the Peruvian borderlands lived a displaced Asháninka people, who in 2000 
witnessed their homelands transformed into forestry concessions and overrun by illegal 
loggers.  Across the border, their Brazilian cousins also confronted Peruvian trespassers 
logging their titled lands.  This study investigates how the borderland Asháninka emerged 
from the “empty” borderlands to grapple with the Peruvian tropical timber industry, its 
forced labor practices, and boundary transgressions.  These people asserted themselves as 
both whistle blowers and exploiters of timber depending on their circumstances and 
location.  Their agency contests the concept of empty Amazonian landscapes, instead 
shaping borderlands as homelands: inhabited by a people rooted in the political ecology 
and political geography of the boundary, capable of galvanizing the nation state to defend 
resources and territory or of entering into debt peonage relations with illegal loggers. 
Other studies of indigenous resistance in Amazonia and the neotropics have 
demonstrated the agency of indigenous people and the complexities and contradictions 
inherent in their resistance (Garfield 2001, Hale 1994, Schmink and Wood 1992).  Others 
 156
have dealt specifically with the complex relationships between revolutionaries (Brown 
and Fernández 1991), drug traffickers (Gagnon et al. 1993), slavers (García Hierro et al. 
1998), and the Asháninka people in their homelands.  This study steps outside the 
Asháninka homelands to investigate the borderland Asháninka’s relationship to a logging 
industry that has been found oppressive to indigenous people elsewhere in Amazonia 
(CEDI 1993, Watson 1996).  This study, like Watson’s (1996) takes a field-based view 
from the forest floor to potentially inform geographers and ecologists of the sub-canopy 
social processes and impacts not captured in recent macro-level Amazonian research on 
logging and logging related impacts (Arima et al. 2005, Asner et al. 2005, Asner et al. 
2006, Nepstad et al. 1999).         
The chapter begins with a methodological discussion followed by four sections to 
analyze and link the tropical timber industry, debt peonage, and borderland resistance. In 
the first section I argue that the Peruvian logging industry remains tied to the debt-
merchandise system, a few high value species, and primitive methods of extraction while 
government intervention has failed to stop illegal loggers from aggressively exploiting 
remote areas where geographic information and state presence is limited.  In the second 
section I describe the debt peonage system loggers use to control labor in the borderlands 
and relate Asháninka accounts of their role in the system.  The third section consists of a 
comparison of the borderland resistance pursued by both the Peruvian and Brazilian 
Asháninka in the face of illegal loggers.  Finally, in the conclusion, I discuss the complex 
relationships between indigenous people, their homelands, and the tropical timber 
industry.  This includes comparing how effectively titled and untitled homelands serve as 
barriers to deforestation and recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the new 
Peruvian forestry law. 
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The Asháninka people, who number around 80,000 (Veber 2003: 185), are one of 
the largest indigenous groups in the lowlands of South America (McSweeney and Arps 
2005) and are well documented for their resistance against state, colonist, terrorist, and 
drug trafficker incursions into their homelands in the central jungles of Peru (Bodley 
1972, Brown and Fernández 1991, Gagnon et al. 1993, Varese 2002).  However, the 
Asháninka also endured the economic booms of Peruvian Amazonia, serving as both 
slave and slaver, often traveling beyond Peru’s borders to avoid conflict or to harvest 
rubber or timber for their patrones (ACONADIYSH 2004, Bodley 1972, Clark 1954, da 
Cunha 1976, Fry 1907, Pimenta 2005, Samanez y Ocampo 1980 [1885] , Santos-Granero 
and Barclay 2000, Varese 1968, Velarde 1905, Von Hassel 1905, Weiss 1975)(Figures 7 
and 8).  These displaced borderland Asháninka are the subject of this study, a group 
whose extractivist and warlike presence helped define Peru’s political border with Brazil 
in the early 1900s (da Cunha 1967, da Cunha 1976) before the collapse of the rubber 
boom and withdrawal of their rubber patrones rendered them an invisible people.  
For almost a century the borderland Asháninka survived by combining 
subsistence livelihoods with patron-based economic relations centered on commercial 
hunting or timber harvesting (Pimenta 2002).  In the 1980s the mahogany rush in the 
southwestern Brazilian Amazon forced the Brazilian Asháninka to organize against the 
increasingly exploitative patrones (CEDI 1993, Pimenta 2002).  With the help of 
anthropologists and NGOs the Brazilian Asháninka were able to get their lands 
recognized and in most cases titled and demarcated.  A few borderland Asháninka 
territories in Peru were also able to obtain title to their lands, but in some cases only by 
entering into pacts with logging companies who subsequently logged their forests 
(Aquino 2004).  Other Asháninka peoples in the Peruvian borderlands are untitled, 
unmapped, and largely unknown (Figures 30, 32, and 57).  Only since 1998 have they 
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Figure 57.  This borderland Asháninka family lives in an untitled borderland Asháninka community.  The father is carving out 
a new dugout canoe by axe. 
 159
emerged from the forests in an attempt to organize against the imposition of forestry 
concessions and the trespassing of illegal loggers on their homelands.   
II. METHODS 
Fieldwork was conducted over ten months in 2004 along four rivers in the 
Peruvian and Brazilian borderlands (Figure 3).  Three research assistants and I spent a 
total of four months living, traveling and working with the borderland Asháninka of the 
Tamaya River, the primary focus of this chapter.  The local area of inquiry consisted of 
the Asháninka homelands of Alto Tamaya and its environs on the Alto Tamaya River in 
Ucayali, Peru (Figure 58).  José Borgo López and I combined to spend over three months 
in this remote community of 27 households and the surrounding logging camps and 
villages.  As shown in Figure 58, the Alto Tamaya homelands are bounded by the 
Brazilian border to the west (Serra do Divisor National Park and Kampa do Rio Amônia 
Indigenous Territory), the town of Puerto Putaya and forestry concessions to the north, 
forestry concessions to the west, and an illegal logging road to the south.  These 
contested homelands are also overlapped by two forestry concessions and one fundo in 
addition to the ubiquitous presence of illegal loggers both within and around Alto 
Tamaya territory (Figure 58).  Alto Tamaya is distant from Pucallpa, the closest regional 
urban center and the capital of the region of Ucayali, with watercraft using the typical 
peke peke outboard motors reaching Alto Tamaya in seven days during the dry season 
(Figure 16).   
The second area of inquiry was the Kampa do Rio Amônia Indigenous Territory 
in the state of Acre, Brazil and its central community of Apiwtxa142 (Figure 59).  
Apiwtxa, as I will call this territory for the sake of brevity, contained over 472 Asháninka 
residents in 2002 with about 80% residing in the main village of Apiwtxa (Pimenta 2005) 




Figure 58: Map of the research site, logging threats, and the Asháninka homelands in this 
portion of the Peru/Brazil borderlands.
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Marechal Thaumaturgo, it is four days journey from the city of Cruzeiro do Sul (Figure 
32) and for ten months out of the year one can only reach the state capital of Rio Branco 
via airplane.   
Field methods in Alto Tamaya consisted of a combination of participatory 
methods, key informant interviews, ethnography, participant observation, point collection 
and attribute collection with GPS, key informant interviews, and map analysis.  
Participatory methods included household mapping, matrices of resources, historical 
timelines, and land use walks143.  Undertaking fieldwork on illegal logging required a 
great deal of patience, humor, and an awareness of one’s own safety.  In one case I spent 
two days in an illegal logging camp within the Isconahua Regional Reserve listening to 
the loggers describe their “concession” and the bureaucratic constraints preventing them 
from fulfilling their “contractual” obligations while making a profit.  In another case I 
spent an hour hidden under a mattress in the bottom of a leaky boat to escape the prying 
eyes of river bandits.  As in all my fieldwork to data, local people proved invaluable 
barometers of danger, key sources of information, and most importantly good friends.  
Together we mapped their ancestral homes, logging camps, community limits, and 
current households.  They also proved critical in mapping the species, diameter, length, 
number, and ownership for each log of every boya (timber raft) lining the banks of the 
Putaya River.  Mapping was accomplished by creating on demand shapefiles with a 
Garmin Etrex Legend receiver attached to a Hewlett-Packard Pocket PC running ArcPad 
software.  While in Alto Tamaya, I also took video footage to record interview data and 
landscape images for future analysis.  To complement this information I conducted key 
informant interviews, document research, GIS analysis, and remote sensing in the urban 
centers of Pucallpa, Lima, and Rio Branco, Acre, Brazil.  Interviews were conducted with 
INRENA officials, NGO researchers, indigenous activists, anthropologists, ecologists, 
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and forestry professors among others.  I obtained documents from AIDESEP, PETT, CPI 
Acre,  in addition to the written paper trail of the Asháninka of Alto Tamaya.  This was 
complemented with newspaper accounts from Ucayali, Acre, Lima and Brasilia.  Finally, 
I compiled a GIS using ArcGIS 8.3 software with layers including not only the field-
based information mentioned above but also political boundaries, indigenous reserves, 
forestry concessions, population centers.  These were qualitatively analyzed in 
conjunction with remotely sensed Landsat 7 images from 2002.  This suite of methods 
promised grounded sub-canopy data to complement recent macro-scale analysis of 
logging impact (Asner et al. 2006). 
III. THE TROPICAL TIMBER INDUSTRY OF UCAYALI 
The tropical timber industry drives the economy of Ucayali (Figure 59), however, 
here like elsewhere in Amazonian Peru, the industry continues to pursue antiquated forms 
of exploitation that contribute to both illegal logging and the unsustainable harvesting of 
timber.  The economic system remains entrenched in debt-merchandise relations while 
extraction continues to focus on only a small percentage of potentially commercial 
species.  To date Peruvian forestry laws have failed to modernize the debt-merchandise 
system, diversify production, or reach sustainable harvest goals in part due to the lack of 
reliable geographic and ecological information from and inadequate enforcement in 
targeted forests.  This lack of information and enforcement leads to the exploitation of 
local communities and facilitates illegal logging.  Estimates of illegal logging range from 
70-80% in Peru (with the majority in the Amazon) ( Ferrero 2005, Galarza and La Serna 
2005, World Wildlife Fund 2005) and 80% in Ucayali (Ahora 2004b). 
Tropical timber is a globally important economic commodity with 2003 imports 
earning more than 10 billion dollars U.S. worldwide  (ITTO 2005).  While Asia 
dominates the global production, consumption, import and export of tropical timber, 
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Figure 59.  A barge laden with timber moves slowly up the Ucayali River towards Pucallpa, capital of the Ucayali region.
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Latin America also plays an important role, particularly in regards to certain high grade 
timber species like mahogany and tropical cedar (ITTO 2005).  Peru ranks 9th worldwide 
in percent forest coverage and is the second largest exporter of timber in Latin America144 
with exports growing over 25% from 2003 to 136 million dollars in 2004 (Perú Forestal 
2005).  Of particular importance to Peru is mahogany, the premier timber species of Latin 
America, and one in constant demand from the United States and Europe.  With over 
harvest and increasing regulation of mahogany in Brazil and Bolivia, Peru became by 
2004 the leading exporter in Latin America (Kometter et al. 2004) despite dwindling 
numbers of commercially sized mahogany and increased restrictions due to the species’ 
inclusion in appendix II of CITES in 2003 (ITTO 2003).  Highly coveted timber species 
of large diameter, such as mahogany and tropical cedar, were increasingly found in Peru 
only within areas of protection or difficult access like conservation units, indigenous 
territories, and remote borderlands.  Approximately 49% of Peru’s Ucayali region 
(102,000 km²) is made up of conservation units145 and indigenous territories with the 
region sharing roughly 1,000 km of border with Brazil.  These borderland protected areas 
contain some of the last stocks of commercially viable mahogany and tropical cedar in 
the world. 
Although the first timber exports left the Peruvian Amazon for New York in 1912 
(Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000), the Ucayali region’s contribution to the Peruvian 
timber industry was limited until 1943 when the creation of the Lima-Pucallpa road 
(Figure 60) facilitated transport to urban markets and Pacific ports.  From the start, the 
debt-merchandise system dominated the timber trade with timber companies controlling 
profits by advancing credit to loggers or habilitadores (middlemen146) who then repaid 
the company in timber to cancel their debts.  Government regulation of this Amazonian 
logging system was sporadic in the first half of the 20th century 
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Figure 60.  This giant statue of an Amazonian worker greets travelers entering Pucallpa 
on the Lima-Pucallpa road.  
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(Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000).  Working in the field in 1974, White (1978: 395) 
found logging in Ucayali to be in “a primal state” dominated by a debt-merchandise 
system channeling profits towards capitalists in Lima.  These capitalists backed lumber 
company owners advancing credit to regional patrones, who in turn passed it to local 
patrones exploiting an indigenous workforce for a few supplies valued at prices often 
100% more than those in Pucallpa.  One Shipibo informant recalled a patrón in 1973 
obtaining two twelve foot logs of mahogany from an Asháninka on the Upper Ucayali 
River in return for 100 bars of soap.  At each stage of the system, repayment consisted of 
under-priced lumber, thus minimizing costs in the field, maximizing profits, and keeping 
capital in Lima and to a lesser extent in Pucallpa (White 1978).   
In 1975, a year after White’s study, the military government introduced a law, 
Ley 21147, to stimulate the rural economy through the granting of small concessions for 
local logging outfits.  Instead, Hidalgo (2003: 4) argues, the law contributed to “an 
almost feudal system” as logging elites merely adjusted their debt-merchandise system to 
the new rules with timber companies and habilitadores subcontracting local patrones 
who continued advancing merchandise on credit to peons (Hidalgo 2003) and then 
laundered the illegally harvested timber with permits purchased from concession owners 
(Norgrove and Barra 2005).  In the 1990s the government suspended these concessions 
due to the rampant illegality, the inconstant supply of timber, the lack of efficiency and 
competitiveness, and the social abuses occurring in the field147, however, the government 
then reopened the concessions under the condition that concession owners follow a 
management plan148.  In 1996, logging on selected rivers, including the Tamaya, was 
banned entirely due to non-compliance with management plans149.   
Four years later the Peruvian government introduced a new law guided by the 
principle of sustainable use through long term investment in forestry concessions.  Law 
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27308, created with input from the World Wildlife Fund and implemented with 
investment from USAID150, is clearly oriented towards sustainable harvesting of timber 
but is fundamentally flawed due to a reliance on detailed knowledge of the human and 
physical geography, adequate cadastral and public record systems, and accurate and up-
to-date ecological data on targeted forests.  In the absence of good maps and local 
knowledge from the forests, logging concessions are mapped a priori in Lima offices 
onto lands containing illegal loggers, drug traffickers, settlers, indigenous people, and 
forests that do not contain the high value hardwoods outlined in the outdated concession 
survey151.  This flawed geographic foundation coupled with extremely weak enforcement 
encourages loggers to elaborate bogus management plans and return to the exploitative 
debt-merchandise system of old: subcontracting local patrones to drive off, intimidate or 
co-opt local people into logging their homelands while using false documents and permits 
to launder timber extracted illegally from outside the concession or in amounts greater 
than allowed within the concession.  One informant logger estimated 90% of loggers 
working in Ucayali to be illegal (Ahora 2004c). 
Other aspects of the timber industry also remain entrenched in the past.  The 
industry continues to struggling to diversify the number of species harvested.  Some 
improvement has been made as in 1963 only five species made up 80% of the trees 
logged in Peru (FAO 1963) while Table 5 shows thirteen species to make up 80% and 
84% of 2002 Ucayali production of sawnwood and roundwood respectively.  Tropical 
cedar and mahogany are likely undercounted here due to illegal logging.  One species, 
Chorisia integrifolia (Figure 42), dominates plywood production with 94% of the total.  
This lack of diversity in logged species encourages extensive logging practices rather 
than potentially more sustainable intensive harvesting (Fredericksen 2000) as 
commercially coveted species often stand hundreds of meters apart in the highly diverse 
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tropical forests of Ucayali.  A similar lack of diversity was encountered in harvests 
measured in the study region: Table 6 lists by species the individual logs contained in all 
77 boyas (log rafts) (Figure 61) on the Putaya River in August, 2004152.  Half of the 
Putaya River lies in Alto Tamaya territory while the headwaters reach the Brazilian 
border (Figure 58).  Thus many of the logs shown in Table 6 come from the Alto Tamaya 
homelands and perhaps, to a lesser degree, Brazil.   
Methods of extraction have also changed little over time as White’s (1978) 
observations in the field in1974 largely describe the same techniques used thirty years 
later.  This is particularly true in the isolated border regions where tractors are only used 
at great trouble and expense.  In 2004 human power remained the primary method of 
getting logs to the river for downstream transport (Figure 62).  Primitive levers (Figure 
63), rails, and pulleys (Figure 64) continued to be used in conjunction with brute human 
force although tree felling was facilitated by the wide spread use of chainsaws.  Floating 
logs downstream (Figure 65) remained the most common method of timber transport in 
Ucayali due to low costs and a pronounced flood season that provided annual water 
access in distant streams153.  In border locations where illegal operations abounded, 
chainsaws were used to cut rough planks154 (Figure 66) that could then be carried to the 
river, floated downstream and then re-cut illegally with band saws at either mobile 
processing sites (Figure 67) or at sawmills in Pucallpa. 
Despite these time and labor intensive harvesting methods with their climactic 
constraints, logging continued to be profitable.  This was particularly true for high value  
species such as mahogany that exponentially increase in price the farther away they get 
from the forest.  Table 7 illustrates how one board foot of mahogany increased in price 
from 60 cents at the point of extraction to over seven dollars in the United States.
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Table 5. 2002 Ucayali timber production and principal species by cubic meter 
Timber Scientific name Roundwood Sawnwood 
Caoba* Swietenia macrophylla 5433 4541 
Capirona Calycophyllum spruceanum 20847 17601 
Catahua* Hura crepitans 22152 18291 
Cedro* Cedrela odorata 9810 7733 
Copaiba* Copaifera sp. 14364 12173 
Cumala* Virola calophylla 20174 18175 
Ishpingo Amburana cearensis 2474 1960 
Lagarto Caspi* Calophyllum brasiliense 491 462 
Lupuna* Chorisia integrifolia 35172 10480 
Moena Ocotea sp. 5164 4492 
Quinilla Manilkara bidentata 11324 4656 
Shihuahuaco Dipteryx sp. 13067 31320 
Tornillo* Cedrelinga catenaeformis 24969 22831 
        
Total 
Production   221845 193621 
* Denotes species mapped in Table 11 below. 





Table 6. Putaya River logs waiting for flood season by species 
Timber Scientific name # of Logs 
Caoba Swietenia macrophylla 125
Catahua Hura crepitans 33
Cedro Cedrela odorata 1042
Copaiba Copaifera sp. 157
Cumala Virola calophylla 134
Lagarto Caspi Calophyllum brasiliense 36
Lupuna Chorisia integrifolia 106
Tornillo Cedrelinga catenaeformis 134
      
Total Logs   1767
Data: Fieldwork in August of 2004. 
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Figure 61: A small sample of the boyas (log rafts) measured along the Putaya River in August of 2004.
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Figure 62.  Paths are cut through the forest and the logs are pushed on tracks such as these.  Photo by Ronald Paredes.
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Figure 63.  Logs await high water season to be levered into the Alto Tamaya River.  Photo José Borgo López.
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Figure 64.  Loggers use a human powered pulley system to pull logs up the bank in borderland Ucayali.
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Figure 65.  Ucayali loggers sometimes float for weeks on these rafts of valuable roundwood through snag infested rivers.  If 
the log is floated without a guard, local people will poach logs from the raft.
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Figure 66: The sawing of planks by chainsaw for commercial sale is illegal but the primary means of extracting valuable 
hardwoods illegally from Brazil.
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Figure 67.  Mobile sawmills like this one are called limpiadoras (cleaners) in Amazonian Peru because they improve the cut of 
planks sawn illegally by chainsaw thus allowing the illegal timber to be sold “legally” (i.e. laundered) using 
falsified document
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Sawmill Lima USA  
Mahogany 
Swietenia 
macrophylla 0.60 0.91 2.11 3.02 7+
Price in USdollars calculated using 2004 November exchange rate of 3.3 soles to the dollars U.S. 
Sources: www.globalwood.com , SIPEC, fieldwork. 
 
Thus, the high demand in the United States and other developed countries for 
mahogany and other valuable hardwoods motivated loggers to access the isolated 
borderlands which still contain some commercial stands of the desired species.  The 
flawed forestry law and lack of geographic information allowed illegal loggers to 
continue pursuing the debt-merchandise and debt peonage systems while frustrating 
loggers seeking to log according to the law.  Eventually, the most valuable timber was 
extracted illegally with falsified documents and debt peonage labor with residents of the 
unmapped and unknown borderlands receiving a pittance to topple and transport some of 
the world’s most valuable hardwoods. 
IV. DEBT PEONAGE 
The patrones of the timber industry continue to practice debt peonage in the most 
isolated regions of the Peruvian Amazon (Ucayali, Madre de Dios and Loreto regions) 
much as it was practiced throughout the region 30 years ago and more (White 1978).  
This section underscores the continued prevalence of debt peonage within the forests of 
Amazonian Peru before describing in ethnographic detail how the system exploits 
laborers within the study area.  
Bedoya and Bedoya (2005) estimate 33,000 laborers to be enmeshed in forced 
labor systems within the Peruvian timber industry.  This number appears to have grown 
since 35 years ago when García Blásquez (1971: 59) estimated “…10,000 peons buried in
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the most remote forest areas, all cruelly exploited and particularly the natives”.  In 2004, 
forced labor continued to thrive in the borderlands and other isolated areas as these 
distant zones had low population densities characterized by extreme poverty and a lack of 
education, had an almost complete absence of state or institutional presence, were labor 
scarce with no labor or credit markets, and contained populations unversed in standard 
economic practices, workers rights or the regional and international timber markets 
(Bedoya and Bedoya 2005). 
The modern forced labor practices of the Peruvian tropical timber industry fell 
into two main systems in 2004: the logging camp and the habilitación-enganche system.  
The borderland Asháninka people engaged in both, with young men usually working in 
logging camps until they gained the expertise and trust of the habilitadores necessary to 
be advanced goods without supervision in the habilitado-enganche system.  The relations 
between timber companies, sawmill operators, concessionaires, habilitadores, 
enganchadores (labor recruiters), habilitados (the boss of the logging camp or individual 
contracted to log), and laborers was complex.  Here I will merely try and describe the 
workings of that part of the system closest to the forest as interpreted through key 
informants. 
A. Logging Camps 
Logging camps usually contained between five and thirty-five workers and could 
be located legally in forestry concessions, legally in indigenous territories with logging 
permits, illegally in Brazil, and illegally in indigenous territories (titled, untitled, or 
reserved for indigenous people in voluntary isolation), conservation units, or state lands 
(Figure 68).  Schulte-Herbruggen and Rossiter (2003) interviewed loggers from 64 
logging camps on tributaries within the Rio de las Piedras watershed in Madre de Dios 
and found 92% of these camps to be within zones inhabitated by isolated indigenous 
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Figure 68.  An illegal logging camp in the borderlands with armed loggers.  Note the incongruous lapdogs.
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groups or recently contacted indigenous groups.  The presence of camps within 
indigenous lands was also common in the other two major Amazonian regions of Loreto 
and Ucayali.  Workers in logging camps in Amazonian Peru could be mestizo (80%) 
and/or indigenous (20%) (Bedoya and Bedoya n 2005) with most of the mestizo workers 
coming from urban areas with high unemployment such as Pucallpa and the majority of 
indigenous loggers coming from nearby indigenous communities.   
An Asháninka named Berto155 described the labor situation in logging camps as 
precarious “…the workers contracted from Pucallpa will abandon you, mostly because 
they are not accustomed to the work, but also because they want their payment in 
advance.  The people from around here are busy, since they are also logging.” The 
enganchadores (logging recruiters) lured young, uneducated, unemployed men with 
small advances in pay and promises of full payment at the conclusion of the logging 
season.  Salaries were extremely low regardless of whether loggers were paid in full with 
most unskilled loggers making approximately 90 to 120 dollars U.S. a month156.  Once at 
the logging site, the new workers were at themercy of the logging bosses who quickly 
introduced them to debt peonage by starting a balance against their earnings with 
elevated costs of transportation and food (Figures 69, 70).  Workers who became 
dissatisfied with the brutal working conditions and mounting debt were often dissuaded 
from abandoning the camp by death threats, the holding of documents (although many 
laborers were undocumented), the threat of non-payment, and limits to their mobility 
through lack of transport and the extremely isolated nature of their camps.  Desertion was 
also limited by the low probability of alternative employment on their return home.   
Thus, once in a remote logging camp, laborers could be forced or encouraged to 
engage in illegal or subversive activities.  One extreme example occurred in the late 
1980’s when a revolutionary group, the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru 
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Figure 69.  This abandoned logging tambo (hut) shows the simple quarters provided to logging laborers.
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Figure 70.  Beds are usually fashioned from palm slats to keep the owner away from the insect infested ground. 
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(MRTA), created a fake timber company and enticed young Shipibo Conibo men with 
advertisements for timber jobs along the headwaters of the Callería, Abujao and Tamaya 
Rivers (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2004b: 349).  The “loggers” took the 
young men to remote indoctrination camps rather than logging camps, and the 
subversives forced the Shipibo to become soldiers for their cause.   Eventually, the 
majority of these young men died in a 1990 military ambush that decimated the MRTA in 
the region (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2004b: 349).  Similarly, the majority 
of the Peruvians loggers captured by Brazilian authorities along the Acre border in Brazil 
fit the description of uneducated loggers duped by their bosses.  Anselmo Forneck, 
Director of the Acre office of the Brazilian Institute of the Environment, declared the 40 
plus Peruvian loggers captured along the Ucayali-Juruá divide since 2004 to be 
uneducated, illiterate, “peons” under the control of timber barons who reap the benefits 
rather than brave the dangers of their transboundary timber poaching operations (Página 
20 staff 2006).  The timber companies used their economic power to hire unscrupulous 
habilitados to control an itinerant and disposable labor force. 
Figures 71 and 72 show the hierarchy of economic relations of two different 
logging groups in the region.  Figure 71 was a legal concessionaire with 40 years  
 
                            
Figure 71.  Economic chain on Q. Putaya.        
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Figure 72. Economic chain on Q. Alto Tamaya 
experience in the area who was subcontracting 5 habilitados who each ran a logging 
camp either within or outside the concession (Figure 58).  While figure 58 shows only the 
main camps found along the Quebrada Putaya, the habilitados in Figure 71 each ran a 
camp at the headwaters of one of the tributary creeks off the Quebrada Putaya.  At least 
two of these camps harvested timber illegally in Brazil.  Figure 72 shows a 
concessionaire financially backing habilitados running legal logging camps within his 
concession in addition to a habilitador who is running illegal logging camps along the 
headwaters of the Quebrada Alto Tamaya through a habilitador/enganchador (Figure 58).  
Again, my field assistant and I were only able to safely geo-register the logging camps 
along Quebrada Alto Tamaya.  However, each of the right bank tributaries entering the 
Alto Tamaya homelands contained a logging camp at its headwaters with several illegally 
extracting mahogany and cedar planks from Brazil.  
Logging camps in the borderlands also contained habilitados and workers 
uninterested in returning to more central locations.  According to the Major in charge of 
the Peruvian border post of Cantagallo, “Logging brings and protects people of dubious 
reputation: ex-convicts, refugees from drug trafficking, and foreigners… people from 
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urban centers come to the border to hide from the law.”  One of the local patrones in Alto 
Tamaya believed many of the loggers illegally harvesting timber in Brazil were deserters 
of the Shining Path.  This belief was reiterated by the aforementioned Major, a veteran of 
the Shining Path conflict in the selva alta near Tingo María.  In other cases the 
inhabitants of Peruvian border towns were refugees from Brazil.  Frederico, a Brazilian 
accused of logging mahogany illegally in Brazil and wanted by Brazilian federal police 
for his connections to the narcotics trade, left his home in the Serra do Divisor National 
Park in Brazil and began working in a Peruvian logging camp in 2001 with his brother 
and nephew only to be cheated after 3 months of work: promised 300 dollars U.S. and a 
50 gallon tank of gas, he received a radio and a hernia for his labor before his boss 
disappeared downriver with the timber and his promised wages (Figure 73).  David, a 
young Peruvian, working with him was paid nothing at all and subsequently enlisted at 
the border military outpost for 2 years of service in order to obtain his identity card and 
thus improved prospects for future employment.  In 2004 Frederico was again in a 
logging camp, but now working as a matero157 (timber spotter) for Peruvian loggers 
working illegally in Brazil saying, “I want to pay for my childrens’ shoes with Brazilian 
mahogany.”  
Indigenous people working in borderland logging camps often fulfilled specialty 
roles as hunters, chainsaw operators, cooks, or sex workers (Figure 74).  One of the 
largest logging companies employed an Asháninka hunter, but he was only paid when he 
brought in game meat.  The younger men often honed their logging skills and contacts in 
these camps and then used the same skills to enter into the more desirable habilitado-
enganche system.  Most loggers, indigenous or mestizo, were dissatisfied with logging: a 
2002 survey of over 90 loggers on the remote Rio de las Piedras found only 37% to like 
their work and 84% to not want their children to be loggers (Schulte-Herbrüggen 2002).   
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Figure 73.  Illegally extracted logs awaiting the flood season.  Note the size of these lupuna logs (Chorisia integrifolia).  
Pushing these logs kilometers through the forest is a difficult and dangerous business that can end in injury or 
death.  Two informants had hernias from working timber.
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Figure 74.  Illegal logging camps such as this one, were also gendered, with women working as cooks or sex workers.  
Brazilian authorities captured Peruvian women working in illegal logging camps inside Brazil territory.
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However, the income producing alternatives for borderland residents were limited with 
options such as illegal commercial hunting, working in the drug trade as a farmer, 
processor, or transporter of coca or producing subsistence crops like plantains and 
manioc whose surplus could be sold to loggers for cash.   
In 2004, the borderland daily wage for an unskilled indigenous worker was the 
equivalent of only three dollars US.  Rodrigo, an Asháninka man of 55 years said, “All 
my life the daily wage has been ten soles (three dollars US). I don’t know if I will ever be 
able to earn a wage of fifteen soles (four and a half dollars US).”  His two sons were 
working as chainsaw operators in a logging camp and earning 120 dollars US a month.  
This was a low wage as skilled chainsaw operators could earn over fifteen dollars US a 
day.   Their mother recounted her view on wage labor with the loggers:  
They pay you but they are tricking you.  Because we don’t know….We know how 
to talk but not how to read or write.  That is the saddest thing here.  The things 
they do to us.  They have us work for months and they give you a little clothing.  
And that is it, you have worked.  You have cancelled your bill.   
Berto, another Asháninka man, said: 
I can say that timber earns cash for the patrones.  But for the laborers, no, it is not 
like they say it is.  They give you 150 soles (45 dollars US) but take you to work 
for months and months…and when the harvest comes… they say we have 
canceled the bill.  I don’t owe you and you don’t owe me, but they know very 
well that they owe you.  That is how they cheat you.  It makes money for them but 
not for the laborer… you work and work and work. The timber comes out and 
they take off.  They don’t pay the bill.   
Patrones also had little time for sickness or injury, telling the stricken Asháninka 
their condition was caused by drinking masato, their staple manioc beer (Figure 75).  
Despite the cheating, the borderland Asháninka continued to work for the same patrones 
because of the lack of alternatives to earn money or goods on the border.  Indeed, the 
presence of the Asháninka was a boon for the local patrones, allowing them a ready and 
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Figure 75. The women of an Asháninka family prepare masato (manioc beer) in an old dugout canoe.  Patrones blame injury 
on the masato, yet outsiders also visit the Asháninka communities to have a few free drinks.
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experienced source of cheap labor to exploit either through the logging camp or the 
habilitado-enganche system. 
B. Habilitado-Enganche System 
Patrones trust habilitados as they assume risk by advancing them goods and 
equipment and leave them to work unsupervised.  This is true of indigenous habilitados 
who are often the only habilitado option in remote areas.  Indigenous habilitados are 
usually paid in merchandise for their extraction of valuable roundwood.  The elevated 
prices of goods, equipment, and merchandise, the low border price of timber, the 
illiteracy of the indigenous people, and the unscrupulous patrones made habilitación 
almost as bad business as wage labor for these indigenous people.  Nevertheless, there 
were few alternatives to gain merchandise in these borderlands and thus the Asháninka 
continued to enter debt peonage. 
In Alto Tamaya the system played out as follows, a patrón would advance a 
coveted item such as an outboard motor to an Asháninka logger in exchange for the 
future harvest of 50 logs of tropical cedar (Gallegós Chamorro 2004).  The Asháninka 
logger subcontracts a handful of his relatives to help harvest the timber.  The Asháninka 
team works for about eight hours a day at ten soles (three dollars US) per person with this 
to be paid in merchandise by the patrón at the end of the harvest.  The patrón also 
advances food to keep the team on task.  As the team approaches harvest time, the patrón 
informs them the debt for motor, labor, and food now vastly exceeds the patrón’s 
calculation of 50 logs of tropical cedar.  In order to cancel their total debt, the team may 
have to extract as much 125 logs.  In addition, it is almost certain that each member of the 
team adds to their debt by asking the patrón for goods specifically for their families.  
This additional debt must also be paid in timber.  Patrones take advantage of the 
community members illiteracy, inability to weigh and measure, and lack of knowledge of 
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the timber and merchandise markets to under value the timber and over value the 
merchandise distributed.  The system described above represented one of the seven 
habilitados contracted by the local patrón in Figure 76.  This local patrón had over 40  
 
 
Figure 76.  Economic relations on the Q. Alto Tamaya. 
years experience working with the Asháninka in this area and was logging illegally with 
Asháninka labor.  He was able to launder the lumber using falsified documents obtained 
by his financial backer, a highly influential sawmill owner.  
Another case involved an illegal logger advancing José, an Asháninka man, a chainsaw 
for the equivalent of 3,500 soles (1,060 dollars US) worth of timber.  José, anticipating a 
swindle, had the mahogany and cedar he harvested measured by another logger who 
found it be 3,000 and 2,500 board feet respectively.  This high grade roundwood 
estimated at 14,000 soles (4,240 dollars US) by local rates (and three times that in 
Pucallpa) was anchored on the river bank when the river suddenly rose.  The logger took 
advantage of the high water, and the absence of José, to take it downstream to Pucallpa to 
be measured, sawn, and sold.  At the time of the interview José feared that when the 
logger returned to tell him the timber’s worth, he would be told he still owed more timber 
for his saw.  These stories were the rule: others recounted deals of 15,000 board feet of 
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lupuna158 (about 1,500 soles at border rates) for an eight horsepower boat motor worth 
2,500 soles (760 dollars US) (Figure 77), of harvesting timber and then being told by the 
patrón that they earned nothing because the logs were found to be rotted on the inside 
when they were sawn in the city sawmill.  Not surprisingly, the patrones often refused to 
cancel accounts or advance money, however, their excuse was to cite their own poverty.  
Tanya remembered the patrón saying, “We are poor, we can never pay you” despite his 
having 150 head of cattle on his farm only 500 meters from the Asháninka village.  
Tanya concluded, “…he has made himself a millionaire with Asháninka labor.”  The 
borderland Asháninka enter the exploitative logging system because there were no 
alternative means to reliably obtain merchandise such as clothes, soap and medicine for 
their families.  The latest timber boom had brought more unscrupulous loggers to 
Asháninka homelands where they abused both Asháninka and mestizo labor.  The 
Asháninka and other border people’s isolation, poverty, and lack of education and the 
state’s lack of a borderland presence and geographic ignorance allowed loggers to rule 
the borderland region.  This echoes accounts from a century before when Coronel Pedro 
Portillo (1905a: 506) observed of the upper Ucayali and surrounding region, “there are no 
laws, there are no authorities…He who is strongest, who has the most rifles, is master of 
justice”.    
V. RESISTANCE 
The borderland Asháninka actively sought justice in 2004, and with guns scarce 
and ammunition scarcer, they discovered other means to combat injustice in the 
borderlands.  They resisted the timber industry, the patrones and debt peonage not only 
by organizing and confronting trespassers in the borderlands but also through official 
channels in regional and national capitals.  Nevertheless, not every Asháninka resisted.  
Many were co-opted by the patrones into logging the borderland forests, while others  
 193
 
Figure 77: Most borderland Asháninka such as this one were only able to purchase a boat or motor if they engaged in debt 
peonage with a local patrón.
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appeared contradictory: simultaneously working as loggers while supporting efforts to 
wrest control of their territory from the concessionaires and logging patrones.  
The greatest variance between means of resistance related to the country the 
Asháninka lived in.  Here in this section I will detail and compare the resistance efforts of 
both the untitled Alto Tamaya Asháninka of the Peruvian border and the titled Apiwtxa 
Asháninka of the Brazilian border (Figure 58).  The Apiwtxa Asháninka gained their title 
in the early 1990s in response to trespassing loggers from Brazil and in 2004 were 
considered one of the most organized indigenous groups in Brazil: using their contacts 
and charismatic leaders to influence government officials in both the regional capital of 
Rio Branco and also Brasilia.  Their regional government was one of Amazonia’s most 
progressive with a demonstrated interest in the welfare of traditional peoples (Kainer et 
al. 2003) and an ongoing economic and ecological zoning project that already contributed 
accurate geographic information to decision makers in urban centers.  The Alto Tamaya 
Asháninka, on the other hand, had no title, few allies, and were still a largely unknown 
people living in an area very poorly understood by a regional government whose two 
most powerful political figures were a sawmill owner and an exporter of high grade 
hardwoods.  This group, and a handful of other Asháninka communities were so 
invisible, as to be completely absent in all 62 pages, including the maps, of the Strategic 
Plan of Development for their municipality of Masisea (Municipalidad Distrital de 
Masisea 2002).  These Asháninka were desperately seeking to title and map their 
territory, so as to defend it legally from the loggers and forestry concessions overlapping 
their lands (Figure 58).  Although the Asháninka increasingly understood that more 
territory could be “defended by maps than by guns” (Nietschmann 1995: 37), violence 
remained part of their borderland struggle.      
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A. The Case of Alto Tamaya 
When the Asháninka arrived in Alto Tamaya from the Amônia River in Brazil 
and the Sheshea River in Perú they followed the traditional Asháninka settlement pattern 
of isolated homesteads (Denevan 1971, Varese 2002) (Figure 78).  While this settlement 
pattern and the associated Asháninka mobility helped the indigenous group resist the 
incursions of the missionaries, the Spanish, and the Peruvians in earlier times (Varese 
2002), in the modern era isolated households of the borderland Asháninka created 
challenges for indigenous groups looking to gain titled land through the required 
demonstration of community organization and territorial occupation (Figure 79).  Indeed, 
to outsiders, the borderland Asháninka remained largely invisible in the landscape: 
known only to each other and local loggers, skin hunters and patrones.  The Asháninka of 
Alto Tamaya began organizing shortly before the new Forestry Law of 2000 imposed 
forestry concessions on the supposedly empty lands they resided in.  Unknown and 
untitled, the Alto Tamaya Asháninka became trespassers on their own border homelands.  
As one informant said, “Before we lived as animals, houses over there, others over here, 
later we got together, organizing to educate our children” (Figure 80). 
1. Resistance through Official Channels 
The Asháninka began following an official Peruvian pattern of organization in 
early 2002, when 39 Asháninka of the Alto Tamaya community met, organized, and  
elected their community leaders in order to solicit title to their lands.  Their President was 
the only literate pure blood Asháninka while the vice president was a mestizo who 
although claiming no Asháninka blood at all was adopted as a grown man by the 
community.  These leaders spent many lean months in Pucallpa writing and carrying by 
hand at least eight letters in 2002 and 2003 to the Regional Director of Agriculture in 
Ucayali, the Defender of the People, the Municipal Mayor, the Admiral of the Pucallpa 
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Figure 78.  Cabo Tornillo was the oldest of the Asháninka at Alto Tamaya and lived an 
itinerant life in the borderlands, regularly relocating every few years to a 
new place.  He has lived in the borderlands of both Brazil and Peru.
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Figure 79.  This is the Asháninka family on the Putaya River that lived farthest away from the community center.  These 
children walked an hour a day to attend school in the community.
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Figure 80.  A view of part of the Alto Tamaya community from the soccer field.  Normally the Asháninka live in isolated 
family clusters, but here they have grouped their houses to organize the community and allow their children to 
attend school.
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Naval base, INRENA (National Institute of Natural Resources), among others159.  All 
these letters asked for community recognition, title, and demarcation in addition to help 
in dealing with illegal loggers and overlapping forestry concessions.  The regional 
indigenous organization of AIDESEP160 also wrote several letters on behalf of 
AltoTamaya in 2003.  Living in the city and engaging the Peruvian bureaucracy was not 
easy for the cash poor and largely illiterate borderland Asháninka.  As Tanya, one of their 
leaders said, “In the city, when you don’t have plata (cash161) you don’t drink even a drop 
of water.  That’s the way it is.”  Despite this, the borderland Asháninka continued to 
press for their rights.  
Progress began to be made in 2003 when finally on the 22nd of April, Alto 
Tamaya was inscribed in to the National Registry of Native Communities and on the 28th 
of April 2003 the primary school was created and a teacher relocated to teach the Alto 
Tamaya children (Figures 81-84).  A month later the first INRENA official visited the 
community to investigate the complaints on illegal logging and overlapping concessions.  
The INRENA forestry engineer observed concessionaires legally logging in concessions 
on lands claimed by the community but also community members logging illegally with 
support from a local patrón.  While this contradiction did not greatly help their cause, the 
community remained dedicated to official channels.  They wrote fifteen letters162 from 
2002 to 2004 asking to dissolve the overlapping concessions.  Finally, frustrated by the 
lack of progress, they asked INRENA to apprehend the timber logged illegally in their 
homeland.  The community found allies in the Defenders of the People and AIDESEP, 
but was discouraged by the bureaucracy endemic to INRENA and PETT (Proyecto 
Especial de Titulación de Tierras).  The community also received a visit from the 
Instituto del Bien Común in 2003 to include them in the Peruvian Native 
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Figure 81.  In 2004, the School of Alto Tamaya had a bilingual teacher and numerous students eager to learn.  When the 
Asháninka told a local patrón they were organizing to get a school, the patrón said, “why do you want a school?  
To teach your children how to be thieves?”  
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Figure 82.  The Asháninka continue to work hard to ensure the education of their 
children.  Leonardo here helps build a house for the new school teacher.
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Figure 83.  Women contribute as well to the construction of the new house.  Here Tamila clears the vegetation in the future 
yard of the house.  In the background other women and children work.
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Figure 84.  The community organized to put up this house frame in just two days with women, men, and children participating.
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Communities Information System (SICNA) and from an AIDESEP anthropologist in 
2004 working for the commission to solve overlapping claims within native communities. 
On October 18th, 2004, following a petition by the President of Alto Tamaya, 
INRENA seized 189 logs of mahogany, tropical cedar and tornillo163 in the storage area 
of the sawmill.  The timber totaled over 275 cubic meters of hardwood worth 
approximately 200,000 dollars US in Lima164.  However, the timber was released to the 
owner, a local patrón operating in Alto Tamaya (Figure 76), when he coerced the 
illiterate Vice President of Alto Tamaya to place his thumbprint on a document stating 
the timber did not come from Alto Tamaya. 
2. Resistance in the Borderlands 
In 1998, an undocumented and illiterate Asháninka family journeyed to the union 
of the Alto Tamaya and Putaya Rivers with the intention of uniting all of the Asháninka 
inhabitants of these watercourses into one community.  This family settled at the current 
site of the community of Alto Tamaya and began to convince their cousins to join them in 
forming a community and a school.  While Asháninka had lived on the Putaya and Alto 
Tamaya Rivers for at least 40 years, they had always lived in isolated households 
alongside the rivers practicing subsistence agriculture and working in timber for the local 
patrones.  The area was thinly settled with a few patrones, the local Asháninka, their 
cousins on the Amônia River in Brazil and Peru, and the mixed Brazilian-Peruvian 
population of Puerto Putaya on the Tamaya River (Figure 58).  However, this changed in 
2000 when the lifting of the ban on logging for the Tamaya watershed, the forestry law of 
2000 and the nation state’s creation of forestry concessions on the Alto Tamaya and 
Putaya Rivers, the growing scarcity of mahogany and tropical cedar elsewhere brought 
hundreds of loggers into the area.  The new forestry system brought a new system of 
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ownership to the rich forests of Alto Tamaya and forced the Asháninka to band together 
to try and protect themselves and their territory. 
The patrones who had enjoyed the exploitation of Asháninka labor for decades, 
quickly saw the threat implicit in the formation of a community and a school.  The titling 
of Alto Tamaya would eliminate their concessions and possibly their ranches and farms, 
deny open access to Alto Tamaya forests outside of concessions, and threaten the current 
debt peonage system with a new generation of educated and empowered Asháninka.  The 
two principal local patrones had lived or worked in the region and with the Asháninka for 
over 40 years and began using their considerable influence to disrupt the organizing 
efforts of the Asháninka.  Simultaneously, the residents of Alto Tamaya asked one of 
these patrones to support their efforts at community formation, “what pleasure we had in 
inviting Don Pablo, that he come to our meeting, that he come hear so we can ask him his 
opinion, but he wanted nothing to do with it.”  Instead, this patrón spoke to the 
community and convinced several families to abandon the effort.  According to 
community leaders, he said: 
Don’t listen to Rodrigo and Tanya, if you follow them you will end up naked in 
the community… there will be no money… everything about the community is a 
lie… they will not get a teacher, they will not organize, they will never get titled, 
it is all a lie, work, work the timber… here you will see money.  If not, in the 
community you will end up naked.  
Berto relates that the other patrón also came to the community saying, “In the community 
you will have nothing.  Come, work with me.  I will pay you.  I will give you 
everything”.  Berto finishes recalling this conversation with, “but it is not like that, it is 
not like how they promise.” 
Several families believed the promises and split from the community.  The 
founder of the community was convinced by a patrón to move a few days journey down 
the Tamaya River to take a paid job caring for his farm.  According to community 
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residents, the patrón thought the exit of the founder would persuade others to also 
abandon the community.  Another patrón, Don Pablo, convinced a single mother and her 
two children to travel downriver with him to Pucallpa promising to provide her with 
work.  Her cousin, Tanya, relates the story, “…and when they arrived in Pucallpa he did 
not even give her a sol.  Instead he asked her to let him sleep with her daughter and then 
he would provide her with money and clothing.”  The woman’s daughter was eleven 
years old.  The mother refused and avoided hunger in the city only by joining the 
researcher and community leaders on the seven day boat journey upriver to the 
community.  Nevertheless, a patrón’s power cannot be underestimated, as Don Pablo 
convinced other families, such as the former nanny of his son, to split from the 
community and continue logging for him (Figure 85-6). 
Thus, like all communities, the Asháninka who make up the community of Alto 
Tamaya were heterogenous, and did not agree on all things or speak in one voice 
(Agrawal and Gibson 1999).  In particular, their relations with patrones and loggers were 
complex with some Asháninka siding with patrones instead of the community, at least 
until they get a title, and even the leaders of the community having sons working in 
logging camps or as habilitados to local patrones.  One mestizo married to an Asháninka 
also asserted that the community titling efforts were being at least partially underwritten 
by another logging patrón pursuing future terms to log within community territory.  This 
would hardly be surprising as there was a lack of funding options to support indigenous 
communities negotiating the bureaucratic hurdles and associated costs involved in 
gaining title.  Indeed, logging companies helped title the nearby borderland Asháninka 
communities of Sawawo and San Mateo.  
Nevertheless, in Alto Tamaya, the majority of the Asháninka and the majority of 
the patrones and loggers are in a contest for territory and natural resources.  In August of 
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Figure 85.  Doña Juana and her family did not live with the community.  She had close ties to the local patrón and had a small 




Figure 86.  José and his family also did not live with the community.  Instead they worked with patrones logging their 
homelands.  Because they lived far away, their children did not attend school.
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2003 delegations from Alto Tamaya blocked off three tributaries because the loggers did 
not give the community a percentage of the timber profits earned from territory the 
Asháninka considered theirs.  The loggers asked for the Asháninka title and then 
continued to log when they were unable to produce any documentation.  The community 
also attempted to barricade a tributary of the Putaya River but their chainsaw 
malfunctioned.  The concessionaire, on hearing of their attempt, came and promised to 
leave a percentage of the timber extracted, but never did.  In another case, the sub chief of 
Alto Tamaya confronted a patrona (female patrón) financially backing tabloneros (plank 
makers) sawing and removing mahogany planks from Alto Tamaya and Brazil (Figure 
87).  The patrona responded by saying the Asháninka had no title to the land.  In addition 
she repeated over and over that she worked with Edgar Velásquez.  While the sub chief 
did not know who Edgar Velásquez was, in 2004 he was the Governor of the entire 
region and a sawmill owner (Figure 88).  In another case violence was narrowly avoided 
in July of 2004 when unknown people entered the community and fired guns.  Luckily, 
nobody was injured.  Five days later the community sent a letter to the Admiral of the 
Naval base in Pucallpa asking for the requirements to form a self defense committee as 
the frontier zone had no state presence and they feared for their lives165.  
3. Crossing the Line: Loggers Trespassing into Brazil 
The Asháninka have lived and traveled along the international border between 
Peru and Brazil for over a hundred years (da Cunha 1967, da Cunha 1976).  Even in 
2004, the inhabitants of Alto Tamaya traveled regularly to visit their parents, in-laws, 
cousins and children in the Brazilian Asháninka village of Apiwtxa.  However, since 
1999 the trespassing of Peruvian loggers into the Brazilian homelands of Apiwtxa had 
strained relations between Asháninka families separated by the border.  In 2004 the 
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Figure 87.  Tablones (planks) such as these are cut by tabloneros in the headwaters with chainsaws and then re-sawn in 




Figure 88. Economic relations of illegal tabloneros operating in Brazil. 
people of Apiwtxa feared the loggers working on the border and would not travel to Perú.  
In addition, the people of Apiwtxa speculated that their Peruvian brethren were 
facilitating the invasion of their homelands with labor and local knowledge.  The people 
of Alto Tamaya disagreed, and had even lost lives trying to help their cousins across the 
political border. 
On July 22, 2003, a young Asháninka man, the son of a resident of Alto Tamaya, 
died of gunshot wounds obtained near the border between Peru and Brazil.  According to 
the President of the Apiwtxa cooperative, the deceased was one of two Asháninka from 
Alto Tamaya who warned Apiwtxa of incursions by Peruvian loggers into their territory.  
Shortly after returning to Peru they were killed by loggers, although only the one injured 
man was found.  Another confrontation occurred on July 28, 2004 when, Mateo, the son 
of an Asháninka from Apiwtxa decided to visit Apiwtxa with three mestizo loggers he 
was working with in Peru.  At the border, men from Apiwtxa stopped them, telling them 
they were Peruvians and should thus return to their country.  The Apiwtxa Asháninka 
then began to hit the Peruvians causing serious injury to one of the loggers who was 
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taken to Cruzeiro do Sul for medical treatment166.  According to Mateo, “With this action 
now the loggers for our patrón also control the border beating Brazilians trying to cross.” 
This local level border enforcement mushroomed following successful 
propaganda by the Apiwtxa Asháninka during their Asháninka Week presentations in the 
University of Brasilia (Figure 89).  Three days later the Apiwtxa Asháninka helped the 
Brazilian Federal Police, army, and Ministry of Environment capture four Peruvian 
loggers sawing mahogany into planks a two hour walk inside Apiwtxa/Brazilian territory.  
Diablo, a Peruvian logger present during the bust described how a helicopter with 40 
soldiers landed and captured four of the fifteen loggers working in the camp.  The 
soldiers burned the camp, dynamited the timber, and took the prisoners with them167 
while the rest of the loggers fled through the forest back to Peru.  This was merely the 
first of a series of arrests of Peruvian loggers by Brazilian officials.   
B. The Case of Apiwtxa 
The Brazilian Asháninka of Apiwtxa warned Brazilian authorities of Peruvian trespassers 
beginning in 1999.  However, these trespassers were not the first loggers to invade this 
Asháninka homeland.  The timber boom on the Brazilian side of the border began in 1970 
before peaking in the late 1980s with the arrival of tractors floated up from Cruzeiro do 
Sul.  During the boom, the Asháninka were enmeshed in a debt peonage system almost 
identical to that described for Alto Tamaya above.  Similar to the trend in Peru 
documented here, over time the Brazilian patrones became more and more exploitative as 
the demand for high grade hardwood increased.  The Asháninka organized in part to 
resist a series of invasions by Brazilian loggers who extracted more than 2,500 logs 
(CEDI 1993) and created over 80 kilometers of logging roads with their tractors (Pimenta 
2002).  In 1992, after much struggle, the Asháninka of Apiwtxa obtained their title with  
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Figure 89. The digital cover of the Asháninka week program. Universidade da Brasilia, 
CPI, APIWTXA.
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the help of anthropologists and indigenistas.  However, the contest for timber would 
continue, this time from the Peruvian side of the border. 
1. The Apiwtxa Asháninka as Border Patrol 
The residents of Apiwtxa began anticipating trouble on their southern border in 
1999 when their Peruvian cousins in Sawawo agreed to a proposal from a logging 
company to establish a road from the Ucayali River and partner with them in the selective 
logging of their territory (Pimenta 2002).  In December of 2000, the Asháninka of 
Apiwtxa alerted Brazilian authorities of trespassers.  According to the press, army 
helicopters beat an Asháninka war party to the logging site in an attempt to prevent 
conflict, discovering eight clearings in Brazilian territory and a series of logging trails 
leading to a logging camp in Peru (Pimenta 2002).  A month later, one of the Apiwtxa 
leaders was quoted in the Folha do Sao Paolo, “We are prepared to defend our people.  
We want everything resolved peacefully but if nature is at risk and nothing is done, we 
will kill and die fighting for our people.” (Folha de Sao Paulo staff 2001: A2).  While the 
attention from Brazilian authorities eliminated or at least slowed trespassing, the 
partnership between the logging company and the Sawawo Asháninka extracted over 
4,000 m³ of mahogany and 2,500 m³ of tropical cedar in their first two harvests (2001-
2003) of Sawawo territory168 (Aquino 2004).  In 2002, the logging company’s road to the 
Ucayali River (and a handful of secondary roads) extended over 140 kilometers and was 
wide enough to map from satellite images with 30 meter resolution169 (Figure 58 and 90).  
According to the President of Apiwtxa the road crossed the Amônia River in 2004 and is 
targeting other borderland indigenous territories for timber harvesting near the Juruá 
River.  The Apiwtxa territory continued to be a target in the following years with the 
community discovering and burning a Peruvian camp a kilometer inside their land in 
November of 2002 (Martins 2003).  A year later, in November of 2003, the President of 
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Figure 90.  An illegal logging road cut by Peruvian loggers into Brazilian territory is clearly visible from this small plane.  This 
is only a small portion of the illegal road network whose main trunk extends 140 kilometers from the Upper 
Ucayali River to the Brazilian border.  Photo courtesy of Apiwtxa, the Commissão Pro Indio do Acre, and 
IBAMA.
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Apiwtxa related to an Acre newspaper that the Asháninka had found 60 Peruvians 
logging mahogany and tropical cedar inside their territory with tractors and chainsaws 
under the guidance of Don Tomás and his brother in law (Schneider 2003).  In January of 
2004, the Asháninka convinced a team of army, federal police, IBAMA and IMAC to 
follow up this discovery with aerial and terrestrial reconnaissance.  The reconnaissance 
documented logging roads shadowing the Brazilian border with harvested mahogany, 
artisanal winches and ten meter wide skid trails located inside Brazilian territory (Martins 
and Freddo 2004) (Figure 91).  A month later the Brazilian army, federal police, FUNAI, 
and state police of Acre forced 30 Peruvian loggers out of Asháninka lands (FUNAI 
2004). 
Despite this action, trespassing continued, and in March of 2004 a federal judge 
of Acre held Brazil, IBAMA, and FUNAI responsible for non compliance of promises 
made to the Asháninka ordering the three institutions to update the border monuments, 
and set up FUNAI, federal police, and IBAMA outposts in the region (Instituto Socio-
Ambiental 2004b).  Four months later the General in charge of the Military Command of 
Amazonia and the Governor of Acre announced the forthcoming establishment of three 
new military bases in the border region with one planned for the mouth of the Amonia 
River (Maia 2004).  This proceeded with the delays typical of the border region until 
September of 2004 when the University of Brasilia hosted a four day celebration of 
Asháninka culture in the Brazilian capital.  This celebration gave the Asháninka a large 
stage to expound on the Peruvian loggers’ continued trespassing into Brazilian and 
Asháninka territory (Amorim 2004) (Figure 89).  While in Brasilia, the Asháninka 
personally denounced the logging activities to Marina Silva, the Brazilian Minister of 
Environment170, FUNAI, a federal judge, a pop music star, a representative of the 
Protection System of Amazonia (SIPAM), and members of the Brazilian press in addition
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Figure 91.  The President of Apiwtxa and two soldiers surveying the logging roads cut by Peruvian loggers into Brazilian 
territory.  Photo courtesy of Apiwtxa, the Commissão Pro Indio do Acre, and IBAMA.
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to incorporating it into their planned expositions at the University (Instituto Socio 
Ambiental 2004a).  The charismatic and eloquent leaders of Apiwtxa made an immediate 
impression, with Marina Silva saying, “In terms of organization, the Ashaninka are an 
example for all of Brazil,” (Ministério do Meio Ambiente  2004), and a Professor of 
Anthropology at the University declaring them to be “… the most organized political 
actors in the region,” (Amorim 2004).  These strong impressions and their concurrent 
message of a threat to national security galvanized Brazil’s security and environmental 
forces into immediate action (Figure 92). 
On September 27, 2004 a joint operation including Brazilian army, federal police 
and IBAMA captured four Peruvian loggers, burned a logging camp, and dynamited 100 
logs of mahogany (equivalent to 1,000 m³) (Sales,V. 2004) (Figure 93).  On October 12, 
2004 the same operation captured 7 Peruvian loggers in Asháninka territory with 150 m³ 
of mahogany inside the Serra do Divisor National Park (Campos 2004).  Three days later 
the operation captured 216 logs of tropical cedar (estimated at 700 m³) that Peruvian 
loggers had abandoned in the Serra do Divisor National Park (Sales, A. 2004).  That 
weekend, IBAMA, the Federal Police, Army, FUNAI, Insitituto Socio Ambiental all met 
with the Asháninka in Apiwtxa and presented them with a GPS, radio, and satellite phone 
to alert them if the invasions continued (Sales, A. 2004).  On October 22, operation 
Asháninka or operation PeBra (Perú Brasil) continued capturing 26 loggers in the Serra 
do Divisor National Park with 300 cubic meters of mahogany (Antunes 2004; O Rio 
Branco 2004). 
This newly active border policing had impacts both positive and negative for the 
community and individuals of Apiwtxa.  The President of Apiwtxa was twice threatened 
personally by Brazilians in league with the Peruvian loggers (Piedrafita 2004).  Other 
threats also led the Asháninka and Brazilian delegation to cancel their participation in a
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Figure 92.  The President of Apiwtxa pointing out the Peruvian forestry concessions (in orange) that border his territory in 
Brazil.  The projected map is one of a suite made by the author in conjunction with the Centro de Investigación de 
Fronteras Amazónicas, Universidad Nacional de Ucayali.  Photo courtesy of Apiwtxa, Commissão Pro Indio do 
Acre, and The Nature Conservancy. 
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Figure 93.  Brazilian authorities burning a Peruvian logging camp in Brazilian territory.  Photo courtesy of IBAMA.
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University of Ucayali led meeting in Pucallpa to address the border invasions.  However, 
Asháninka access to and recognition by Acre and Brazilian institutions improved 
markedly with the President of Apiwtxa receiving the Brazilian Nation’s human rights 
award in October of 2004 (Piedrafita 2004), and the unprecedented visit of the head of 
the Military Command of Amazonia and the Governor of Acre to Apiwtxa in February of 
2005171 (Maia 2005).  When informed by the Asháninka of continued trespassing by 
Peruvian loggers, the head of the Amazonia command promised to mount a similar 
operation to the one made in September and October of 2004.  In March of the same year, 
the Governor of Acre took the President of Apiwtxa with him to a meeting with President 
Toledo172 in Lima, thus forcing the Peruvian head of state to recognize the borderland 
indigenous people to be affected by the planned increase in commerce and infrastructure 
between the two nations (La República 2005).  Months later continued trespassing led to 
the operation promised in February.  The Timbó III operation took place over a ten day 
period starting July 10, 2005.  The Amazonia Military Command consisted of 7,000 men 
(6,230 Army, 917 Navy, and 387 Air Force) acting simultaneously across the entire 
border of the Brazilian states of Rondônia, Acre and part of Amazonas (Simonetti 2005).  
The operation netted 700 cubic meters of logs, 620 stakes and over 1,400 tablones along 
with capturing 40 Peruvians involved in the illegal transport of timber (Simonetti 2005).  
Despite these military operations, invasions continued with the Brazilian armed forces 
engaging in a gunfight with Peruvians in the Parque Nacional Serra do Divisor in 2006 
(Página 20 2006). 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has investigated marginality on the margins through the study of the 
borderland Asháninka and their complex relationship with the tropical timber industry 
and the political boundary line.  The suite of methodologies used in the study provided 
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the sub-canopy cultural ecology data to complement large scale modeling of logging 
related impacts of Amazonian forests (Asner et al. 2005, Asner et al. 2006).  The 
contributions of this study to the literature on logging impacts and indigenous resistance 
will be covered in greater detail in the conclusion.  In summary the results include several 
findings.  First, this research finds the Peruvian logging industry’s operations in 
Amazonia to be shackled to the debt-merchandise system, a few high value species, and 
primitive methods of extraction.  This antiquated industry model, and the failures of the 
new forestry law allow illegal loggers to aggressively exploit remote areas where 
geographic information and state presence is limited.  Second, this research finds 
exploitation to include not only timber species but also local people.  The complex 
exploitative labor relations between the loggers (both illegal and quasi-legal) and the 
borderland Asháninka are here described in ethnographic detail.  These details describe 
the presence of precapitalist social relations of production and exchange and a weak state, 
thus contradicting Santos-Granero and Barclay’s (2000) argument that the Loreto-
Ucayali frontier is tamed.   
Finally, the chapter finds significant differences between the borderland resistance 
pursued by the Peruvian Asháninka and the Brazilian Asháninka in the face of illegal 
loggers.  This comparison of resistance efforts by Alto Tamaya and Apiwtxa Asháninka 
demonstrate a large gap between their levels of organization and the amount of 
governmental support obtained for their efforts against Peruvian loggers.  In this case, 
titled homelands (Apiwtxa) have proved superior barriers to logging related deforestation 
than untitled homelands (Alto Tamaya).  Apiwtxa sounded the alarm to mobilize 
thousands of troops on the border even as Alto Tamaya struggled to obtain their first 
community school teacher.  A number of variables contribute to Apiwtxa’s improved 
organization and support: titled land, a progressive regional government, stronger ties 
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with NGOs, ability to use national security discourse as the trespassee, are just some 
examples.  While these variables rely on the ability to mobilize power (Schmink and 
Wood 1992) and encourage political will in a contested frontier, I argue in this 
dissertation’s conclusion that these also depend on the improved geographic knowledge 
available in the Brazilian borderland region.  In the absence of this knowledge Apiwtxa 
lies in an unmapped borderland unable to obtain a title, invisible to the Acre government 
and interested NGOs, and easily dismissed by military leaders when residents attempt to 
alert authorities of Peruvian trespassers. 
This is the situation of Alto Tamaya, a community desperately seeking to get on a 
borderland map currently dominated by forestry concessions and blank spaces (Figure 
94).  This lack of geographic knowledge and the associated absence of a state presence 
have allowed illegal loggers to rule the borderlands: building hundreds of kilometers of 
illegal roads, exploiting indigenous and urban labor through debt peonage, and 
trespassing into neighboring countries to harvest mahogany and cedar.  To date, these 
loggers have been stopped only through the sounding of an alarm by an unanticipated 
Brazilian border patrol, the Apiwtxa Asháninka.  Although not official, the Asháninka 
people have proved to be superior border guards because of their local knowledge and 
motivation to defend their land and resources.  Their unofficial but highly effective 
boundary vigilance fulfills the national security goals of a Brazilian state preoccupied 
with their extensive Amazonian boundaries.  They are the most charismatic, organized, 
and visible presence along a scarcely populated and vulnerable political boundary.  
Interestingly, the ongoing defense of their Asháninka territory reflects a role the Brazilian 




Figure 94.  Pablito,  sub-chief of the Alto Tamaya community, shares his geographic 
knowledge of the region.  One outcome of this research has been the 
creation of  both counter maps and a GIS shapefile showing the territorial 
homelands of the Asháninka of Alto Tamaya (Figure 58).
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“If it was up to me to suggest on behalf of these our noble compatriots…to submit 
them to a brand of military regime, administered without severity in villages 
alongside the boundary lines that so suit us to garrison without destroying their 
family ties….”.   
Borderlands throughout Amazonia are often sparsely populated with most residents being 
traditional peoples.  Ultimately, these extensive borders are likely to be patrolled most 
effectively by the people who know them best: their traditional residents.  However, this 
will only be the case if these populations are given a territory of their own that merits 
patrolling. 
The alternative is to perpetuate a lawless border such as the one described in Alto 
Tamaya: a poorly mapped borderland where loggers or other illegal predators of natural 
resources are allowed to roam unchecked in areas that administrative centers know little 
if anything about.  While a top down imposition of forestry concessions on these 
unknown lands may appear to simultaneously satisfy economic and territorial 
organization goals, in this case it merely perpetuated injustices and poor resource 
management in the inhabited borderlands.  This signals the potential failure of the new 
forest law to substantively improve the governance of Peru’s Amazonian forests (Smith 
et al. 2006).  This study has pointed out examples of ineffective law enforcement, 
corruption, insecure property rights, and the lack of basic geographic information under 
the new forestry regime.  These governance failures result in a continuation of the status 
quo, where the violation of timber laws is an accepted code of behavior (Smith et al. 
2006:468).  A more prudent measure to the top down imposition of new legislation and 
concessions is to obtain accurate geographic information from the ground up by taking 
advantage of the local knowledge from the traditional inhabitants of these political 
margins.  While this alone will not solve the injustice in these remote areas, it is the first 
step in empowering formerly marginalized populations to obtain title to their territory and 
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allowing state and non-state organizations the opportunity to invest in the cultural and 
ecological diversity of these areas.  In addition, as demonstrated here, the titling of land 
also can alert the administrative centers of the trespassing of foreigners on remote 









Chapter Four: The Social and Environmental Impacts of Coca 
Cultivation in the Amazon Borderlands of Peru 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The world’s demand173 for coca derivatives is almost entirely supplied174 by coca 
cultivated in the coca growing region of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru (UNODC 2005a).  
While world demand cannot easily be measured, the United Nations Office of Drug 
Control (UNODC) estimates 687 metric tons of cocaine were produced from 158,000 
hectares of coca leaf cultivated in the region in 2004 (UNODC 2005a).  The sale of this 
coca leaf generated an estimated 860 million dollars for coca farmers (UNODC 2005b).  
The economic and political importance of coca cultivation in these countries is reflected 
at the macro scale by the recent election of the charismatic former coca farmer and 
organizer Evo Morales to the Bolivian presidency (Economist 2005).  Despite this 
importance, local scale studies of coca cultivation are rare due to the difficult and 
dangerous nature of field research on the cultivation of illicit drugs175 (Henkel 1971, 
Morales 1994).  This lack of local level research leads to serious oversights such as the 
UNODC’s 2005 Peru Coca Cultivation Survey (2005c: 10, 32) and others (Machado 
2001: 388, Plowman 1984: 131) finding no cultivation in the central borderlands of Peru.  
Similar to the two previous chapters, I argue local level field research to be of critical 
importance to understand borderland resource dynamics.  In this case, the focus is coca, 
and here I explore the importance, nature, and impact of coca cultivation in the central 
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borderlands of Peru.  What are the characteristics of borderland coca cultivation?  How 
widespread is it?  And if widespread, what are its social and environmental impacts? 
While Peruvian coca cultivation is primarily associated with the coca production 
zones of the eastern Andean slopes and valleys (Young 1996, 2004a), this research 
estimates borderland coca production to be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in the 
four watershed study site alone.  Since borderland coca cultivation was established in the 
1980s, farmers and traffickers alike have adjusted to the new constraints and 
opportunities present in the border region.  This chapter describes how the introduction of 
this lucrative crop and the unique culture of its farmers fundamentally changed the 
demographic, economic, cultural, and social patterns of settlement in these borderlands.  
Here I describe the real and potential links of borderland inhabitants (indigenous and 
non-indigenous) and industry (logging and mining) in both Peru and Brazil to this 
transformative crop.  In addition I explore the relationships between mapping, timber, 
and coca: the three main topics of this dissertation.  This chapter also addresses the 
linkages between coca cultivation, processing, and trafficking and deforestation, forest 
fragmentation, biodiversity conservation, and contamination of soil and water.  
Moreover, this chapter contributes a detailed description and analysis of Peruvian 
eradication methods and measures to propose the hypothesis: coca eradication increases 
rather than mitigates the negative social and environmental impacts of coca cultivation. 
The chapter begins with a brief description of the varieties of cultivated coca and 
their uses before introducing the methodologies and study site in the second section.  The 
third section gives a recent history of coca eradication and eradication methodologies in 
Peru.  The following section outlines how coca cultivation in the borderland study site 
may be distinct from coca cultivation described in published accounts elsewhere in Peru.  
Then, the fifth section describes real and potential social impacts of this borderland coca 
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cultivation through an analysis of coca boom towns, the ties of the coca industry with 
logging mining, and revolutionary groups, and the relationship between indigenous 
groups and commercial coca.  The sixth section focuses on environmental impacts with 
specific attention to deforestation, threats to protected areas, and chemical inputs.  
Finally, the conclusion discusses the findings and offers some policy recommendations. 
II. COCA 
The sources of all cultivated coca are two closely related South American shrub 
species Erythroxylum coca and Erythroxylum novogranatense (Plowman 1984).  Each 
species has an additional variety, E. coca var. ipadu and E. novogranatense var. 
truxillense, with the former known for its traditional use by lowland Amazonian groups 
(Plowman 1981) and the latter a drought-resistant variety grown largely for commercial 
purposes in arid to semi-arid interandean valleys (Young 1996).  The most important 
variety for both traditional leaf chewing and the production of coca paste and cocaine in 
Andean Peru is E. coca var. coca.  Although E. coca var. ipadu has been cultivated in 
lowland Amazonia for many centuries, historically, its low alkaloid content has made it a 
poor choice for cocaine production, indicating E. coca var. coca to be favored for 
cultivation in the expanding production areas of Amazonian Peru.  Nevertheless, recent 
research on coca cultivated illegally in the Colombian Amazon indicates farmers to be 
increasingly cultivating high-producing hybrids of E. coca var. ipadu (Johnson et al. 
2003).  These hybrids would be well adapted and easily diffused across the Putumayo 
River to the Peruvian Amazon, and may well be increasingly planted in the study site. 
While expanding production in Peru is driven by foreign demand for coca leaf 
derivatives like cocaine, over four million Peruvians continue to practice traditional use 
of the leaf (Rospigliosi et al. 2004) as they have done for perhaps as long as five thousand 
years (Piperno and Pearsall 1998).  Coca leaf chewing can alleviate hunger, cold and 
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fatigue and is used both in traditional medicine and shamanic practices (Rospigliosi et al. 
2004).  Traditional use of the coca leaf appears to have no negative consequences (Duke 
et al. 1975, Morales 1994) while the sharing of leaves and participation in group sessions 
of coca chewing continues to create and strengthen ties between friends and family 
(Allen 2002, Andrews and Solomon 1975, Morales 1994,Young 2004a).  Indeed, the 
economic interchange of coca leaf has also fortified ties between highland consumers and 
foothill producers for at least the last millennium (Morales 1994, Osborne 1952). 
The eastern slopes and foothills of the Andes continue to be the principal source 
of Peruvian coca leaf with the valleys of Alto Huallaga, Apurimac-Ene, and La 
Convención-Lares containing 88% of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) estimated176 50,300 hectares of Peruvian coca surface in 2004 although 
production is growing rapidly in other areas (UNODC 2005c).  These 50,300 hectares of 
coca represent a 14% growth in total area under cultivation and the fastest expansion of 
coca surface since 1994.  This growth places Peru second to Colombia in coca leaf 
production among countries worldwide.  The UNODC estimates these 50,300 hectares 
capable of producing 110,000 metric tons of coca leaf (UNODC 2005c), well over the 
approximately 7,500 metric tons used by Peru’s four million traditional users (Rospigliosi 
et al. 2004: 14) and the small amounts needed for the pharmaceutical industry and as 
flavorants.  Thus, the majority of coca leaf production is driven by the global demand for 
coca derivative drugs such as coca paste, cocaine, and crack.  Coca leaf can be processed 
into coca paste after soaking, and trampling the leaves and their residues in treatments 
using acids, solvents, neutralizers (Morales 1994, Young 1996).  Coca paste is a drug 
used locally by farmers and processors, or nationally and in neighboring countries by the 
rural and urban poor (Geffray 2001, Maia 2005, Rojas 2002, Schonenberg 2001).  The 
distillation of coca paste into cocaine hydrochloride requires another step often 
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undertaken in laboratories that reduces the volume even as it increases significantly in 
value (Morales 1994).  Once made into readily transportable cocaine, the drug can be 
moved at less cost and risk to North America and Western Europe, the two regions 
estimated to have consumed over 70% of global cocaine in 2001-3 (UNODC 2005a).  
Latin America is the safest target for cocaine exports due to proximity and a growing 
market with over 5% of global consumption in 2001-3 (UNODC 2005a).  Regardless of 
the end market, Veja estimated 45% of cocaine produced in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru 
to pass through the Brazilian Amazon (Peres and Coutinho 2004). 
III. METHODS 
Field research was conducted in the Peruvian region of Ucayali and the Brazilian 
state of Acre for 10 months in 2004.  The primary region of inquiry consisted of four 
watersheds in Ucayali, Peru whose headwaters coincided with the Brazilian border in the 
state of Acre (Figure 3).  I and my five research assistants conducted in depth field work 
in nine different communities (indigenous and non-indigenous) within these watersheds.  
Initial field research focused on such local use of land and natural resources as ranching, 
farming, logging, and hunting.  Research soon confirmed coca cultivation to be present in 
the study site and coca to be the most important cash crop in the region.  The question 
was how to go about studying the crop.  Morales outlined the challenging nature of 
ethnographic field research on Peruvian coca cultivation (Morales 1994: 175-189) and he 
was a highland indigenous Peruvian working in his home community.  My own status 
was quite different: an obvious outsider working in watersheds where U.S. financed coca 
eradication was actively taking place.  In order to successfully study coca cultivation I 
combined ethnographic field research, GIS analysis of a coca eradication data set, and 
document research. 
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My field approach was to pursue an indirect progressive contextualization.  
Rather than ask the typically direct factual and counterfactual questions (Vayda 1983, 
2004), I looked for causal explanation through indirect questions and direct observation.  
Similar to Morales (1994), I found patience, good humor, and a casual curiosity to 
encourage people to share their stories about the cultivation and trafficking of the crop.  I 
trained my field assistants to pursue the same strategy, showing casual interest by day 
and then recording notes by night behind the relative obscurity of the mosquito net.  
Participatory methods and interest in all types of crops and livelihood pursuits often led 
to the subject of coca and allowed willing participants to talk unsolicited about their 
experiences with or knowledge of this important regional crop.  
The initial communities chosen for fieldwork were indigenous as I had an 
invitation from the regional indigenous organization to help raise the visibility of 
borderland indigenous groups.  These first villages gave me a platform to find out more 
information about other villages and select ones that might have coca cultivation but also 
be relatively safe and open to researchers from outside the region.  This required a great 
deal of trust, later found well deserved, in local knowledge and the abilities and reasoning 
of my field assistants.  Ultimately, two of the nine community research sites were 
primarily dedicated to coca cultivation while two others had coca eradicated within their 
community limits and all communities had direct or indirect ties with the crop. 
The ethnographic information on coca cultivation was complemented in the final 
week of data collection with the reception of a 2003-2004 eradication dataset of the four 
watershed study area from the special project Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation 
in the Alto Huallaga (CORAH)177 of the Peruvian Ministry of the Interior.  This dataset 
confirmed the extent and impact of coca cultivation in the study area, and was 
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supplemented further by two days of informational interviews with CORAH 
topographers, geographers, and administrative personnel.   
On my return to the United States I conducted additional remote sensing, 
GIScience analysis, informational interviews, document research, and archival research 
to contextualize my fieldwork.  Remote sensing consisted of qualitative analysis of 
unclassified Landsat images from 2002.  Analyzing these images in conjunction with the 
location of eradicated coca fields and my own field-based data allowed me to better 
understand the land use and transportation dynamics of the coca crop.  The spatial 
relationship of coca fields and hydrological systems was determined using vector files of 
the major rivers and coca fields and ArcGIS 8.3’s buffer wizard to create a buffer 5 
kilometers distant from the thalwegs of rivers and the centers of lakes and analyze the 
extent of overlap of this buffer with the coca fields.  Elevation data was generated, using 
ArcGIS 8.3, by taking the coca field polygons, interpolating them to raster and running 
statistics on their overlap with 90 meter resolution Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 
(SRTM) elevation data178.  Other GIS analysis included selection of coca fields by 
attributes and location and running descriptive statistics in ArcView 8.3.  I also analyzed 
the spatial relationships between mining concessions, forestry concessions, indigenous 
territories, conservation units, and the eradicated coca fields using the same software.  
Field data and geospatial analysis was supplemented by archival and document 
research in three languages (English, Spanish, and Portuguese).  While in Peru and Brazil 
I was able to collect documents and newspaper clippings about the borderland peoples, 
indigenous territories, resource concessions, conservation units, drug trafficking, logging, 
and to a limited degree, coca eradication.  On my return to the United States I did 
additional research using libraries and the internet.  In some cases, my field-based 
knowledge of the region allowed me to incorporate references that would have been 
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meaningless beforehand.  Newspaper accounts from Ucayali, Peru and Acre, Brazil 
proved particularly helpful in supplying useful context and related data.  The Benson 
Latin American Collection also yielded good sources of secondary, and in some cases, 
primary material.  The search function of the internet (in all three languages) also proved 
useful in providing leads to the electronic documents of the United Nations Office of 
Drug Control, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Peruvian Ministry of the Interior, and a 
variety of international journals in Portuguese and Spanish among a host of other sources.  
The combination of the comprehensive fieldwork, an exceptional dataset, technical skills, 
and documentary research described above provided a unique and detailed look at the 
real and potential social and environmental impacts of coca cultivation in this borderland 
site. 
IV. ERADICATION 
This study analyzes a borderland data set on coca eradication in 2003 and 2004 
from the special project Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Alto Huallaga 
(CORAH) of the Peruvian Ministry of the Interior.  The Peruvian government reported 
the total eradication of 10,257 ha of coca fields in 2004 and 11,312 ha in 2003 with 
CORAH eradicating 7,022 ha in 2003 and 7,604 ha in 2004 (Ministerio del Interior 
2003a, UNODC 2005c).  In Amazonian Peru CORAH is synonymous with the forced 
eradication of coca fields as CORAH’s central goal is to reduce the cultivation of coca to 
levels commensurate with the legal use of the plant for traditional consumption and 
pharmacological purposes.  Eradication measures are not often well received: in 2004 
San Gaban residents threatened to retaliate by seizing control of the local hydroelectric 
power station and in Alto Huallaga and Apurimac, the two most prolific production 
zones, CORAH did not even attempt to eradicate coca due to fear of reprisals (UNODC 
2005c).  CORAH’s self defined objectives are threefold (Ministerio del Interior 2002).  
 235
First, to predict, destroy and control illegal adult, juvenile, and abandoned coca crops 
used by drug traffickers for the illicit production of cocaine paste and derivatives.  
Second, CORAH seeks to prevent the expansion of coca on the landscape by expanding 
programs to eliminate coca seed beds.  Finally, CORAH supports policies oriented 
towards the protection of natural areas, eradicating existing plantings of coca within 
National Parks and other state protected areas.   
CORAH was created in 1982 to work in the coca growing region of the Alto 
Huallaga Valley.  In 1994 CORAH was granted the right to expand efforts across Peru 
and today is administered by the Office of Drug Control in the Peruvian Ministry of the 
Interior and entirely financed by the Narcotic Affairs Section (NAS) of the United States 
Embassy in Peru through two 1996 agreements between the two countries: the 
Agreement to Combat the Illicit Use, Production, and Illegal Traffic of Drugs and the 
Operative Agreement for the Drug Control Project (Ministerio del Interior 2002, 
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores 2005).  Up until 1996 CORAH was only allowed to 
eradicate coca seed beds, not planted fields.  The Peruvian Government allowed CORAH 
to eradicate coca fields in remote locations distant from population centers starting in 
1997 and since 1999 CORAH eradicates coca fields throughout the country except in the 
areas of greatest potential conflict (e.g. Alto Huallaga and Apurimac/Ene).  According to 
the Peruvian Ministry of Interior, the United States provided a nine million U.S. dollar 
budget for CORAH from September 2003 to October 2004 with 4.1 million destined for 
eradication efforts, 1.9 million to administrative concerns, and three million for 
monitoring and quantification of the plant179 (Ministerio del Interior: Oficina de 
Comunicación Social 2004). 
CORAH’s eradication methodology initially relies on the remote sensing of coca 
fields, specifically spectral analysis of satellite images, performed in Peru by the Cuerpo 
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de Asistencia para el Desarrollo Alternativo (CADA) and in the United States by the 
Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC).  These methods produce cartographic and 
quantitative data on coca field location and distribution that is then corroborated by 
overflights and on the ground intelligence.  Once the coca field targets are identified, 
CORAH eradication teams are transported to the eradication site by 21 UH-1H and UH-II 
helicopters owned by the United States (Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs 2005) and supported logistically by MI-17 helicopters owned by the 
Peruvian government180.  CORAH teams eradicating in the study site averaged 106.9 
CORAH personnel and 13.8 Peruvian National Police over 162 trips from August 2003-
November 2004.  The majority of CORAH field personnel are laborers, as eradication 
methods are manual with team members using specialized hoes called cocochos (Figure 
95) to pull up coca plants by the roots before burning them in the center of the eradicated 
field.  These teams eradicated 4,446 hectares of coca in 2,915 fields with each coca field 
averaging just over 1.5 hectares in size.  This effort took an estimated 1,152 hours with 
the CORAH teams eradicating an average of 3.85 hectares an hour. 
CORAH teams often require more than one day for eradication and thus at times 
build their own temporary base camps to house their laborers.  These areas require armed 
guards due to the hostile actions of both the local coca farmers and the river bandits.  One 
informant recounted his own experience as a pilot for the boats bringing supplies to these 
camps:  
I only made two trips before quitting.  In June of 2003 at about 8 PM I arrived at 
the mouth of the Tamaya with my bowman in a boat full of goods for the CORAH 
camp.  The boat had a forty horsepower outboard motor and was fast even as full 
as it was.  The mouth of the Tamaya was always the trickiest place as river 
bandits usually waited there for boats bringing coca and money down from the 
coca centers and airstrips or boats bringing supplies up river.  In this case, as we 
entered the river we saw a boat with six bandits just as they began firing.  I started 
to swerve the boat from side to side immediately because I knew I was the target.  
The bandits always shoot for the pilot because once they get him the boat is  
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Figure 95.  CORAH personnel use cocochos to manually eradicate coca in the field.  First, they clamp the coca bush at the base 
and then pull the plant out of the ground roots and all.  Photo: CORAH.
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directionless.  There were four shots but they all missed.  When they missed me, 
we were safe because their peke peke motor was no match for our outboard.  
Once we delivered the supplies to the CORAH base, I saw that it was enormous 
with 6 tents, a helicopter pad, kitchen, and dining for one hundred men.  I made 
one more trip to the base but quit after hearing of the murder of another boat pilot 
ferrying supplies. 
Another facet of the eradication efforts is the compilation of geographical data on 
coca field location and contents.  Each team counts among its members a topographer 
equipped with a GPS and laser range finder binoculars who measures the size and 
location of the field and compiles a short tabular description of its coca contents: age, 
density, degree of maintenance and in some cases associated crops and tree cover181.  
This data is then taken to the temporary operations center where the chief topographer 
enters information using geographic software (AutoCAD).  On returning to Pucallpa, the 
location of the regional seat of CORAH, the information is added into a larger geographic 
database for geographic and statistical analysis using GIS (ArcGIS).  The data is also 
shared with partners in Peru, the United States, and the United Nations for additional 
analysis and the production of status reports. 
V. COCA IN THE BORDERLANDS 
Traditionally coca has not been associated with the central borderlands of Peru 
(UNODC 2005c, Young 2004a).  While the use of coca by the former indigenous 
inhabitants of these borderlands, the Remo and Amahuaca, is unknown, the current 
indigenous inhabitants, the Shipibo-Conibo, Asháninka and Isconahua, cultivate very 
little of the crop.  The floodplain dwelling Shipibo-Conibo appear to have not 
traditionally used coca (Bergman 1974, Tournon 2002), the Isconahua, an indigenous 
group in voluntary isolation, concentrate on hunting and gathering rather than farming, 
while the small populations of borderland Asháninka appear to mainly produce coca for 
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their own consumption, and this, only since their arrival in the region the last hundred 
years. 
Maps of coca distribution and cultivation also show no presence of the plant in 
these borderlands.  Plowman’s 1984 coca distribution map based on herbarium 
collections show none of the four cultivated varieties to be found between the Ucayali 
and Juruá Rivers182 (Plowman 1984).  More recently, the UNODC’s 2005 Peru Coca 
Cultivation Survey shows no cultivation in the region although they have extensive data 
on production countrywide including just across the Ucayali River in Aguaytia and 
Pachitea (2005c).  Despite this absence of published accounts, fieldwork found coca to 
have been an important and lucrative crop with a significant distribution in these 
borderlands since at least the mid 1980s while the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
of Peru recently defined 1985 as the year when coca began to be openly traded and 
cultivated along the Tamaya and Abujao Rivers (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 
et al. 2004a).  Since then coca cultivation has expanded, as in 2003 and 2004 alone, 
CORAH eradicated almost 3,000 fields containing over 4,000 hectares of coca plants in 
the four river basin study area (Table 8)(Figure 38).   
Table 8. Number and size of coca fields eradicated in 2003 and 2004 within the four 
watershed study site. 
Year 2003 Std Dev. 2004 Std Dev. 
Total Fields 1,674  1,241  
Total Has 2,227  2,020  
Avg. Has per Field 1.45 0.95 1.63 0.87 
My analysis of these eradicated fields reveals coca cultivation in these 
borderlands to be unlike the majority of Peruvian coca, as cultivation is neither associated 
with roads nor hillside agriculture (Young 2004b).  The strong association between 
commercial coca cultivation, roads and hillside environments exists because roads and 
steep slopes overcome the two primary limiting factors of well drained soils and 
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transportation: both for processing chemicals and taking the product to markets (Ray 
Henkel personal communication).  However, the Peruvian road network extends only to 
the west bank of the Ucayali River with the few roads on the other side being either 
logging tracks183 or the rare town road (Figure 38).  Without roads, borderland coca relies 
on waterways, the traditional transportation routes of the Amazonian lowlands, with 95% 
of the fields eradicated in 2003-4 falling within five kilometers of a major river or lake.  
In addition, these three thousand fields average only 177 meters in elevation above sea 
level, perhaps the lowest published elevation for commercial coca cultivation.  Despite 
the low elevation, the fields are well drained with terra firme soils and a pronounced dry 
season between July and October.  Although the lack of roads and hillside agriculture 
preclude impacts such as deforestation driven by an expanding road network or 
accelerated soil erosion due to steep gradients, the amount of coca coverage in this 
sample, over 4,000 hectares eradicated, suggests borderland coca cultivation may have 
other social and environmental impacts. 
VI.  SOCIAL IMPACTS 
The social impacts of coca cultivation are vastly understudied when compared to 
the extensive literature on the social impacts of coca consumption (Fryer et al. 2005, 
Rospigliosi et al. 2004, Sterk 1999).  Nevertheless, these impacts are both substantive, 
widespread, and varied in the source countries of Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru due to 
amount of coca cultivation, 158,000 hectares (UNODC 2005a), and the variance in the 
human and physical geography of these diverse nation states.  This section attempts to 
elucidate some of the real and potential social impacts of coca cultivation, and to some 
extent coca eradication, in the Amazonian borderlands of Peru by focusing on the themes 
of drug trafficking, boom towns, the economics of cultivation, ghost towns, and the 
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existing and prospective connections of coca cultivation with loggers, miners, 
revolutionary groups, and indigenous peoples. 
The borderlands felt the social impacts of coca production long before the arrival 
of regional commercial coca cultivation as the political boundary has historically served 
as a gateway for coca and other illegal goods smuggled to Brazil and beyond.  While the 
air bridges connecting source countries to processing centers and international markets is 
the most widely known scale of international coca traffic, coca, largely in the form of 
coca paste, has also moved across the border by water, foot or a combination of the two 
(Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs 2000).  In the central 
borderlands, local people on both sides of the border participated in the process, serving 
to guide or carry the paste across the varaderos connecting the Ucayali and Juruá 
watersheds and on to urban centers (Araujo 2001).  Local people provided logistical 
support as guides, boatmen, builders of landing strips, and spies for complex operations 
involving caravans of porters and armed guards taking coca paste across the border to 
urban markets or to water and air transport destined for processing in Colombia (Araujo 
2001).  Brazil, originally a transit country for Andean coca products, now has trafficking 
of its own and the dealing of coca paste, pasta básica, in its towns and cities 
(Schonenberg 2001).  Coca paste traffic is so prevalent along the border that Brazilian 
youths from nearby border towns are now recruited to process and carry paste into their 
country.  These young men are paid in kind and thus their subsequent peddling of the 
paste has addicted a portion of the Brazilian border towns’ population (Maia 2005). 
Although well paid for their services relative to other options, coca transport 
increased the potential for violence as drug traffickers, narcotraficantes, are known to 
place little value on human life.  Thus, coca transporters do not share with others their 
routes through the border region as they are suspicious of ambushes laid for the cash and 
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goods they bring back from Brazil.  Violence, however, is nothing new to these 
borderlands whose residents have grown accustomed to danger in their occupations as 
skin hunters, loggers, rubber tappers, subsistence farmers and smugglers.  Indeed, in 
some ways, this region has changed remarkably little from a century ago when he who 
had the most rifles ruled the frontier (Portillo 1905a: 506).  The narcotraficantes, or 
nachis as they are known locally, have had the most weapons and the most money in this 
remote and thinly settled region since at least the mid-1980s.  One informant, a former 
logger, now a private in the Peruvian army, was hunting on a trail near the border in June 
of 2004 when he bumped into three Peruvian nachis carrying guns and what he estimated 
to be 15-25 kilograms of cargo, likely coca paste.  Later that day, on another section of 
the trail, he saw seven more nachis returning from Brazil, all armed with shotguns, but 
now without cargo.  He also shared how he had discovered two skeletons tied to a tree 
when on another hunting trip.  A Peruvian army major in charge of a military outpost 
adjacent to the Brazilian border underscored the dilemma of the under equipped and 
much maligned Peruvian armed forces by stating, “If I fight against the illegal logging or 
drug trafficking I would have an armed conflict in two weeks…why would I stop narcos 
if when I turn in the paste or money I will be accused of keeping half.” 
The isolation, absence of law, and proximate international transportation routes of 
the borderlands proved attractive to the coca farmers from Huánuco, Ayacucho, and San 
Martín who arrived in the region starting in the mid 1980s and were soon followed by 
drug traffickers from the Alto Huallaga region (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 
et al. 2004a).  Table 9’s data on eradicated coca fields corroborates the arrival of the 
farmers as it shows regional coca production to not be a recent phenomenon with fields 
averaging almost nine years of cultivation and 23% of the fields being cultivated for more 
than fifteen years.  The influx of coca farmers from the eastern slopes of the Andes 
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changed demographics drastically.  The Shipibo-Conibo who inhabit the floodplain 
region on the lower portion of these rivers describe boatloads of people, goods, and 
foodstuffs traveling upriver at regular intervals with an occasional stop at in their 
community to buy foods like plantains or fish.  Shipibo-Conibo informants depicted the 
new settlements upriver as organized by individual coca bosses controlling 30-40 
workers farming 20-30 hectares of coca fields.  Existing settlements became transformed 
with one even renamed after a locally famous drug trafficker (Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación et al. 2004a: 386).   
Table 9. Age of coca eradicated in 2003 and 2004 within the four watershed study site. 
Year 2003 Std Dev. 2004 Std Dev. 
Total Fields 1,674  1,241  
Avg. Age of coca crop in fields 8.79 5.6 8.66 5.7 
# of fields wth coca >= 1 yr 1511  972  
# of hectares with coca >= 1 yr 2182  1669  
# of fields wth coca >= 2 yr 1443  939  
# of hectares with coca >= 2 yr 2095  1631  
% of fields with coca >= 15 yrs 23%  22%  
These formerly isolated one and two family homesteads carved out of the upland 
rainforest exploded into coca hamlets, caseríos cocaleros, replete with coca cultivating 
colonists, bars, discos, brothels, alcohol, weapons, and associated drug use, alcoholism, 
prostitution, and violence.  One informant who worked as a boat pilot for a Colombian 
trafficker on the Tamaya from 1986 to 1987 recounted how the area changed almost 
overnight in 1986: “There was constant boat traffic, big yachts with 55 horsepower 
Evinrude outboard motors, between the coca fields of Borges and the landing strip of 
Noche Buena.  Flights took off daily from Noche Buena.”  Violence increased as a result.  
In 2003 and 2004, in the Abujao, Callería and Utiquinía watersheds alone, researchers 
heard of coca farmers killing four coca buyers (traqueteros), two miners, and a Piassaba 
palm frond harvester while three narcotraficantes died fighting amongst themselves.  
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Nonetheless, violence was likely more common before eradication, as one informant in 
one of the Callería field sites stated, “Two years ago there were a lot of bad people here 
and they would kill anyone who appeared the least bit strange.”  
However, even this level of violence pales in comparison to the dark years in the 
late 1980s and early to mid 1990s.  During this period the Shining Path and MRTA 
(Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru) followed the drug traffickers into the 
borderlands and began to impose their doctrine on local residents while inserting 
themselves into the coca business.  The lack of state presence and education, the isolation 
of the area and residents, and the poverty and recent growth of the coca business provided 
opportunities for these revolutionary groups to establish an alternative political structure.  
While the remote area and lack of geographic information worked against authorities 
seeking to locate and destroy these groups, the revolutionaries’ dependence on river 
transportation also made them vulnerable to attacks from the air and water.  Despite this 
limitation, the Shining Path established committees along the Tamaya, Abujao, and 
Utiquinía River and kept an armed company (Frente Popular de Alto Huallaga) near Lago 
Inés (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004a, Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación et al. 2004b). The MRTA arrived later along the Callería River.  While 
theft and murder was already common between the coca farmers and drug traffickers, the 
entry of the Shining Path did little to lessen the violence.  The Shining Path initially 
inserted themselves as a buffer between the coca farmers and the drug traffickers by 
controlling the weighing of coca leaf and paste.  However, they soon asserted control 
over the drug trade and the population through public trials, firing squads, and the 
appropriation of coca fields.  Before long the Shining Path controlled both river 
transportation and agricultural production along the Tamaya River, forcing farmers to 
plant one hectare of coca along with one hectare of their own choosing (Frente Popular 
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de Alto Huallaga) near Lago Inés (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004a, 
Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004b). 
While the Shining Path may have established relations with the borderland 
Asháninka, they appear never to have infiltrated the area’s Shipibo residents.  Indeed, 
some groups of Shipibo and other residents began to form self defense committees to 
combat the Shining Path directly.  Along the Tamaya, the most famous of these 
committees were the Shipibo committee of Cucharita and the largely Brazilian committee 
of Puesto Alfredo (Frente Popular de Alto Huallaga) near Lago Inés (Comisión de la 
Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004a, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 
2004b).  Both of these committees used their local knowledge of the landscape to not 
only ambush the Shining Path but also to provide critical information to an increasingly 
aggressive Peruvian navy.  This local geographic knowledge led to the bombing of key 
Shining Path outposts and effectively broke Shining Path control of the Tamaya River in 
1994 (Frente Popular de Alto Huallaga) near Lago Inés, (Comisión de la Verdad y 
Reconciliación et al. 2004a, Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004b).  
Similar confrontations occurred along the Callería River where residents recounted a 
1996 gunfight between the MRTA and the Peruvian navy that left 5 revolutionaries and 
three soldiers dead.  However, in the 1990s some of these borderland groups had already 
traded their political ideology for coca capitalism, and the destruction of the last 
revolutionaries merely meant a return to power of the traditional drug trafficking 
structure and a continuation of the coca boomtowns with their violence, dollarization, and 
cocalero culture. 
Coca boomtowns and the transformation of livelihoods has been documented 
elsewhere in Peru (Rojas 2002), and Colombia (González Posso 2000, Muse 2005), 
although the transformation described here may be particularly acute due to the extremely 
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isolated nature of these borderlands.  While increases in drug use, alcoholism, 
prostitution, and violence are negative, not all of the changes to these hinterlands were 
negative, as laborers could now earn a high daily wage working in the coca fields and 
access and afford better food, clothes, and medicine.  The quality and quantity of river 
transportation also increased dramatically and the formerly isolated residents could now 
send their children to the new schools created to educate the children of the coca farmers.  
However, the influx of coca dollars also caused inflation in these weak backwater 
economies and may have undermined local livelihoods formerly rooted in cooperation. 
Rojas argues that coca boom town residents fail to assemble with their neighbors 
for cooperative agricultural activity, minga, like harvesting or planting, as labor now cost 
money, and residents had developed the short term view of the ephemeral coca farmer 
(Rojas 2002).  Despite the apparent logic of this argument, this study found residents 
participating in mingas for food production in former boomtowns where eradication 
recently took place.  Whether minga was restricted during the coca years to food 
production or to non-coca cultivating families, returned only after coca eradication, or 
was common throughout remains unknown.  Even if current residents demonstrate 
traditional communal and sustainable practices in their place of residence, the more 
recently arrived cocaleros can commit neither to sustainability nor to forming an 
attachment to place as they are constantly preoccupied with the eradication of their fields. 
Their preoccupation stems from the lucrative nature of their crop and their 
reluctance to desist despite eradication.  This reluctance is understandable when one takes 
into account just how much a coca farmer can earn from the coca leaf produced by one 
hectare of land.  Although I cannot reliably estimate coca leaf production in the study site 
directly, production can be extrapolated using published United Nations data from coca 
cultivation in Aguaytia, Ucayali (just across the Ucayali River) or in the 
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Putumayo/Marañon area in Loreto where low elevation production also takes place.  The 
UNODC estimates sun-dried coca leaf production in Aguaytia and Putumayo/Marañon to 
be 1,376 kg per hectare and 860 kg per hectare respectively (2005c).  Although Tobler’s 
law would dictate choosing Aguaytia due to proximity, here I use the Putumayo/Marañon 
estimate because it is both more conservative184 and based on coca grown away from the 
higher elevation Andean foothills.  Thus, one hectare in the study site could 
conservatively produce approximately 860 kg of sun dried coca leaf at an average farm 
gate price of 2.8 US $ per kg in 2004  (UNODC 2005c) or 2,350 US $185 without the 
farmer even having to leave the caserío.   
While conservative, this estimate dwarfs the income potential of alternative crops 
farmed close to the regional market city of Pucallpa (Table 10).  This table reflects the 
riverine and agricultural fields in the immediate vicinity of Pucallpa and does not 
incorporate transportation in the production costs.  Table 10 shows a hectare of corn, rice, 
beans, or peanuts, the most marketable crops in the region, to earn much less than this 
extremely conservative estimate for coca.  Corn, rice, and beans produce marginal returns 
while a hectare of peanuts approaches 400 dollars in earnings (Figure 96). 
Estimating the total worth of the coca production eradicated in the fields provides 
a window to the regional importance of coca cultivation to these borderlands.  Since the 
coca plant does not reach full maturity until 18 months186 (Morales 1994), I estimate 
borderland production using only those fields of at least 2 years in 2004, or 3,183 
hectares187 according to Table 9.  To be conservative I deduct from this total the un-
weeded coca fields eradicated in both 2003 and 2004 (1,660 hectares according to Table 
9) to arrive at a total of 1,523 coca hectares with plants over 2 years old that are weeded 
or semi-weeded.  Using the conservative UNODC Putumayo/Marañon estimate, 2004 
annual production of sun dried coca leaf would be approximately 1,310,000 kg for these  
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(b) 2004 Price ($**) (c) 
 
Income($**) (d) = b x c Earnings ($**) d - a 
Corn Zea mays L. Var.  Marginal 28 Tropical 1 ha 560 4,000 .15 per Kg 600 40 
Rice Oryza sativa L. Var Maravilla 1 ha 480 4,000 .15 per Kg 600 120 
Beans Vigna sinensis Var. Caupí regional 1 ha 290 1,200 .36 per Kg 430 140 
Peanuts Arachis hypogea Var. Rojo Masisea 1 ha 520 1,500.00 .61 per Kg 910 390 
Data: Jorge Vela and Noel Ramírez, Universidad Nacional de Ucayali 
* Production costs include soil preparation, seeds, equipment (e.g. bags for packing), labor for planting, weeding, harvesting, and post harvest 
processing.  Costs do not include risks associated with pests, disease, flooding, or drought.  Transportation costs vary widely and thus are also ommitted. 
** Price in US$ calculated using 2004 November exchange rate of 3.3 Peruvian soles to the U.S. dollar.
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Figure 96.  Residents of a former caserío cocalero now look to beans for income.  Photo: Ramírez Zumaeta.
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fields with an estimated worth of 3,667,000 US $ at the 2004 farmgate average price.  
However, this is just a fraction of the potential profits the narcotraficantes realize from 
these fields in coca paste or cocaine.   
Since UNODC data on the cocaine/leaf ratios are derived from oven dried rather 
than sun dried leaf estimates, I reduce the 1,309,780 kg of sun dried leaf by 70%188 to 
916,846 kg of annual oven dried leaf.  According to the UNODC, one kilogram ofcocaine 
can be processed from 375 kg of oven dried leaf (UNODC 2005c) allowing me to grossly 
estimate 2,445 kg of potential annual cocaine production from these borderland 
watersheds.  This amount of cocaine would be worth approximately 53,988,045 $ US189 
in the United States and 111,809,850 $ US in Europe190 at wholesale prices (UNODC 
2005d).  Wholesale prices are of course just a fraction of the estimated street prices: 
188,265,000 $ US in the United States and 215,160,000 $ US in Europe191 (UNODC 
2005d).  Thus, although the coca leaf significantly improves the local farmer incomes, 
their potential earnings are less than 2% of the street value of the coca leaf product, 
cocaine. 
While these conservative estimates underscore the economic importance of 
regional coca cultivation and the potential local impacts in terms of inflation and 
dollarization, the reality is these fields were eradicated in 2003 and 2004.  Therefore, the 
regional coca boom must also be analyzed in terms of the subsequent bust.  Forced 
eradication changed these boom towns to ghost towns.  CORAH began systematic 
eradication efforts in the region in 1999 and their successfully repeated efforts in 2003 
and 2004 drove many coca farmers from the region.  CORAH eradicated all of the coca 
fields in one of the field sites only five months previous to fieldwork.  The people of this 
village were leaving town for good.  One of the informants there stated, “This is a 




Figure 97.  A largely deserted village on the upper Callería River.  Photo: Ramírez Zumaeta.
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lonely… All of the towns upriver are losing people just like here.”  Travel upriver 
confirmed this statement with villages characterized by a lack of people and a number of 
deserted houses (Figure 97).    
Table 11 shows the population for the middle and upper Callería River, where the 
inhabitants reside almost exclusively in caseríos cocaleros, in 1999 and in 2004.  Over 
this five year period population declined over 67%.  However, data from a 2004 census 
by a key informant, the local health official, state the numbers to be even lower, at 416 
people, an 81% decline from 1999 (Table 11).  This demographic change transformed the  
Table 11.  Population change after repeated eradication for the 13 coca farming towns on 
the Callería River. 
Year 1999 2004 2004* 
Population 2,228 773 416 
Sources: Center of Epidemiology, Ucayali, Peru 
* Key Informant: The health official for all 13 towns took a 2004 census.. 
caseríos cocaleros into ghost towns, pueblos fantásmas, with abandoned houses (Figure 
98), under attended schools, and the remaining residents contemplating moving on, 
pursuing alternative livelihoods, or in some cases gambling on discontinued eradication 
and replanting their coca.  Eradication impacts both the professional coca farmers and the 
original residents of these pueblos fantasmas who now must adapt to life without coca. 
Life without coca equates to a depressed economy, a reduction of transportation options, 
the flight of many of the school teachers, and a return to a largely subsistence livelihood 
(Figure 99).  One farmer on the Callería recounted, “five years ago there were a lot more 
people here in town, we had a bar, discotheques, a video pub and all of the entertainment 
available in Pucallpa (the regional capital), but now nothing, because all of this business 
has fallen since CORAH came.  The people are leaving…”  At one point when traveling 
up the Tamaya we stopped at a deserted riverside clearing with a few ruined tambos.  The 
boat pilot, a former boat pilot to a Colombian drug trafficker on the Tamaya, was stunned 
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Figure 99.  Residents of a former coca boom town ponder life after coca while collecting tobacco seeds.
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when he learned this was formerly the village of Libertad: “When we used to stop here in 
1986 it already had seven or eight houses, there was lots of money and plenty of stores, 
now there is just a ruined hut.”  Coca farmers, familiar with this boom and bust dynamic, 
and invested in the lucrative coca crop and the coca farming lifestyle, will likely move on 
to the next coca farming frontier.  With approximately twenty years in the region, an 
entire new generation of coca farmers has been raised within a new borderland cocalero 
culture.  Included in this group are necessarily the offspring of the original inhabitants 
who have also grown up surrounded by coca farmers and coca dollars.  Some of these 
younger inhabitants will also likely move to either established or new coca cultivation 
centers to maintain a familiar lifestyle.  On the Callería River the majority of inhabitants 
have already left despite the 2003 CORAH donations: a grain mill (Figure 100), a rice 
husker, three boat motors, five chainsaws, seven first aid kits, and 780 zinc laminate 
sheets.   
While CORAH believes “these donations win over the population and improve 
the image of CORAH” (Ministerio de Interior 2003b), fieldwork and local media 
coverage (Ahora 2004a) revealed a great deal of dislike for the institution.  Although 
several of the caseríos communally used the grain mill and rice husker in 2004 (Figure 
100), many of the remaining residents hoped to continue farming coca, desiring to work 
with the Peruvian National Coca Enterprise, ENACO192, to legally sell coca rather than 
switch to alternative crops. 
The donation of chainsaws is particularly interesting given the numerous forestry 
concessions in the four watersheds (Figure 40) and the existing connection between 
loggers and narcotraficantes.  While CORAH’s hope would be for the chainsaws to be 
used to harvest tropical hardwoods rather than clear forest for coca fields, the relationship 
between loggers and coca farmers may currently revolve around the trafficking and 
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Figure 100.  This grain mill and rice husker donated by CORAH are underused by the caserío due to the emigration of the 
majority of inhabitants after the eradication of their coca fields.  Will these youngsters raised in a cocalero culture 
adapt easily to the post boom era or follow the coca to a new boom town?  Photo: Ramírez Zumaeta.
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laundering of coca paste193.  Araujo (2001) contends some former rubber patrons in 
Brazil transitioned into the coca business either after an intermediate stop in or while 
simultaneously working in the illegal logging trade.  Loggers possess the means of 
transport (barges etc.), geographic knowledge, and commercial and personal contacts that 
facilitate movement of goods in remote areas194 (Araujo 2001).  Indeed, a logging outfit 
in Peru has built a 140 kilometer illegal road from the Ucayali River to the Brazilian 
border in order to extract high grade hardwoods.  However, this road could serve equally 
well to move coca derivatives to the Brazilian border, especially since, as an 
unsanctioned road, it is not monitored by Peruvian authorities.  Obviously these 
traditional patrons wield enormous power in these isolated regions and have ample 
opportunity to get involved in the trafficking or laundering of coca and coca dollars.  Two 
examples might include a former Governor of the State of Acre, Brazil and a former 
Mayor of Coronel Portillo, Ucayali, Peru since these immensely powerful and wealthy 
men made their fortunes harvesting borderland natural resources, particularly timber, and 
have been accused of both illegal logging and trafficking cocaine (Araujo 2001, Cruz 
2003, Yovera and Cisneros 2004).  Influential patrons such as these use their status as 
public officials and wealthy businessmen to maintain a political and economic clientele 
through their appointment of civil servants and their employment of hundreds of 
individuals in their stores and businesses (Araujo 2001).  On the other hand, coca 
trafficking and illegal logging can also attract undue attention to each other’s illegal 
activities as one Asháninka informant noted: “on the Upper Tamaya the narcos demanded 
the illegal logger stop logging along and across the Brazilian border because it was 
attracting too much attention to the region. 
Another potential source of laundering in the area is the borderland gold mines in 
the Abujao and Utiquinia watersheds.  Coca paste has a history of being laundered 
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through gold mining operations in the Amazonian borderlands (Brazil/Bolivia) with 
Brazilian gold miners or garimpeiros on the Mamoré and Guaporé Rivers also 
contributing to the growth of the Brazilian national coca market through their 
consumption of coca derivatives (Geffray 2001).  Gold mining is relatively new to these 
Peruvian borderlands but is growing rapidly with more than 140 new concessions in the 
region since 2001 covering over 68,000 hectares (Figure 47).  While my GIS analysis 
shows only six of these mining concessions to directly overlap with eradicated coca 
fields, the presence of mining boom towns between coca fields and the Brazilian border 
indicates a potential relationship given the regional history between miners and coca.  
Many of these mine workers are Brazilian garimpeiros although by law the holders of 
any concession title within fifty kilometers of the international border must be Peruvian. 
While loggers, miners, and coca farmers live near the international border, the 
longest residents of the borderlands and the people who physically demarcated much of 
the regional boundary line (López 1925, Tastevin 1926) are the longtime indigenous 
residents.   Commercial coca cultivation can pose a cultural threat to indigenous people 
as González Posso (2000) found indigenous people in the Colombian Amazon to have 
been “decultured” through their assimilation of the productive practices of the coca 
farmers to the point of preferring canned sardines over fresh fish.  The two ethnic groups 
most prevalent in the study site are the Shipibo Conibo195 and Asháninka peoples: the 
former live largely in the floodplain regions of the Ucayali River while the Asháninka 
tend to settle on higher ground.  As can be seen in Figure 38, the majority of the 
eradicated coca fields in the four watersheds lie upriver of the Shipibo territories located 
near the Ucayali River but downriver of the borderland Ashaninka territories nearest the 
border.  Although there is some overlap of coca fields with Shipibo territories, 
particularly near Lago Inés, the vast majority of coca fields in the area fall outside of the 
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Asháninka and Shipibo territories as most commercial coca farmers are colonists from 
outside the region. 
Despite this, both the borderland Asháninka and Shipibo have had contact with 
drug traffickers and coca cultivation in the last twenty years.  The borderland Shipibo 
Conibo’s relationship with drug traffickers in the years between 1985 and 2000 
demonstrates indigenous agency as they chose to resist and then expel the Shining Path, 
but also selectively invested in the lucrative business of coca cultivation.  The Shipibo 
successfully repulsed the repeated indoctrination efforts of the Shining Path with one 
Shipibo recounting, “They did not have to impose their laws because we know how to 
act.  We have one woman and we don’t steal.  Here the thieves and people with bad 
manners are the mestizos” (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004b: 357).  
The Shipibo Conibo’s existing communal organization, distinct culture, and disinterest in 
Shining Path discourse stonewalled the revolutionaries. 
If the Shipibo demonstrated resistance to the Shining Path they also displayed a 
commercial interest in coca cultivation and drug trafficking.  The Shipibo began working 
as well paid field hands in coca fields, but with the dollarization of the economy soon 
found selling food crops more lucrative: “There came a time when a bunch, five units, of 
bananas cost 10 soles and a chicken cost 40 soles.  Everything had a high price and they 
paid in dollars” (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004b: 371).  The Shipibo 
also rented landing strips to drug traffickers until the navy threatened to bomb the landing 
strips if the Shipibo did not desist.  One threat to the commercial interests and culture of 
the Shipibo were the Shining Path revolutionaries and their desire to control all aspects of 
the local population, coca cultivation, drug trafficking, and the related commerce.   
Thus, some Shipibo attacked the revolutionaries directly, in the case of the self 
defense committee of Cucharita community, or provided the Peruvian navy with valuable 
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reconnaissance informed by local knowledge: “I have served my country and I would do 
it again to defeat the Shining Path…  Our work was difficult because we had to disguise 
ourselves as civilians and then watch them kill innocent people while we stood silent and 
helpless” (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004b: 365).    The self defense 
committee of Cucharita helped hasten the demise of the Shining Path in the Lago Inés 
region, and then supplied drug traffickers with local protection after the Shining Path 
collapsed.  The drug traffickers gave the Cucharita committee a boat and ammunition to 
patrol Lago Inés and protect the coca business from bandits and delinquents (Comisión 
de la Verdad y Reconciliación et al. 2004b).  
The Lago Inés area of Ucayali bears continued analysis to determine the current 
involvement of Shipibo and coca as it is both a center for coca cultivation and the 
location of five Shipibo titled indigenous territories.  Despite the Shipibo’s control of 
most of this area and the proliferation of coca fields it is the non-indigenous residents 
who appear to dominate coca cultivation around the lake.  According to my analysis, in 
2003 and 2004 CORAH eradicated 676 coca fields, 980 hectares, within five kilometers 
of the lake shore.  Within this same area are five Shipibo communities and nine caseríos 
with 2003 population totals of 1514 and 1184 respectively (SICNA: IBC 2004).  These 
Shipibo indigenous territories cover over 56% of the land within five kilometers of the 
lake shore with the rest of the territory owned by the state or individuals.  Despite the 
Shipibo dominance in the lake area of both population and territory, 92% of the coca 
fields are located on non-indigenous lands.  Of the 8%, 57 coca fields, located within 
indigenous territory, the majority predate the titling of the indigenous territory, are 
located in remote areas closer to caseríos than the indigenous population centers, or both, 
thus demonstrating the possibility that the fields may not be farmed by the local 
indigenous people.  However, this study conducted no fieldwork near Lago Inés and thus 
 261
I have no ethnographic data to clarify why these overlaps exist and who specifically is 
farming the coca.  The area is of particular cultural importance as archeologist Donald 
Lathrap used analysis of the Cucharita dig to suggest the lake region to have had the 
“…densest concentration of Pre-Columbian population in the Central Ucayali Basin” 
(Lathrap 1970: 145). Interestingly, the Regional Government of Ucayali has declared the 
lake region one of two priority areas for regional conservation units (Tedy Tuesta 
personal communication).  A well enforced conservation unit would likely decrease coca 
farming in the region, but the typically under funded and poorly protected conservation 
unit might give existing coca farmers greater leeway to expand their operations.   
Another example of a Shipibo territory overlapping eradicated coca fields occurs 
on the Utiquinía River.  The residents of Fuente Rica lived along the Ucayali River until 
1986 when two consecutive years of flooding and the erosion of their lands forced them 
to seek refuge on the left bank of the Utiquinia River where they obtained title to 534 
hectares of land.  After a few years these relocated Shipibo families had exhausted their 
small quantity of land, and thus, in 1992, solicited an amplification of their territory to a 
total of 29,162 hectares.  However, this attempt to amplify their land met with immediate 
resistance from the neighboring caseríos.  Resistance came from four caseríos who 
protested in writing to the Ministry of Agriculture of losing land necessary for their crops 
(AIDESEP 1996).  The families of Fuente Rica argued against favoring the caseríos as 
such a stance would only favor “predatory loggers and give rise to coca fields within 
community territory” (AIDESEP 1996: 96) beyond the 4.5 hectares of coca the caseríos 
already cultivated in the area solicited.   
While the Ministry of Agriculture did award Fuente Rica the majority of the land 
they asked for, my analysis shows that coca cultivation grew tenfold from 4.5 hectares to 
41 hectares in a little over a decade.  In May of 2004, CORAH eradicated 27 fields along 
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the northern perimeter of the Fuente Rica territory196.  These fields averaged thirteen 
years in age and totaled 41 hectares with each field averaging roughly 1.5 hectares a 
piece.  The majority of these fields (78%) were in active cultivation with 18 of the fields 
covered by tree canopy to disguise the crops from remote sensors.  All of the fields 
appear to belong to neighboring caseríos on the northern border of the community of 
Fuente Rica.  Indeed accessing the fields from Fuente Rica would entail traveling upriver 
by peke peke197 at least three hours before hiking into the fields while they were only a 
short walk from the neighboring caserío.  These results from Lago Inés and Fuente Rica 
illustrate the increasing danger coca cultivation poses to indigenous communities.  
Indigenous communities struggle to control their land from well funded and well armed 
coca farmers, especially given the lack of investment in their territory and support by 
governmental and non governmental organizations in their borderland communities.  
Further research needs to be undertaken to determine the degree of involvement of the 
communities in coca cultivation near and within their communities.   
The borderland Asháninka are much less numerous and control much less land 
than the floodplain dwelling Shipibo Conibo, nevertheless, both their upland territories 
and labor appeared to have been coveted by drug traffickers eager to expand their coca 
cultivation.  Unlike the Shipibo, the Asháninka have a strong history with coca, having 
grown and consumed it for centuries in their homelands in the Selva Central (Fry 1907, 
Sotomayor 1908, Tessmann 1930).  Residents of San Marcos recounted how narcos came 
into their village and told them they needed to plant coca or they would be punished.  The 
village chief declined, saying that they had title to their land and did not have to listen to 
the narcos.  The residents of San Marcos were never punished and claim to not cultivate 
coca although they do obtain it from downriver and use it for traditional use: chewing and 
shamanic practices. During borderland fieldwork, an Asháninka shaman read my fortune 
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using crushed coca leaves.  Along the Tamaya at least one resident remembered being 
paid to carry what he called harina, flour, across the border into Brazil more than a 
decade ago.  Residents have also been offered large sums of money to build an airstrip 
for the narcos.  Now these people are in a struggle to title their land and claim to not plant 
coca for commercial purposes.  Another Asháninka community of the Upper Tamaya was 
invaded by Columbian drug traffickers around 1990 (Richey 2005).  They killed a 
number of Asháninka before they eventually killed each other due to a dispute over 
money.  According to residents, some of the Asháninka worked for them during this 
period.  Downriver other Asháninka villages are surrounded by recently eradicated coca 
fields. 
CORAH arrived in one untitled indigenous community along the middle Tamaya 
in 2003, camped in the community, and eradicated the coca fields in the surrounding 
region.  The majority of the coca farmers were outsiders from the Andes who left after 
CORAH uprooted their coca plants.  Nevertheless some of the coca farmers were 
Asháninka who have traditionally used the coca plant for many generations.  These and 
other area Asháninka on the Tamaya River continue to work towards gaining title to the 
area.  On the Brazilian side, the Asháninka of the indigenous territory Kampa do Alto Rio 
Amonia are unhappy with how the commercial coca is threatening their cousins in Peru 
and how it is being transported through their boundary territory to Brazilian markets.  
However, even the Brazilian Asháninka have been offered money, 30,000 U.S. dollars, 
by narcotraficantes to construct a landing strip in their territory (Aquino 2004).  They 
have repeatedly declined to accept bribes.  
The final indigenous residents in this borderland region are the Isconahua, an 
indigenous group in voluntary isolation, who apparently still roam the reserve set aside 
for their use despite the increasing incursions of illegal loggers and drug traffickers.  In 
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1960 two missionaries from the South American Mission (SAM) convinced seventeen of 
the Isconahua to relocate downriver and live with the Shipibo Conibo in the community 
of Conta (Arbaiza Guzmán et al. 1995, Momsen Jr. 1964, Whiton et al. 1964).  This 
group of Isconahua then split off from Conta to live on their own, but in 1993 returned to 
Conta because of fear of drug traffickers and terrorists threatening their small village.  
The anthropologist Manuel Cuentas estimates the Isconahua in voluntary isolation to 
number 240 persons (Arbaiza Guzmán et al. 1995).  Seen as recently as 2001 on the 
Peruvian side (Manuel Cuentas personal communication) and 1999 across the border in 
Brazil (Montagner 2002), these nomadic indigenous people must avoid the established 
drug trafficking trails crisscrossing their homelands for their own safety.  While the 
impact of the repeated smuggling of coca derivatives and the established drug trafficking 
routes on these elusive people and their territory is unknown, there can be little doubt 
they bring negative consequences. 
VI. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
The environmental impacts of coca cultivation remain uncertain in part due to the 
paucity of field research and data on the subject (Dourojeanni 1989, Henkel 1995, Salm 
and Liberman 1997, Young 1996, Young 2004a).  This is particularly true of the 
borderlands where few human-environment studies of any sort have been carried out.  
Not surprisingly, the environmental impacts of coca cultivation are likely to vary widely 
throughout the regions where the plant is cultivated.  For example, Henkel argues against 
the elimination of coca in the Bolivian Chaparé from an ecological standpoint as the 
hardy coca plant is capable of growing on impoverished soils and its substitution by an 
alternative cash crop would force farmers to penetrate into forested lands to find 
sufficiently fertile soils for a new economically viable agricultural system  (Henkel 
1995).  On the other hand, Young found 3,375 plant species to be potentially negatively 
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affected by the clearing of forests to establish coca fields in Peru’s San Martín 
department (Young 1996).  Here I focus on some preliminary observations regarding the 
relationship between coca cultivation and the environment by looking specifically at 
deforestation/forest fragmentation, protected areas, and chemical inputs. 
There is no question that coca cultivation has a severe negative impact on the 
primary forests of remote areas such as the borderlands.  These areas would likely still be 
forested if not for the world’s demand for coca derivatives.  This demand and eradication 
elsewhere drives cocaleros to search for new cultivation sites.  However, once coca 
cultivation has begun the deforestation impacts are somewhat mitigated by the long 
growing cycle of the perennial plant and the spatial clustering of coca fields.  These 
attributes may make the deforestation impacts of a fixed number of cocaleros less than 
that of the colonists practicing legal agriculture (Salm and Liberman 1997).  In addition, 
other agricultural options would require more land to make production commercially 
viable and would require more fertile soils than the hardy coca bush. 
Soil erosion is a negative environmental impact often associated with coca 
cultivation (Dourojeanni 1989).  However, erosion is spatially dependent given variables 
such as soil type, topography, elevation, rainfall, soil preparation, and defoliation to name 
a few.  While primary forest is recognized as a better preserver of soil than coca, experts 
disagree on whether coca cultivation is more or less detrimental to soils than other crops.  
Dourojeanni’s research in Peru found, “… there is no other crop that, in a generalized 
way, provokes similar levels of erosion” (1989: 288).  On the other hand, in Bolivia, 
Salm and Liberman argue that coca requires low nutrient needs compared to other crops 
and can retain soil better than most due to its long growing cycle (1997).  The erosive 
properties of coca cultivation in the borderlands remains inconclusive due to the inability 
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to conduct research within coca fields in the study site, and thus deserves further study to 
contribute to the debate. 
The location of the 2,915 fields of coca eradicated in the study site demonstrate 
coca cultivation to be taking place in upland forest proximate to waterways.  The need for 
riverine transport due to lack of roads and the ready availability of arable land 
encouraged coca cultivation close to rivers and lakes.  Indeed 77% of the eradicated coca 
fields were within two kilometers of a major river or lake and 95% within five 
kilometers.  Coca cultivation was not unique in this regard as almost all agricultural 
activity in the area occurs close to waterways to facilitate transport to market and because 
that is where local people live.  The clustering of coca fields seen in Figure 101 is not 
unusual in the region and demonstrates the relative low level of deforestation impact in 
situ.  These coca field clusters often surround the caserío centers and their individual 
fields are usually either adjacent to the next coca field or separated by another crop field 
or a band of secondary or primary forest.  While both the intervening and surrounding 
forest likely lose species diversity due to edge and fragmentation effects, in addition to 
negative effects related to the extraction of timber, game and non-timber forest products 
(NTFPs) (Cochrane and Laurance 2002, Laurance et al. 2002, Nepstad et al. 1999, Peres 
2001), the biodiversity impact of coca cultivation appears relatively localized due to this 
clustered and localized spatial pattern. 
The coca plant can also be harvested for twenty years after planting and does not 
need particularly fertile soil making it a much more spatially stable crop than traditional 
upland crops requiring the slash and burn of primary and advanced secondary growth.  
While coca fields tend to multiply when prices rise, the low population levels and 
isolated nature of the study site ensure limited expansion.  Manual eradication measures 
obviously remove coca fields but some coca farmers continue planting as evidenced by 
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Figure 101.  Coca cultivation causes deforestation and forest fragmentation but the clustering of coca fields and the repeated 
replanting of the same fields lessens the negative environmental impacts.
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12% of the fields eradicated in 2004 being newly planted within fields eradicated in 2003 
(Figure 101).  Repeated eradication may not discourage all farmers from replanting but, 
interestingly, coca cultivation is most threatening to terrestrial biodiversity immediately 
after repeated eradication as coca farmers now must relocate to an even more isolated 
region to continue their relatively lucrative livelihood.  The borderland coca farmers 
arrived in this remote region after eradication efforts and drug related violence forced 
them out of the Andean foothills in the mid-1980s.  So now they may very well take their 
coca cultivation and the associated deforestation front to a new and more inaccessible 
region where biodiversity levels may be even higher.  Few areas in Amazonian Peru are 
more remote than these borderlands, some exceptions being conservation units, protected 
forests, and indigenous territories. 
Protected areas are obvious targets for migratory coca farmers for this very reason 
and coca cultivation is threatening the national parks in Peru even as it continues to 
expand inside the boundaries of parks in Colombia and Bolivia (UNODC 2005e; 
UNODC 2005f).  My 2004 analysis of the overlap of coca cultivation and Peru’s 
National System of Natural Protected Areas (SINANPE) reveals cultivation to be 
immediately adjacent if not within the limits of the Peruvian national parks of Tingo 
María, Cordillera Azul, Bahuaja-Sonene and Bolivia’s Madidi National Park.  The recent 
exodus of the coca farmers in the four watershed study region could lead them to 
continue up the Ucayali to infiltrate isolated and poorly protected conservation units like 
the Alto Purús National Park.  Indeed fieldwork in 2002 revealed coca has been 
transported by raft from the headwaters of the Purús through the park and on to Brazil 
since 1995.  In addition, coca cultivation and processing has recently been confirmed 
along the border of the Alto Purús National Park (Chris Fagan personal communication).  
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Trafficking is also extremely problematic for Brazil’s borderland Serra do Divisor 
National Park as the narcos constantly move coca paste through the park and into Brazil.  
In April of 2006, the Peruvian government created the Zona Reservada Sierra del 
Divisor to protect the biologically diverse zone along the Brazilian border.  The Zona 
Reservada designation is a transitional category that could become a national park, 
communal reserve, or another definitive conservation category depending on the 
conservation threats and opportunities of various human and non-human stakeholders.  
This borderland zone, which includes the Isconahua Regional Reserve, is crossed by 
numerous drug trafficking trails leading through the Sierra del Divisor mountain range 
and into Brazil.  However, the area also contains former, and perhaps current, coca 
cultivation along the Callería River while coca cultivation has also been practiced 
downriver from the Zona Reservada along the Utiquinia and Abujao Rivers.  Table 12 
reveals extensive coca eradication within the Zona Reservada along the Callería River 
with 422 fields eradicated in 2003 and 91 in 2004.  Over 56% of the 2004 fields 
eradicated had been replanted in fields eradicated in 2003.  While the area’s status as a  
Table 12. Callería watershed coca fields eradicated in 2003 and 2004 falling completely 






Total Fields 422  91  
Total Has 672  105  
Avg. Has per Field 1.59 1.02 1.16 0.56 
Avg. Age of coca crop in fields 8.26 5.99 2.7 5.15 
# of fields wth coca <= 1 yr 80  71  
# of fields replanted No Data  51  
# of fields with coca >= 10 yrs 204  14  
coca cultivation and drug trafficking zone is a serious threat to the conservation of the 
area, the successful, repeated eradication described here and the subsequent migration 
described along the Callería River in the previous section may provide an opportunity to 
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invest in conservation projects in the area.  A substantive and timely investment in the 
area’s development by conservation organizations could provide a conservation incentive 
for local people looking for economic opportunities following the coca boom.  Without 
alternative products or opportunities, coca could return rapidly to this biologically critical 
area and foreshadow future conflicts between coca and conservation.  
UNODC data on Bolivia and Colombia relate a cautionary tale of territorial 
conflict between coca cultivation and biodiversity protection as coca within their national 
parks continues to grow despite eradication measures in both countries (UNODC 2005e; 
UNODC 2005f).  Bolivia’s Chaparé region has been a major center of coca cultivation 
for decades (Henkel 1971) but new fields are increasingly established within nearby 
national parks: “between 2003 and 2004 coca cultivation increased by 71% in the 
national parks of Chaparé, as opposed to increasing only 22% outside national park 
boundaries.  In fact, coca cultivation within two parks (Isiboro Secure and Carrasco) 
represented 40% of the Chaparé’s total coca cultivation” (UNODC 2005e: 48).  In 
addition, in 2004, coca cultivation also appeared for the first time inside the Madidi 
National Park, which shares hundreds of kilometers of border with Peru and is already 
threatened on the Peruvian side by coca farmers (UNODC 2005e). 
Coca cultivation also overlaps with protected areas in Colombia where 7% of 
Colombia’s coca cultivation takes place within national parks (UNODC 2005f).  Thirteen 
of Colombia’s 50 National Parks contain commercial coca cultivation for a total of over 
5,000 hectares of coca fields (UNODC 2005f).  Overlap of coca and national parks is 
particularly problematic in Colombia where aerial spraying is a common means of 
eradication and a significant threat to conservation (Fjeldsa et al. 2005). 
While manual eradication not aerial spraying is the primary eradication method 
used in Peru, coca related chemical inputs do exist in the study area.  Given that 
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fieldwork did not record the use of herbicides or pesticides for borderland coca 
cultivation, and coca farmers in the nearby and more established cultivation region of 
Aguaytia do not use chemicals, it seems likely they are not present in the study site 
(UNODC 2005c).  However, chemicals do enter the air, soil, and water system through 
the processing of coca on farm sites.  While not every farmer processes coca leaf into 
coca paste, borderland coca is often processed right there in the borderlands, most likely 
because much of it is sent directly over the border into Brazil.  One informant recounted a 
battle between CORAH and coca farmers in one of my study sites on the Callería River 
that resulted in the capture of two coca chemists. 
CORAH destroyed 21 processing pits in eight locations across all four watersheds 
in the two year period of 2003-4.  Processing pits are easily relocated or rebuilt since they 
are usually nothing more than holes in the ground lined with either concrete or plastic.  
The holes vary in size but are usually about eight meters long, five meters wide and one 
and a half meters deep (Morales 1994).  Processors fill the holes with coca leaves before 
soaking and trampling them and their residues in a series of treatments using sodium 
carbonate, sulphuric acid, solvents (e.g. kerosene), and neutralizers (e.g. lime) (Morales 
1994, Young 1996)198.  The amount of chemical inputs per kilo of coca paste is 
impressive: roughly 115 kg of coca leaves, 1 kilo of sodium carbonate, 5 kilos of 
sulphuric acid, 7 gallons of kerosene, and 8 kilos of lime (Morales 1994).  Thus 11,390 
kg of coca paste could be created from the estimated 1,309,780 kg of sun dried leaf 
produced in the study site.  At 640 $ US per kg this amount of paste would be equal to 
7,289,600 $ US.  But this amount of coca paste could require199 as much as 11,390 kg of 
sodium carbonate, 56,950 kg of sulphuric acid, 79,730 gallons of kerosene, and 91,120 
kg of lime.  All of these chemicals then find their way into the environment through the 
processing pits. 
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Researchers in the Bolivian Chaparé have argued that the immediate 
environmental impact of these processing chemicals could be less than anticipated200 as 
the existence of holding ponds, the concentration of pollution at the processing site, the 
scattered distribution of these sites across the landscape, and the diluting effect of high 
levels of rainfall restricted biodiversity loss to soil microorganisms in the immediate 
vicinity of processing sites (Henkel 1995, Southwest Research Associates 1993 cited in 
Henkel 1995).  While I am aware of no holding ponds in the study site other than the 
processing pits themselves, the pollution concentration in scattered sites with high rainfall 
does hold true for the borderland region.  However, the long term effects of the chemicals 
on biological populations following chemical filtration into the groundwater and fluvial 
system are unknown.  Kerosene is recognized to severely affect flora, fauna, and 
particularly plankton, in addition to reducing oxygen level in water while sodium 
carbonate and sulfuric acid are toxic substances (Dourojeanni 1989). Given the presence 
of these processing chemicals, the clustering of coca fields near waterways threatens the 
highly biodiverse floodplain forests essential to aquatic life (Goulding et al. 1996, Smith 
1999). This study is sorely needed as chemical residue threatens not only plant and 
animal biodiversity but also human populations, both rural and urban (e.g. Pucallpa and 
Iquitos), downstream of coca processing sites.  Long term effects could follow these 
Amazonian tributaries as far as Brazil and beyond. 
Another environmental impact relates directly to the human biological system as 
drug traffickers often employ local people, including children, to trample the leaves in the 
processing pits.  The acidic solution can burn the feet of the laborers (Rojas 2002) and 
irritates the throat and eyes (Impetu 2004): to my knowledge a thorough study of the side 
effects of processing remains to be done. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the social and environmental impacts of coca cultivation in the 
borderlands of Peru provides new insight into a topic poorly explored by geographers 
despite its real and potential influence on the landscapes and peoples of the Andes and 
the Amazon (Young 2004b: 366).  The chapter’s first conclusion is to declare coca 
cultivation to be present in the Amazon borderland study region despite the lack of 
documentation from both the recent research of the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC 2005c) and the extensive historical work of Plowman, the foremost 
ethnobotanist specializing in Erythroxylum (Plowman 1981, Plowman 1984, Plowman 
and Hensold 2004).  Figure 38 is the first detailed map of coca cultivation in the central 
borderlands of Peru.  Although coca has traditionally been associated with roads and 
hillside agriculture in Peru (Young 2004a, 2004b), this study demonstrates commercial 
coca cultivation to be present in the low lying and roadless borderlands since the mid 
1980s.  Indeed with these fields averaging 177 meters in elevation, this may be the lowest 
elevation recorded for commercial coca cultivation.  This study also updates the literature 
on social impacts, contradicting Rojas (2002) in finding coca cultivators still practicing 
cooperative agricultural activity, minga, despite the influx of a dollar driven coca 
economy.  This research Coca cultivators likely descended into these lowlands following 
increased eradication in the Upper Huallaga valley (Bedoya and Klein 1996: 180). 
The influx of outside coca farmers and the rapid growth of the coca boom towns 
changed the economy, demography, and culture of the region’s formerly isolated 
riverside hamlets.  This was exacerbated in the late 1980s and early 1990s by 
revolutionary/drug trafficking groups such as the Shining Path and MRTA.  However, 
repeated eradication and associated out migration such as seen here transformed the 
boom towns into economically depressed ghost towns.  The vast majority of indigenous 
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people in the region are likely not coca cultivators despite the promotional and 
threatening efforts of drug traffickers and revolutionary groups, although some have 
participated as laborers, and consumers, and many benefit from the dollarization of their 
formerly subsistence goods.  Further research is needed to understand the complex 
relationship between the borderland indigenous peoples and coca cultivation, but this 
research is problematic given the extraordinary demands on both the researcher and the 
communities worked with in terms of trust, participation, patience, and safety.  
Nevertheless, successful conservation and development projects hoping to preserve the 
cultural and biological diversity of the region will need a detailed understanding of the 
present and potential economic activities pursued both within and outside the borderland 
indigenous reserves. 
This analysis of the environmental impacts of commercial coca cultivation 
proposes a strong link between the cultivation and increased deforestation and forest 
fragmentation due to the in migration of coca farming populations and the resulting 
expansion of coca fields.  These findings support literature linking tropical deforestation 
to coca cultivation (Bedoya and Klein 1996, Dourojeanni 1989, Young 1996, 2004a, 
2004b).  Nevertheless, this study agrees with others arguing that the localized impacts of 
coca cultivation are somewhat less than other more common forms of extensive 
agriculture in the tropics (Henkel 1995, Salm and Liberman 1997) given deforestation 
and fragmentation is mitigated in part by the spatial clustering of coca fields, the twenty 
year productive crop life of the perennial plant, and the ability to replant coca on the 
same fields due to the plant’s tolerance for poor soil conditions.  Chemical inputs in the 
biophysical environment are difficult to quantify as the use of pesticides and fertilizers is 
unknown and field analysis of processing chemicals a dangerous proposition.  
Regardless, processing of coca leaf to coca paste is taking place in the study site and the 
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chemicals do make their way into the natural environment.  While soil contamination is 
likely localized and diluted by the high levels of precipitation, long term contamination of 
water poses a risk to the biodiversity in the floodplains and the organisms downstream, 
including the residents of Pucallpa and Iquitos, who consume aquatic resources. 
Eradication of coca in the region appears to be largely successful by CORAH 
criteria due to the reduction in coca coverage and the out migration of coca farmers.  
However, post eradication effects require continued investigation as the exodus of the 
coca farmers and the reduction of associated dangers presents the opportunity for policy 
makers to invest in conservation and sustainable development projects among both 
indigenous and ribereño communities.  Well designed projects could decrease the 
likelihood of a return to coca cultivation.  Drug trafficking will surely continue in the 
borderlands due to the geographic proximity of Brazil as a market and intermediate 
destination, and the inability of authorities to adequately patrol by foot the lengthy, 
forested boundary.  With trafficking assured, if governmental and/or non governmental 
organizations do not invest in the borderlands, coca cultivation will likely return due to 
the comparative advantage of production close to the border and the lack of other income 
generating opportunities. 
Eradication has also brought upon the greatest social and environmental impact of 
all in the likely relocation of the majority of the coca farmers to a new coca cultivation 
front.  The new site will likely be to an ever more remote location, and thus perhaps more 
sensitive ecologically and culturally.  This pressure on critical ecosystems and natural 
areas creates a contradiction in CORAH’s mandate where their first goal to control the 
reduction of illegal coca cultivation potentially contradicts their third goal of supporting 
policies oriented towards the protection of natural areas.  Instead, eradication may 
directly endanger the protection of natural areas.  While I cannot prove that coca 
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eradication increases rather than mitigates the negative social and environmental impacts 
of coca cultivation, the issue deserves further research.  This is particularly true since 
likely targets for the relocation of the coca front are borderland conservation units and 
indigenous territories.  Given the ecological and cultural patrimony contained in these 
remote protected areas and the itinerant threat of coca cultivation menaced by 
eradication, the redirection of some eradication funds to these borderland protected areas 
may prove a more cost effective means of combating the establishment of coca 
cultivation than eradication after establishment.  Another useful use of eradication funds 
would be the improved mapping of the borderland sites likely to be the next destination 
for coca farmers. 
Any conservation or development investments in the borderland region must be 
integrated with the human and physical geography of the region if they are to be 
successful.  The current absence of adequate geographic information has allowed drug 
traffickers, cocaleros, and formerly revolutionaries to proliferate in the borderlands.  Just 
as the borderland defeat of the Shining Path required local knowledge and support so to 
do successful conservation or development projects in this poorly understood area.  Top 
down projects seeking to provide alternatives to coca cultivation will certainly fail in part 
due to the lack of geographic information.  Cabieses (2004: 16) criticized similar 
initiatives in the coca growing regions of Huallaga, “A serious flaw in alternative 
development projects has been their tendency to consider the high jungle as an empty 
space where a social fabric barely exists…”.  This flaw may already be replicated in the 
borderlands.  This research has revealed the presence of borderland coca cultivation, and 
conducted a preliminary analysis of its social and environmental impacts, and the impacts 
following eradication.  While eradication has likely merely relocated cultivation to even 
more remote areas, it remains to be seen whether any enlightened policy makers can take 
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advantage of the diminished coca cultivation here to invest in this oft ignored region.  A 
bottom up conservation and development project might succeed if based on geographic 









Chapter Five: Conclusion 
I. SUMMARY 
This study underscores the continued importance of fieldwork in geography.  
Despite our advanced technological capacity, growing digital libraries, and plethora of 
critical theories, fieldwork remains central to our understanding of a complex world.  
This dissertation’s approach builds on the field-based tradition of Sauer, Parsons, and 
others (Butzer 1989, DeLyser and Starrs 2001, Doolittle 2001, Parsons 1977, Sauer 1956, 
West 1979) to shed light on the surprisingly complex and unpredictable processes at 
work in the Amazon borderlands.  The general public envisions the far reaches of 
Amazonia as an endangered “exotic realm of nature” blanketed by forests full of 
ecological riches with a sprinkling of native peoples (Slater 2002: 3).  In contrast, this 
field-based inquiry of resource mapping, timber, and coca highlights the presence of local 
people, dynamic extractive and illegal economies, and high levels of resource related 
conflict.  These findings can inform not only debates in the geographical and Amazonian 
literature, but also Amazonian policy makers, often lacking in reliable information about 
their region.  This conclusion summarizes each chapter’s findings and contributions 
before tackling larger questions related to Amazonian frontiers, participatory mapping, 
and policy recommendations. 
Chapter Two documents a central problem in these borderlands: a lack of 
adequate geographic information.  In this chapter I presented some of the challenges of 
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mapping the physical and human geography of these borderlands while demonstrating 
some of the flaws in the existing maps.  Chapter Two’s comparison of local and state 
geographic knowledge found local knowledge to be more accurate and up-to-date, but 
accessing this knowledge entails participatory, field-based research, something few 
frontier state agencies and NGOs have pursued.201  Instead, State and NGO planners use 
flawed maps to project resource concessions and conservation goals on the landscape.  
The results marginalize local people, complicate planning and create confusion and 
conflict on the ground.  The flawed cartography, lack of state presence, and confusion 
does benefit the illegal operators and resource extractors of the borderlands.  Illegal 
operators such as loggers and drug traffickers build field-based geographic knowledge in 
order to successfully operate their business and avoid law enforcement (Araujo 2001, 
Archibald 2007). 
Political will, governance, social and environmental justice need to be improved if 
the Amazon borderlands are to be better and more equitably managed.  These topics, 
however, cannot be fully addressed by this dissertation’s field-based rather than 
institutional emphasis.  What Chapter Two’s emphasis on mapping does contribute is to 
underscore the link between inadequate geographic information and the multiple, 
concurrent, and intersecting claims on these borderlands.  Schmink and Wood (1992) 
described similar overlaps and power struggles in their study of contested frontiers in the 
Brazilian Amazon.  Their field-based analysis saw frontier change as the net outcome of 
a contest for resources between social groups capable of mobilizing varying degrees of 
power (Schmink and Wood 1992: 344).  I argue in this conclusion that participatory 
field-based inquiry can generate and improve geographic information, an important base 
from which historically marginalized groups can mobilize and consolidate power.  While 
there is no guarantee that indigenous groups, traditional populations, or local people will 
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manage their resources well in the long or short run (Salisbury and Schmink n.d.), their 
investment in their homelands and environment serves as a potential counterpoint 
(Nepstad et al. 2006) to a state concerned primarily with resource extraction and to illegal 
operators currently working unchecked in the borderlands. 
It is my argument that the occupation of “Amazonia’s empty spaces” (Schmink 
and Wood 1992: 345) and the harvesting of Amazonian resources should take place after 
field-based participatory research provides baseline geographic information on the human 
and physical geography of the region.  Local people who are obscured by emptiness or 
otherwise cartographically misrepresented on official maps cannot easily contend against 
the map wielder. Chapter Two’s research updates other literature on the power of silent 
and empty spaces in maps and the imagined landscape.  Harley’s research on mapping 
the colonial Americas found evidence of indigenous geographic knowledge in European 
map construction even as European maps “…served to dispossess the Indians by 
engulfing them with blank spaces” (Harley 1992: 531).  Bassett’s analysis of blank 
spaces in 19th century European maps of West Africa led him to assert these null spaces 
to be evidence of a “disregard for indigenous geographical knowledge” by European 
explorers (1994: 322).  These spaces also incited exploration and colonization as 
imperialists used blankness to justify appropriation and control (Bassett 1994: 324).  
Harley contends these empty spaces or cartographic silences are active rather than 
passive constructs and as such, actively desocialize the landscape (Harley 1988b: 66, 70).  
The landscape contains no blank spaces and thus, Harley contends metaphorically, “there 
is no such thing as an empty space on a map (1988b: 71).  Harley urges us to make these 
silences speak, to uncover the agenda hidden in the emptiness, to investigate the absence 
(1988b: 58, 71, 70).  Hecht (2004) finds agendas in an invented empty Amazon, what she 
calls the tabula rasa, that permits the projection of desires (development, conservation, 
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and others) onto a landscape imagined devoid of local people and full of natural 
resources.  Chapter Two informs both Harley and Hecht by providing examples of how 
the projection of goals into an Amazonian landscape assumed empty creates contestation 
while field-based methods can generate geographic information that potentially helps the 
marginalized borderlanders speak through their cartographically imposed silences. 
Chapter Three takes a close look at the operations of both the illegal and legal 
tropical timber industries through a comparison of logging in two of the most isolated 
borderland communities in Brazil and Peru.  Results demonstrate the complex and 
contradictory relationships of indigenous people, the timber industry, and their border 
homelands.  Indigenous people are both the exploited and the exploiter, with their 
homelands both barrier and site of deforestation.  This supplements another Amazonian 
example to a rich and growing literature of the complex agency of historically 
marginalized indigenous people in the neotropics who embody both resistance and 
contradiction (Brown and Fernández 1991, Gagnon et al. 1993, Garfield 2001, Hale 
1994, Schmink and Wood 1992).  In Chapter Three, however, my scholarly emphasis is 
on understanding the social impacts of selective logging, the primary source of tropical 
forest degradation worldwide (Curran and Trigg 2006).   
The rapid advancement of tropical deforestation and remote sensing technology 
have fueled a recent trend of macro-scale research documenting region or country-wide 
impacts of Amazonian logging using remote sensing and GIS modeling (Asner et al. 
2005, Asner et al. 2006, Arima et al. 2005, Nepstad et al. 2006).  These studies are 
capable of estimating the extent of logging-related impact on the forest cover and thus 
catching the attention of policy makers, but cannot capture the sub-canopy intricacies and 
impacts of the timber industry that need to be solved to improve policy.  Curran and 
Trigg (2006) see Asner et al.’s (2005, 2006) work as an example of interdisciplinary 
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sustainability science’s potential to improve monitoring, governance capabilities and an 
understanding of the drivers of deforestation.  Meanwhile, other studies rely on key 
informant interviews and surveys in regional capitals (Kommetter et al. 2004, Smith et al. 
2006) to identify problems associated with the enforcement or governance of logging 
legislation (Kommetter et al. 2004, Smith et al. 2006).  While I see both remote sensing 
and survey driven studies as necessary and useful for monitoring and governance at the 
regional level, I believe neither can provide the field-based sub-canopy information 
necessary to fully understand social and environmental impacts and the reality at the 
source of extraction.  Chapter Three documents the local complexities of a 
transboundary, debt-peonage driven, primitive, selective logging industry working with 
inadequate geographic information.  Interviews with illegal loggers in their camp, and 
indigenous people rolling timber through their homelands provide the resolution missing 
in the remotely sensed and survey methodologies and inform sustainability science 
initiatives. 
This is not a new finding as Sussman et al.’s (1996: 309) remotely sensed and 
ethnographic study of deforestation in Madagascar primary recommendation was that 
detailed ethnographic studies on resources, resource use, and resource needs are 
necessary precursors to any meaningful conservation or development project (Sussman et 
al. 1996: 309).  Similarly, Chowdhury (2006: 96) argues for multiple methodologies and 
interdisciplinarity as enhancing spatial driving force models ability to not only better 
understand the processes, causes, and agents of tropical deforestation, but also inform 
policy to effectively protect tropical forests and livelihoods.  Thus, sub-canopy studies 
can demonstrate the degree of impact not only on the forest and its fauna and flora (Peres 
et al. 2006) but also on its indigenous inhabitants (Veríssimo et al. 1995, Watson 1996).  
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This is relected in this study’s finding of the timber patrones endeavors to destabilize 
indigenous self determination efforts in the borderlands.   
These self determination efforts are important not only to the people but also to 
the forest given Nepstad et al.’s (2006: 65) argument that indigenous reserves are “the 
most important barrier to Amazon deforestation.”  Chapter Three’s comparison of a titled 
and untitled indigenous homeland demonstrates the superiority of the titled reserve in 
preventing logging related deforestation.  The Brazilian Asháninka community of 
Apiwtxa is much better off than their Peruvian cousins in Alto Tamaya given the 
improved geographic information, increased government presence, and stronger ties to 
NGOs in Brazil.  Alto Tamaya, on the other hand, despite being a large and growing 
indigenous community, did not even appear on maps previous to this counter-mapping 
research, were marginalized by the state and subject to the illegal loggers’ continued 
invasion of their territory.  Despite these challenges, the agency and ability of borderland 
indigenous peoples, here documented in Alto Tamaya, to organize, resist and even serve 
as an effective if unofficial border patrol make a case that titling indigenous territories 
could help slow illegal logging and logging-related deforestation.  Indeed, the official 
sanctioning of indigenous border communities as recommended over a hundred years ago 
(Mendonça 1907: 142) may have mitigated some of the current transboundary tensions 
Brook (2005: 452) also found tenure insecurity to limit indigenous agency regarding 
logging and forestry policy in Mosquitia.  On the other hand, the creation of titled 
indigenous reserves has considerably reduced indigenous human rights violations in 
Ucayali (Gray 1998: 217), provided a platform to protest trespassing by miners, loggers, 
and colonists in Pará (Simmons 2002: 254-5), and likely helped indigenous people 
maintain a better record of sustaining the forest than other populations in the Brazilian 
Amazon (Fearnside 2003: 774).  
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Forest policies are currently undergoing change in Amazonia (Putz et al. 2004, 
Paniagua 2001, ITTO 2005).  Smith et al. (2006: 468) argue that radical changes in 
forestry laws may merely mask governance failures rather than improve logging 
practices.  They saw the implementation of new Peruvian forestry law at a critical stage 
in 2006 (Smith et al. 2006).  This dissertation’s 2004 fieldwork documented that breaking 
this new law was already an accepted code of behavior among many borderland loggers 
given their inability and unwillingness to comply with rules that are ineffectively 
enforced.  While this study supports Smith et al.’s (2006) thesis and acknowledges their 
concerns about existing and potential governance failures such as corruption, insecurity 
of property rights, and ineffective law enforcement, it also shows how the legislation was 
built on an assumption of adequate geographic information regarding the existing timber, 
human populations, and river courses present in the newly created production forests.  
These field-won findings demonstrate how inadequate geographic information 
contributed to the undermining of the new forestry law.  More interdisciplinary field-
based research is needed to help improve the current understanding and regulation of 
forest use (Blundell and Gullison 2003).  An ideal research project would include macro 
level remote sensing (Asner et al. 2005), an investigation into governance (Smith et al. 
2006), field-based studies of forest ecology, and field-based cultural ecology studies such 
as this one. 
Chapter Four’s contributions to the study of coca are many, given the dearth of 
local level fieldwork on the plant’s cultivation in the lowlands.  This study not only maps 
3,000 fields in a borderlands declared empty of cultivation by the UNODC (2005c), 
Machado (2001), and Plowman (1984), but also details characteristics of the illegal crop 
and its cultivators.  Unexpected findings include the low elevations (180 meters) and long 
term presence (20% over 15 years) of the coca fields, and their location on riverside 
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uplands distant from roads.  Coca farmers arrived in the region in the mid 1980s and 
quickly transformed the economic, social, and physical landscape with their illegal cash 
crop, coca boom towns, and farming methods.  Coca cultivation relied on external 
demand from developed nations and capital brought in by drug traffickers.  Both 
traffickers and cultivators developed complex relationships with indigenous groups and 
revolutionary forces alike before the latest round of eradication in 2003-4 forced the 
majority of the coca driven demographic front to relocate elsewhere.  This chapter 
describes how hundred men crews of eradicators were flown in by Vietnam era U.S. 
owned helicopters to manually uproot hectares of coca bushes.   
The sudden withdrawal of coca cultivation following eradication meant the loss of 
a multi-million dollar business in an economic backwater.  This withdrawal reduced local 
impacts on the environment such as deforestation and chemical dumping.  Violence also 
decreased, but so did positive aspects like opportunities for employment, education, and 
improved transportation.  There appears little cause to celebrate the eradication of coca in 
the borderlands given this will likely only drive the cultivators and traffickers to other 
more distant lands, such as borderland national parks and indigenous lands.  Once coca 
cultivation becomes untenable in one borderland location, coca cultivators move on, 
potentially relocating to even more isolated and poorly understood areas, thus, putting 
additional culturally and ecologically critical landscapes at risk.  There similar social and 
environmental impacts would likely be repeated until the next wave of eradication forced 
the cycle to continue. 
This field-based research responds to the research of a variety of geographers and 
ecologists working in remote Latin American frontiers on resource related topics.  The 
detailed investigation of coca answers Young’s call (2004b: 366) for more geographical 
research on the social disruption and environmental degradation caused by the cultivation 
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and traffic of coca and coca derivatives.  The investigation into the networks of loggers 
and coca growers also demonstrates how local level fieldwork in remote locations 
provides valuable insight into poorly understood and complex processes (Brook 2005: 
493-4, McSweeney 2004: 638, 656): such as the strong ties between illicit economies and 
borderland peoples and the transboundary nature of extraction and production to name a 
few.  This research also supports Herlihy and Knapp’s (2003) assertion that Latin 
American regions characterized by large indigenous populations often have inadequate 
cartographic coverage. 
II. BORDERLANDS: CONTESTED OR TAMED? 
The synopsis of the three chapters above describes a borderland of a violent and 
transient character (Scmink and Wood 1992) rather than a domesticated and stable 
frontier character as described by Santos-Granero and Barclay (2000).  Schmink and 
Wood (1992) documented the high cost of inadequate geographic information along 
Amazonian frontiers in their study of colonization in southern Pará.  Their research found 
that “fleets of yellow construction machines pushed roads into places that until then had 
rarely seen a surveyor’s rod” (Schmink and Wood 1992: 345) and “draftsmen in Brasília 
planning offices envisioned a grid-square system of land distribution that bore little 
relationship to the hydraulic and topographic reality of the undulated and highly varied 
Amazonian terrains” (Schmink and Wood 1992: 346).  The victims of pursuing 
development before building adequate geographic information were not only the poor 
colonists, but also the agencies themselves given crisis colonization policies ended up 
intensifying rather than dampening rural violence (Schmink and Wood 1992: 349).  
While my borderland site lags behind Pará in terms of the degree of infrastructure and 
colonization pressures, the priorities of forestry and mining concessions appear to mirror 
the quotes above.  The new forestry law has allowed loggers to bring bulldozers and 
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skidders in advance of adequate surveying and the projection of mining concessions from 
Lima planning offices allows miners to lord over rectilinearly framed fiefdoms at the 
expense of both the local residents and the environment.  However, just as Schmink and 
Wood, the contest documented in this chapter goes beyond a simplistic state versus local 
people confrontation brought upon by the state’s desire to settle empty lands and control 
its resources at the expense of local people.  Here in the borderlands, concessions, 
conservation units, coca farmers, local people, indigenous groups, and national and 
regional entities have opposing goals leading to a “multiplicity of simultaneous and 
overlapping contested frontiers” (Schmink and Wood 1992: 19).  In these contested 
borderlands, as documented in the Brazilian Amazon (Schmink and Wood 1992, 
Simmons 2004, 2002), the contest for resources among different groups has led to 
overlapping claims, confrontation, violence and fatalities.         
Santos-Granero and Barclay’s (2000) book, Fronteras Domesticadas, portrays a 
different vision of the Peruvian Amazon through its rich historical analysis of the key 
economic indicators of the greater Loreto region (Loreto and Ucayali regions) from 1851 
to 1990.  They use historical documents to reconstruct the trajectories of key institutions 
and individuals during this time period and compile valuable historical data about the 
Peruvian Amazon.  Their thesis is that the last 150 years of radical change in Loreto has 
led to the taming of the frontier: “the suppression of the negative economic, social, and 
political traits characteristic of frontier economies” (Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000: 
308).  According to their analysis, these traits “have disappeared or are confined to the 
region’s remotest areas” (Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000: 299).202   
My recently conducted (2004) field-based analysis of mapping, timber and coca 
in the remote borderlands contrasts with their holistic historical (1850-1990) and 
economic focus, archival methodology and necessary concentration on merchant houses 
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and large landholdings203.  This variance helps inform their study by providing recent 
data about the region’s remotest areas to ascertain if greater Loreto is in fact “no longer a 
frontier” (Santos-Granero and Barclay 2000: 321).  My results argue against Santos-
Granero and Barclay’s assertion that the Loreto and Ucayali region has been “tamed”, 
particularly in the remote borderlands.  In making this argument I address, in sequential 
order, the five traits that Santos-Granero and Barclay argue to be true of their study 
region. While I cannot address these traits for their entire study region, given that it 
includes all of historical Loreto, I can provide insight into how well their theory works in 
this dissertation’s four watershed borderland study site.   
First, they argue that the region’s economies are no longer dependent on external 
capital and demand204.  My research focuses on the two most lucrative resources in the 
borderlands: timber and coca.  Both of these are almost entirely driven by external 
demand and financed by external capital.  The borderland timber species harvested 
specifically for regional markets are lupuna, Chorisia integrifolia, and bolaina, Guazama 
rosea, both of which make up only a small portion of the timber market when compared 
to higher value exported species.  Table 5 does not even list bolaina while lupuna made 
up only 16% of Ucayali roundwood production in 2002.  According to key informants, 
the majority of investors in the timber sector include international and Lima-based 
companies given the amount of capital needed to finance these operations.  Another 
source of capital for timber operation allegedly comes from coca money.  In the case of 
coca, the business is based on external demand from developed countries and external 
capital from international drug traffickers.  I find the borderland timber and coca 
economies very much dependent on external demand and capital. 
Second, Santos-Granero and Barclay argue that there is now local capital 
accumulation and the emergence of a bourgeoisie.  This argument is not easily addressed 
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by the rural nature of my fieldwork given local capital accumulation and bourgeoisie are 
usually headquartered in regional cities and towns.  However, I can attest to the lack of 
capital accumulation among local people working in the debt peonage based timber 
system.  My analysis of local capital and the bourgeoisie is necessarily inconclusive. 
Third, they argue that precapitalist social relations of production and exchange are 
no longer present.  However, I did find precapitalist relations common in the borderland 
timber industry.  Timber harvesting in the borderlands remains largely illegal or quasi-
legal and is still broadly characterized by debt peonage rather than capitalist relations.  
This system harks back to a bygone era of exploitation and represents the pervasive 
nature of the extractive economy in the borderlands.  My fieldwork and the work of 
Bedoya and Bedoya (2005) also indicate that the presence of debt peonage in the timber 
industry is not unique to the borderlands in the Peruvian Amazon.   
Fourth, they argue that Loreto is no longer dependent on itinerant extractive 
economies such as rubber, timber, and rosewood oil and thus has generated permanent 
demographic fronts.  The primary economies I researched in this dissertation are 
extractive and/or illegal.  Timber harvesting has certainly not established any significant 
permanent demographic fronts in the borderlands unless one counts the invisible 
Asháninka who have been present if ignored for over 100 years.  As shown in Chapter 
Three, the people attracted to these regions to harvest timber are poor young urban men 
(Bedoya and Bedoya 2005) or the men of dubious reputation described by the Major.  
Coca, while not extractive, can generate an extremely impermanent demographic front as 
shown by demographic field data of the Callería River and certainly does not fit into any 
definition of “tamed” given the violence associated with the business.  Here again I find 
one of their negative frontier traits to be very much present in the borderlands. 
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Finally, they argue that Loreto no longer has a weak state presence or state 
subservience to private economic interests.  There can be little doubt that a weak state 
presence continues to exist given it is a central argument of this dissertation.  The state 
has been unable to impose its will on a poorly understood border area.  The issue of state 
subservience cannot be adequately addressed here, but the continued existence of illegal 
loggers and the long time presence of coca farmers speak to a state perhaps not interested 
in or capable of policing its frontiers.  This rings particularly true when one takes into 
account the timber backgrounds of the most powerful officials in Ucayali and their 
alleged ties to drug traffickers as detailed in the previous chapters. 
Thus, my field-based inquiry argues against the presence of four of the five traits 
of tamed frontiers.  This argues against a “tamed” borderland and questions the 
universality of the tamed frontier theory of Santos-Granero and Barclay given that so 
much of Loreto and Ucayali fall within either the borderlands or areas considered remote.  
Despite my criticism of their overarching assertion, I find their book a useful analysis and 
compilation of difficult to obtain Amazonian data.  The strength of the study is in their 
archival work, and therein also lies the weakness.  It is difficult to support a theory on 
modern Amazonian frontiers using archival materials alone, given the paucity of accurate 
written accounts about these extensive lands.  There is no theorization or methodology 
that can substitute for empirical field-based research in frontier environments.  There 
simply is not enough data to support arguments about the current or recent state of these 
frontiers without experiencing the people, flora, and fauna through direct observation.  
Archival maps and documents are certainly extremely useful and informative, 
particularly if carried into the field, but cannot on their own support theoretical arguments 
in these poorly understood environments. 
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III. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This argument for more field-based research is applicable not only to academic 
inquiry but also to policy making.  Effective policy making requires field-based research 
to improve the currently inadequate geographic information.  As I have demonstrated in 
the previous chapters, the lack of field-based information facilitates the illegal 
exploitation of borderland resources and residents.  The remote nature of these 
borderlands combines with poor surveying, communications, land titling, and land tenure 
systems and the dynamic Amazonian landscape and people to create the illusion of an 
“empty” Amazon borderland.  While this emptiness is belied by local populations, the 
associated lack of state presence allows illegal exploitation of these borderland 
populations and their natural resources.  Where the nation state has become more 
interested in the borderlands it appears centered on a desire to control and tax resources 
like high value hardwoods and gold through mining and forestry concessions.  Interest in 
the borderland peoples continues to be minimal. 
Historically the isolation, geographic ignorance, and perceived emptiness of these 
borderlands made them havens for indigenous people and fauna seeking to avoid 
exploitation.  Recently, however, advancing settlement, agricultural, and resource 
frontiers have increased both state and illegal interest in the dwindling lands and 
resources of the local inhabitants.  With their refuges disappearing in the face of coca 
cultivators, illegal loggers, and the resource claims of the state, the borderland residents 
are now best served by being recognized by the national and regional state.  However, 
state ignorance and indifference combined with the violent and abusive tactics of illegals, 
such as loggers and drug traffickers, threaten to erase these residents from the “empty” 
landscape just when they seek recognition. 
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This dissertation demonstrates integration, development, and conservation 
initiatives to be increasing in these borderlands despite the lack of adequate geographic 
information and the associated presence of illegal operators putting these projects 
(including foreign policy) at risk.  All of these projects require basic information 
currently unavailable, inadequate, or outdated.  Although the generation of geographic 
information is a critical first step, this process must also include local participation and a 
supportive state (among other factors) if this information is to lead to positive results.  In 
the absence of a supportive state and local mobilization, such information is likely to be 
underutilized and perhaps even harmful to local interests.  Given this dissertation’s focus, 
the recommendations made here will center on how to improve geographic information 
through local knowledge rather than the larger and more elusive questions of how to 
strengthen political will and governance to ensure the positive implementation of this 
improved information over time. 
While this research successfully combined local knowledge and geographic field 
methods to document flawed maps, contested resources, marginalized local people, the 
negative impacts of coca cultivation, and abuses related to the tropical timber industry, 
the same combination has great potential to not only improve existing knowledge of the 
region but also to help reconcile conservation, development, and social justice in these 
borderlands.  The geocoding of local knowledge will provide the best baseline 
information available for improved mapping and planning even as it empowers local 
populations and mitigates future conflict over declining borderland resources and 
territory.  Schmink and Wood (1992: 344) found Amazonian frontiers locked in a contest 
for resources between groups capable of mobilizing varying degrees of power.  
Geographic information and maps can provide a platform for local people to increase and 
mobilize power (Dana 1998, Herlihy and Knapp 2002, Nietschman 1995).  The 
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incorporation of geographic information in an official geographic information system 
would allow for detailed, updated, accessible, and dynamic information that not only 
reflects the constantly changing frontier landscape and peoples but could also incorporate 
feedback processes from interested stakeholders.  While the logistical and financial 
obstacles205 to producing this information are formidable, they are likely less costly than 
failed projects based on flawed geographic information. 
Without improved geographic information and planning, initiatives such as the 
potential Pucallpa-Cruzeiro do Sul road, the Zona Reservada Sierra del Divisor, and the 
titling of the borderland Asháninka could fail just when the exodus of the coca cultivators 
provides increased opportunities for borderland investment.  Without, a basic geographic 
foundation such initiatives are likely to be fundamentally flawed in a similar fashion to 
the Peruvian forestry law documented in Chapter Three. 
One possibility is to pursue a dynamic Ecological Economic Zoning (EEZ) of the 
borderlands using a geographic information system informed by local knowledge.  EEZ 
is not new to the region, having been analyzed by members of the Amazonian 
Cooperation Treaty in 1994 who defined Ecological-Economic Zoning as “a dynamic 
process permitting a spatial ordering of areas characterized by physical, biotic, and socio-
economic factors evaluated in relation to their sustainable use by or tolerance of human 
intervention” (Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica 1994).  This analysis was followed in 
1996 by an agreement among seven Amazonian countries, including Peru, on a common 
methodological approach to EEZ (Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica 1996).  Since that 
time several other countries have pursued EEZ, including Rondônia, Mato Grosso, and 
Acre in Brazil  
The largest example of EEZ on tropical frontiers is underway in the neighboring 
Brazilian state of Rondônia (Mahar 2000).  This Agricultural and Forestry Plan for 
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Rondônia (Planoforo), is a US$229 million project that began in 1993 as an alternative to 
the typically unconstrained frontier-type development and settlement present in 
Amazonia.  Zoning consisted of state-wide mapping at 1:250,000 scale based on satellite 
imagery, soil samples, and a range of economic and social data (Mahar 2000: 121).  The 
principal opponents to Planoforo have been the logging and ranching interests who see 
zoning as a straight jacket preventing their exploitation and expansion goals (Mahar 
2000: 120).  While international environmental communities, indigenous people, rubber 
tappers and some small farmers have been largely for zoning, there has also been 
criticism of a lack of local participation (Perz 2002: 46).  Based on his analysis, Mahar 
(2000: 126) argues EEZ to be a sound instrument, although not a panacea, for guiding 
land use on tropical frontiers.  Critical lessons learned from Rondônia are that EEZ is a 
political process that requires broad public support and a continuous participatory 
planning process including the entire spectrum of stakeholders at the earliest stages of 
study and implementation (Mahar 2000: 126-127).  This support is critical as powerful 
interests restricted by zoning laws such as loggers, ranchers, and municipal governments 
will repeatedly challenge zoning legislation.  Unfortunately in 2000, Planoforo’s 
continued to rely on external funding to finance state bureaucracy and infrastructure, and 
thus mollify the powerful anti-zoning interests (Mahar 2000: 128).  The results of 
Planoforo are mixed, with the greatest beneficiaries appearing to be indigenous groups, 
extractivists, and conservationists given the process included the creation and 
demarcation of indigenous reserves, extractive reserves, and conservation units (Mahar 
2000: 125).  On the other side, are the powerful logging, ranching, and urban elite 
interests who appear to gain little from the process and continue to challenge the 
government’s ability to enforce and maintain zoning laws (Mahar 2000: 126-7).  Long 
term success relies on the government’s commitment to zoning with this still contingent 
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(in 2000) on capital from international donors.  Ultimately, as an existing project, it is 
easy to critique Rondônia’s EEZ efforts, however, one must keep in mind what the state 
would look like without EEZ.  Now, at the very least, historically marginalized and 
culturally diverse groups such as indigenous peoples and rubber tappers have a legal 
basis, and demarcated territory, to strengthen their hand in the contest for resources 
(Schmink and Wood 1992).  These areas, along with demarcated parks, also function as 
warehouses of biodiversity and barriers to deforestation in a state increasingly losing its 
forest cover (Nepstad et al. 2006, Pedlowski et al. 2005).  
Another example of EEZ is in the neighboring state of Acre, who finished their 
first approximation of 1:1,000,000 scale EEZ in 2000 and continue refining the process to 
the 1:250,000 scale (Government of Acre 2000).  The EEZ in Acre has been held up as a 
model for other Amazonian zoning initiatives given its quality and incorporation of 
historical process, local knowledge, and dialogue.  Directed by four geographers and an 
agronomist, Acre defines its EEZ as “a strategic tool of regional planning and territorial 
administration involving studies of the environment, natural resources, and human-
environment relations that inform democratic negotiations between governmental 
institutions, the private sector, and civil society concerning a collection of public policies 
oriented towards sustainable development” (Government of Acre 2000: 1).  By state law, 
researchers working on Acre’s EEZ were guided by participatory, equitable, sustainable, 
holistic and systematic principles in their elaboration of a comprehensive three volume 
EEZ work with chapters ranging from geomorphology to biodiversity to indigenous 
peoples to socio-economic infrastructure206.  While this compendium contains a great 
deal of geographic information,207 Governor Viana recognized in his foreword that this 
“dream map” was merely recognizing the zoning already formed by the region’s natural 
and human history and that these three volumes were but a modest beginning to a 
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continuous process (Government of Acre 2000).  Viana, a forester using the rhetoric of 
sustainable development (Kainer et al. 2003), demonstrated the leadership, longevity and 
political will to see this first phase through, but the EEZ requires continued updating, 
scaling down, community involvement, governmental support, and legal enforcement if it 
is to be truly successful. 
Indeed, despite the rhetoric and propaganda, some questions exist as to whether 
Acre has taken the fullest advantage of the EEZ initiative as not all of the zoning 
recommendations have been incorporated into public policy.  While the government 
established several ecologically important conservation units based on the 
recommendations of the EEZ208, there is no published data describing the degree of 
implementation of other recommendations, nor of the status of the second EEZ phase at 
1:250,000 scale.  For example, prior to the start of the second phase, the government 
never consulted the participatory state EEZ commission209 to identify what aspects of the 
first phase should be prioritized.  Despite these concerns, the published 1:1,000,000 scale 
EEZ project has been a substantive contribution to the geographic knowledge of the 
Brazilian borderlands.  This experimental effort not only produced geographic 
information of varying types, but also systematically organized and interpreted the data to 
make it available to local people, NGOs, universities, researchers, governmental offices 
and other interested parties.  But can this success continue through time and new 
administrations, and can it be implemented successfully in other borderlands where 
institutions may be less committed to sustainability principles? 
While ecological-economic zoning is promoted by a Peruvian supreme decree210 
as the means of organizing national territory for sustainable development, zoning has 
never moved beyond the proposal stage in the Peruvian Amazon.  The Peruvian Amazon 
Research Insititute (IIAP211) with financing from various international funding agencies 
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and national and regional organizations completed initial ecological economic zoning 
proposals at the macro scale (1:250,000) for the regions of Madre de Dios and San 
Martín, and at the meso scale for the Aguaytía watershed of Ucayali (IIAP 2001, IIAP 
2003).  Despite their thought provoking cartographic, tabular and textual contents these 
proposals and their geographic information have not been used systematically by 
governmental authorities.  This is likely due to an absence of political will at both the 
national and regional level, hardly surprising given the restrictions that might be placed 
on powerful logging interests and the complications that would ensue from trying to deal 
legally with coca cultivation in Madre de Dios, San Martín, and Aguaytía.   
In 2006, the Regional Government of Ucayali signed an agreement with the 
World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) to create an EEZ based on the Acre model for the 
borderland provinces of Purús and Atalaya (Tedy Tuesta personal communication).  This 
would seem a perfect opportunity to continue north and incorporate the borderlands 
researched here in an EEZ.  The incorporation of the Acre model could be critical given it 
potentially allows informed dialogue of transboundary initiatives and transgressions.  
However, EEZ requires an enormous investment as success relies on human resources, 
the institutionalization of the process, transparency, appropriate scaling, financing, the 
political will for implementation, mechanisms for enforcement, and the participation of 
local people.  If local participation is ensured, the most likely failure of an EEZ would be 
political will for enforcement and follow through.  Nevertheless, even the creation of a 
participatory, updated, unenforceable, static map would be a significant improvement 
over the inadequate geographic information currently on hand given it would provide an 
information platform from which local people could mobilize against illegal activity and 
state indifference in these contested frontiers.  Illegal logging, coca cultivation, and 
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contested resource concessions would be exposed even as local people were 
demonstrated to be present in the borderlands. 
This EEZ would be best elaborated by a committee of institutions including state 
(federal and regional), non-state organizations, and Universities.  This would ensure that 
the information be official, while holding the state accountable.  Once field-based 
research generated the information, the spatial database would be made public so that a 
wide range of stakeholders could approach the decision making table and participate in 
informed, participatory land-use decisions.  While a well-mapped region does not ensure 
that it will be well-managed, improving information in a participatory manner through 
EEZ does serve to potentially democratize development and conservation where it has 
formerly been imposed.        
As reviewed in the introduction, the participation of local people in mapping 
endeavors can be particularly problematic given a reliance on external funding, “experts”, 
agendas, and Western spatial paradigms, epistemologies, and worldviews (Dana 1998: 
34, Fox 2002: 66, King 2002: 50, Kosek 1998: 5, Peluso 1995, 384, Poole 1995, Robbins 
2003: 250, Rundstrom 1995: 45, 1998: 7).  Specific negatives include the freezing of a 
fluid culture and boundaries (Dana 1998: 34, Fox 1998: 3, Fox 2002: 66, Peluso 1995: 
400-1, Rundstrom 1995, 52), the alteration of local politics (Dana 1998: 41, Flavelle 
1995: 73, Peluso 1995: 387, 399), and control of the map and data after the participatory 
fieldwork (Chapin 1998: 7, Fox 2002: 77).  These questions and concerns also made the 
participatory fieldwork used here a difficult proposition both practically and morally.  
This became particularly clear when technical expertise required that I be the primary 
cartographer and holder of the data.  Now, however with the conclusion of this 
dissertation, I will return the latest iteration of their maps back to the community and 
continue the participatory project through a new round of actualization.  In returning to 
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the field I will not only be fulfilling my obligations as a responsible participatory map 
maker but also following the footsteps of a long line of field geographers (Butzer 1990, 
Dana 1998, Doolittle 2001, Sauer 1941: 10, Knapp 1991,Young and Leon 2000) who to 
quote Parsons (1977: 3, 14) understand the advantages of viewing a particular area over 
time. 
Ultimately, I feel the potential drawbacks of local participation, both in my 
borderland research and the EEZ, are less damaging than the loss of life, livelihood, 
biodiversity, and culture now arising from the anonymity and misrepresentation of these 
same people and their surroundings on flawed maps.  This situation allows illegal 
loggers, coca cultivators and other outsiders to rule a contested borderland “empty” of 
governmental authority.  Thus, anonymity, misrepresentation, and the proliferation of 
illegality contribute to this marginalization of Amazonian borders or margins.  In my 
opinion, the dissemination of local geographical knowledge is a first step towards 
overcoming marginality on the margins.  In short, these borderlands need be better 
mapped, preferably using the expert local knowledge already available.  Unless field-
based inquiry improves geographic information, the blank or scrawled slate of the 
Amazonian borderlands will continue to serve as the planner’s canvas until the cultural 











                                                 
1 See glossary. 
2 See glossary. 
3 Both the nation state and sub-nation state have inadequate geographic information.  See glossary. 
4 See glossary for more explanation. 
5 Local knowledge refers to the knowledge local people gain from living in a place and environment for 
years at a time.  This might include knowledge of the curative properties of the area’s plants, knowledge of 
the courses and headwaters of rivers, or knowledge of the cultures of neighboring peoples to just name a 
few examples. 
6 State indifference refers to indifference from both the national and regional governments although 
national indifference tends to be greater due to distance.  I also refer to both when I use the phrase state 
presence. 
7 In 2004 I was fortunate to be an Associated Member of this Non-Governmental Organization dedicated to 
the protection of indigenous people, their homelands, and resources.  Instituto del Bien Común translates as 
Institute of the Common Good. 
8 The Asháninka and Ashéninka are closely related groups with origins in the eastern slopes of the Andes.  
The borderland Asháninka/Ashéninka communities often have both ethnicities present.  From this point on 
I will refer to these related groups as the Asháninka to save word space although I acknowledge the 
presence of both groups in the borderlands.  Please see the glossary for a more in depth explanation. 
9 Conservationists in particular are actively identifying and prioritizing the protection of the last tropical 
wilderness frontiers (Fagan et al. 2006: 433, Laurance et al. 2006: 462). 
10 See Amazonian boundaries in glossary for more explanation. 
11 Treaties define political boundaries, but coastlines, river banks, ridgelines, and other natural features 
change in the best of circumstances, making boundaries difficult to measure.  
12 Here boundary lands is synonymous with borderlands. 
13 In defining a broad Amazon borderlands, I begin with the nation state of Brazil that makes up the 
majority of both the Amazon basin (68%) and the Amazon borders (62%).  This dominance combined with 
the legal and political importance and the specificity of Brazil’s 150 km faixa de fronteira allow the 
consideration of this 150 kilometer swath as a basis for defining the Amazon borderlands.  However, a 150 
kilometer buffer around the Amazon borders is too general a territorial definition of Amazon borderlands at 
even a 1:1 Million scale due to inclusion of highland regions.  Clipping the 150 kilometer buffered zone 
with the limits of the lowland rainforest provides a more useful if still general Amazon borderlands.  This 
definition excludes the Andean regions over 700 meters in elevation, but includes areas in Venezuela and 
the Guianas containing the familiar lowland rainforest biota. 
14 Santos-Granero and Barclay (2000: 5) define the taming of the frontier as the “suppression or 
containment of the worse traits identified with frontier economies.” 
15 An important caveat is Santos-Granero and Barclay’s (2000: 299) statement that “at present most of the 
traits characteristic of frontier economies have disappeared or are confined to the region’s remotest areas.”   
16 A region is Peruvian political unit similar to a department. 
17 An area larger than the country of Hungary 
18 All the indigenous territories shown are titled.  Later in the dissertation I will present maps of the untitled 
homelands of the Asháninka/Ashéninka of Alto Tamaya. 
19 For the sake of simplicity, from here on I will refer to the Shipibo Conibo group simply as the Shipibo. 
20 Unidad Militar de Asentamiento Rural (UMAR) 
21 An interesting group that bears more analysis is the religious sect Israelitas (called Chunchi’s by the 
locals for their facial hair) who have several state supported settlements in the region. 
 301
                                                                                                                                                 
22 The Zona Reservada Sierra del Divisor was created on April 5, 2006 by Ministerial Resolution #0283-
2006-AG.  The Regional Government of Ucayali also has submitted a conservation proposal to protect the 
entire border between the Zona Reservada Sierra del Divisor and the Alto Purus National Park. 
23 Coming from Texas, Acre is cheaper (but not easier) to get to via Peru than via Brazil,   
24 I was eating breakfast and reading the paper at the hotel restaurant when I saw a man enter who looked 
exactly like the photograph of the Minister on the front page.  I had my maps with me, walked up, 
introduced myself, and gave him one. 
25 Pg. 36 at 
http://iirsa.mediawebsa.com/BancoMedios/Documentos%20PDF/mer_baires04_presentacion_eje_peru_bra
sil_bolivia.pdf . 
26 My Master’s research took place in Acre, Brazil (Salisbury 2002). 
27 These four presentations include: “Geografía en la Selva,” presentation at la Pontífica Universidad 
Católica de Perú, Lima. Peru,.  “Dinámicas Fronterizas entre Acre y Ucayali: Un análisis geográfico,” 
Presentation for the Ministry of Foreign Relations, Lima, Peru.  “Geografía en la Selva,” presentation at la 
Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina, Lima. Peru.  “Geografia do Século XXI: um análisis geográfico 
da fronteira Acre-Peru,” Presentation at the Universidade Federale do Acre, Rio Branco, Brasil.  
“Dinámicas Fronterizas: Un análisis geográfico de los beneficios y desafios de la integración Pucallpa-
Cruzeiro do Sul,” Exposition for the state government of Ucayali, in the Cámara de Comércio, Pucallpa, 
Ucayali, Peru. 
28 The combined investment almost equaled initial funding from Fulbright-Hays. 
29 An agreement of Mutual Cooperation with the Regional Government of Ucayali, Peru.  Status as an 
Associated member of the Instituto del Bien Común.  A letter of understanding with Universidad Nacional 
de Ucayali (UNU), Peru. 
30 Additional data is still being processed for future publications. 
31 This investigator worked in the most distant community which required a week to get to.  Given the size, 
importance, and particular needs of this Asháninka community the researcher stayed on to help the 
Asháninka map their land for self determination and titling purposes. 
32 A more detailed description of these methods can be found in Salisbury 2002. 
33  http://www.map-amazonia.net/index.php?lang=en&page=video&item_id=2 
34 The United States provides economic, political, and logistical support to coca eradication efforts in Peru. 
35 Spanish and Portuguese exploration and expansion into these the Amazon brought death, disease, and 
landscape change to the region.  While I do not address this historical topic specifically in this dissertation, 
the impact of contact on the landscape and demography of the Amazon has been addressed by Denevan 
(1992, 2001) and Mann (2005) among others. 
36 Uti possidetis is a concept derived from Roman Law giving territory to the possessor, by law (de jure) 
and by fact (de facto).  In the case of the Treaty of Madrid, the concept used was de facto. 
37 1810 was selected as it was when the Latin American states began revolting against the Spanish crown. 
38 The uti possidetis of 1810 relied initially on a de jure definition of uti possidetis where the rule applied to 
the limits legally in force when the act of decolonization occurred.   However, these lines did not 
necessarily coincide with the boundaries observed for practical administration by colonial authorities: the 
Spanish sometimes governed beyond their legal limit.  This second, de facto, interpretation was then 
accepted by the state as it gave them access to more territory.  An example would be Venezuela (Prescott 
1987: 105-6).    
39 Here Ireland uses the term frontier when referring to a boundary. 
40 Here Ireland uses the term border territory when referring to a what I call borderlands. 
41 These boundaries were well defined on the map, but the lack of geographic knowledge of the area made 
defining these boundaries very imprecise. 
42 Ironically, Sternberg’s connection of Maury’s obsessions and Brazilian defensiveness of the Amazon 
may be a precursor to the freezing of my Brazilian research permit for the research of Amazonian 
borderlands. 
43 This dissertation uses the Brazilian spelling of Javarí rather than the Peruvian Yavarí. 
44 This line was called the Gibbon Line, apparently because it took advantage of the U.S. reconnaissance of 
Amazonia and U.S. Lieutenant Gibbon’s coordinates for the mouth of the Bení River. 
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45 Spanish and Portuguese terns are defined in the glossary. 
46 Euclides da Cunha recognizes the Campa, “to preserve a primitive freedom, thanks to their ferocity, 
within the tortuous contracts they accept” (da Cunha 1976: 264).  These fierce Campa, now called 
Asháninka or Ashéninka are the borderland indigenous people analyzed in chapter 4. 
47 All translations from the Spanish and Portuguese, unless otherwise noted, are made by the author. 
48 Santos-Granero and Barclay define the selva central as the “central jungle”, “central montaña”, or central 
portion of the Peruvian selva alta or high jungle (Santos-Granero and Barclay 1998: 1).  This area lies 
along the eastern slopes of the Andes.  Within this selva central region lie the historical and current core 
homelands of the Asháninka/Ashéninka peoples in the Pajonal, and along the Perené, Ené, Tambo, Upper 
Ucayali and Urubamba Rivers.  
49 Amônia is used in this dissertation rather than Amônea, Amonia, or Amonea given Amônia is the 
spelling used by the Brazilian state for the Asháninka indigenous territory located along the banks of this 
river bisected by the Brazil/Peru border. 
50 Current ethnic names placed in parenthesis by the author. 
51 Terra Indígena Kampa e isolados do rio Envira (262 Asháninka residents). Terra Indígena Kampa do 
igarapé Primavera (21 Asháninka), Kampa do rio Amônia (472 Asháninka), and Terra Indígena 
Kaxinawá/Ashaninka do rio Breu (114 Asháninka) (Pimenta 2005).  In 2002 there were 52 Asháninka 
living in the Terra Indígena Jaminawá do rio Envira (dos Santos de Almeida 2002). 
52 Emory Richey’s census of the 4 untitled Asháninka villages in the Tamaya watershed in 2005 showed the 
following numbers: San Miguel de Chambira (83 residents in 2005), Alto Tamaya (82), Nueva California 
(55), Nueva Amazonia de Tomajao (57), and Cametsari Quipatsi (126).  Emory Richey is a University of 
Texas at Austin undergraduate who kept a journal called 47 days on the Tamaya River in October and 
November of 2005 (Richey 2005).  He also took thousands of photographs, hundreds of GPS points, and 
carried out a census.   
53 Exceptions are the titled communities of San Mateo on the Alto Abujao River and San Miguel de 
Chambira on the Tamaya River.  The Instituto del Bien Común has also begun mapping the borderland 
Asháninka of Perú while the Government of Acre has maps of the Brazilian Asháninka’s titled territories. 
54 The Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, was a revolutionary Marxist group fighting in the countryside in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  Chapter 4 will address their presence in the borderlands in limited detail. 
55 See glossary for more details on Castilloa. 
56 See glossary for more details on varaderos. 
57 Mendonça claims these caucheros fled from an exploitative Peruvian patrón (Mendonça 1989). 
58 Espinar also sent men to explore and return to Peru by two Abujao-Juruá Mirím varaderos (Rosas 1905). 
59 Mendonça relates the predictable demise of a trail made by outsiders lacking in local knowledge of 
terrain, “This (trail) was effectively opened from the mouth of the Putaya directly to the Juruá in 1898, but 
never being used by the caucheros, who thought it too long and with too many hills, now it lies abandoned 
and partly overgrown with forest” ( Commissăo Mixta Brasileira-Peruana e Mendonça 1907: 114). 
60 López dedicates one chapter to necrophagy practiced by the Kaxinawá.  He also notes the presence of the 
arrogant Campa of Huaca Pistac (probably the Bacapishtea River,  an affluent of the Juruá) along the 
border (López 1925: 102) and the presence of Ticuna Indians brought to the mouth of the Breu River by an 
Ecuadoran rubber patrón all the way from the Napo River before being abandoned there to their own 
devices (López 1925: 101). 
61 All photos are taken by the author unless otherwise indicated in the caption. 
62 Official coordinates for #61 (WGS 84): 8° 15' 19.101" Latitude, 73° 32' 38.942" Longitude, Elevation 
268.26 (PCDL 2006).  Official coordinates for #62 (WGS 84): 8° 15' 12.212" Latitude, 73° 32' 48.207" 
Longitude, Elevation 239.37 (PCDL 2006).  Our CIFA coordinates for # 61 (WGS 84): 8° 15' 19.0224" 
Latitude , 73° 32' 38.8355" Longitude, Elevation 265.  Informatiao on etched into concrete base of 
monument # 61: VIII-1925, Y=8° 15' 20.73" S, L=73° 33' 02.54" W.  CIFA coordinates for #62 (WGS 84): 
8° 15' 12.0276" Latitude, 73° 32' 48.3539" Longitude, Elevation 242.     
63 The Asháninka and Ashéninka are closely related groups with origins in the eastern slopes of the Andes.  
The borderland Asháninka/Ashéninka communities often have both ethnicities present.  From this point on 
I will refer to these related groups as the Asháninka to save word space although I acknowledge the 
presence of both groups in the borderlands.  Please see the glossary for a more in depth explanation. 
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64 While nobody is capable of holding a Global Positioning System in hand, the term GPS is also 
commonly used to refer to the handheld GPS receiver used for commercial, recreational and research 
purposes.  I am using GPS in this colloquial sense here. 
65 Chris Fagan was instrumental in finding me a place on this expedition and we happily assumed our roles 
as the map wielding geographically ignorant outsiders we were.  
66 Commonly called a carta nacional.  These maps, or cartas nacionales, are explained in detail later in the 
chapter.  Also see glossary. 
67 Names of borderland residents are substituted with pseudonyms to protect their anonymity in both the 
text and figure captions. 
68 Peke peke is the local name for the ubiquitous and inexpensive outboard motors with the long shaft 
needed to operate in both low and high water seasons.  
69 Harley (1988a, 1988b, 1989) has deconstructed the textual, rhetorical, political, and powerful nature of 
maps.  His deconstruction has extended to the colonial Americas where he has found evidence of 
indigenous geographic knowledge in European map construction even as European maps “…served to 
dispossess the Indians by engulfing them with blank spaces” (Harley 1992: 531).  Bassett’s analysis of 
blank spaces in 19th century European maps of West Africa led him to assert these null spaces to be 
evidence of a “disregard for indigenous geographical knowledge” by European explorers (1994: 322).  
These spaces also incited exploration and colonization as imperialists used blankness to justify 
appropriation and control (Bassett 1994: 324).  These empty spaces or cartographic silences are active 
rather than passive constructs and as such, actively desocialize the landscape (Harley 1988b: 66, 70).  The 
landscape contains no blank spaces and thus, Harley contends metaphorically, “there is no such thing as an 
empty space on a map (1988b: 71).  Harley urges us to make these silences speak, to uncover the agenda 
hidden in the emptiness, to investigate the absence (1988b: 58, 71, 70). 
70 Both Peruvian nation state and Ucayali region goals are affected. 
71 Pseudonyms for these population centers are used in the figure headings to protect local inhabitants.  
Names in tables are correct for comparison to other cartographic sources. 
72 Paper maps are available for purchase through el Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN) < 
http://www.ignperu.gob.pe/web_espanol/portal.htm >. 
73 Cartographic information is available from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) at < 
http://desa.inei.gob.pe/mapas/bid/ >.  The INEI location information for population centers can also be 
obtained through personal contacts in Peruvian institutions. 
74 This data set is not publically available and is described in more detail in Chapter Four. 
75 There is no official database for Peruvian indigenous territories and datasets of various qualities are 
available from personal contacts and institutions.  I used datasets from Instituto del Bien Común (IBC), 
Instituto Nacional de Recursos Naturales (INRENA), and Gobierno Regional de Ucayali (GOREU). 
76 INRENA’s website is < http://www.inrena.gob.pe/ >. 
77 Coordinates can be purchased at the MINEM website < http://www.minem.gob.pe/ > although I obtained 
them through other personal contacts. 
78 These data are not publically available. 
79 Abizaid found this new channel formation to have been hastened by local people using hand tools and 
bulldozers (Abizaid 2005). 
80 El Instituto Geográfico Nacional (IGN).  Metadata is not complete for these four maps (17n, 17ñ, 18n, 
18ñ) although 17ñ and 18ñ do state that they were compiled by the DMAHTC in 1990.  Based on my 
analysis of other IGN maps “compiled” refers to compilations of aerial photos taken in the 1950s, 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s. 
81 Winklerprins (2002), Sheikh et al. (2006), and Smith (1999) among others have addressed the impacts of 
a dynamic floodplain on livelihoods in the Brazilian Amazon. 
82 In figure 24 note the clouds in the northeast corner of the satellite image despite this being a September 
image (the driest portion of the dry season).   
83 This settlement pattern, like many modern Amazonian models, has a precedent in pre-Columbian times 
(Denevan 1996). 
84 320 of these maps cover the entire area of the Peruvian Amazon (Smith et al. 2003). 
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85 In November 24, 2003, NIMA changed its name to the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) 
< http://www.nga.mil/StaticFiles/OCR/nga_history.pdf >. 
86 These maps were purchased in 2004 at the National Geographic Institute. 
87 Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática (INEI) 
88 The geographic methods used by INEI to georeference the data are unclear. 
89 Oficina Nacional de Evaluación de Recursos Naturales (ONERN) 
90 See glossary. 
91 ONERN was abolished in the early 1990’s by the Fujimori administration and replaced by INRENA.  
INRENA has never reached the comprehensive research capacity of ONERN.  
92 To compound matters, ONERN neither studied the entire borderlands nor consistently used ecologically 
grounded boundaries (e.g. their study of the area is partially framed by lines of latitude) making spatial 
comparisons over time difficult. 
93 “The zone is scarcely populated with people dispersed alongside the Abujao and Utiquinía Rivers and 
totally uninhabited in between” translated from (Centro de UNALM 1981: 1-2).  Later the same study says, 
“The reconnaissance undertaken in this study confirms the colonist occupation of the Río Abujao and also 
along the middle and upper portions of the Río Utiquinía, since the lower portion is subject to flooding. 
Native populations were not found given that they dwell along the bank of the Ucayali Rivers.” (Centro de 
UNALM 1981: 10).  An analysis of names of the 77 residents of agricultural lots along the Abujao in 1979 
reveals more than a few residents to be Asháninka/Ashéninka.  This is confirmed by our own fieldwork in 
the titled Asháninka/Ashéninka community of San Mateo Alto Abujao, many of whose residents were born 
on the lower Abujao. 
94 Hamlet in Spanish.  Caserío is the common name for all of the towns in the study site whose population 
is mostly not indigenous. 
95 According to their website, The Instituto del Bien Común is a Peruvian not-for-profit civil association, 
whose principal concern is a deep caring for the many resources held in common with additional foci on 
rural peoples and ecological services (Instituto del Bien Común 2004). 
96 This was true at the time of our fieldwork in 2004. 
97 Again, for the purposes of this study we have elected to use the most common usage today: Callería. 
98 I thank anthropologist Manuel Cuentas for first bringing this to my attention. 
99 Distinct from the Contamanillo farm, fundo, on the Callería although settlers of both had roots in the Río 
Ucayali town of Contamana. In 1970 the Utiquinía River’s Contamanillo  had five families. 
100 It appears that this indigenous community never received legal status as there is now no indigenous 
community by that name. 
101 The Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, is a Marxist based revolutionary organization with a history of 
violence in the region. 
102 See glossary. 
103 For example, our stop at Barión Poza, one of the fundos along the Tamaya present in the IGN data 
sources, found only a small ranch worked by two men for an absentee landlord.   
104 University of Texas student Emory Richey took an informal census of the borderland Asháninka on the 
Tamaya in 2005 (Richey 2005). 
105 These territories surround El Sira Communal Reserve. 
106 The Asháninka will be explained in much more detail in chapter 4. 
107 Riverside dwellers, often agriculturalists and extractivists pursuing near subsistence livelihoods. 
108 Proyecto Especial de Titulación de Tierras y Catastro Rural. 
109 Probably the Sendero Luminoso who was active along the Tamaya in the late 80s and early 90s 
(Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2004a; Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2004b). 
110 Renovación de Certificado. 
111 Certificado de Posesión Especial de 1987. 
112 The special project Control and Reduction of Coca Cultivation in the Alto Huallaga (CORAH) of the 
Peruvian Ministry of the Interior is in charge of eradicating coca in Peru.  This organization will be 
described in detail in the fourth chapter. 
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113 Analysis of CORAH data later showed that coca had indeed been eradicated nearby, but in November 
not July or August.  Within 2 kilometers of the caserío 19 fields had been eradicated for a total of 33 
hectares of coca. 
114 Varaderos, or portage trails, are called varadouros in Brazil. 
115 An analysis of the social and environmental impact of coca cultivation in these borderlands is included 
in chapter four of this dissertation. 
116 Drug traffickers and Shining Path members repeatedly tried to motivate local people (indigenous and 
non-indigenous) to plant coca.  The headman of the indigenous community of San Mateo recounted how he 
refused just such a forceful request/threat by saying they had title to their lands and nobody could force 
them to do anything.  In another case, a village of predominantly Brazilian origin formed a citizen’s militia 
and proved critical in defeating the Shining Path in the region (Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 
2004a; Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación 2004b).  
117 The State Forestry Patrimony (Patrimonio Forestal del Estado) includes all forest resources and wildlife 
not part of private property (Paniagua 2001: 201105).  
118 Ken Young (personal communication) points out this is also a sign of corruption. 
119 Asociación Interetnica de Dessarrollo de la Selva Peruana 
120 Asociación para la Conservación del Patrimonio del Cutivireni 
121 Centro del Desarrollo del Indígena Amazónico 
122 In the borderlands, the basis for these surveys are natural resource inventories conducted in the late 
1970s by Peru’s national office of natural resource evaluation (ONERN) and while these are excellent 
studies of largely unknown areas, they simply do not represent the current state of these forests. 
123 The link between forestry concessions, illegal logging, the international border, and indigenous people is 
explored in detail in Chapter Two of this dissertation.  Other factors also encourage illegal logging (Smith 
et al. 2006), but these basic issues will be the focus here. 
124 The Peruvian Ministry of Energy and Mines uses the Provisional South American Datum 1956 (PSAD 
56) for their National Cadastral Map of Mines, but recognizes GPS to be the most efficient way of 
determining position for mining rights.  However, for taxation purposes, points are collected in WGS 84 
and then transformed into PSAD 56 through transformations now published in Supreme Decree # 001-
2002-EM (Toledo et al. 2002). 
125 Both foreigners and nationals are allowed to hold a concession but article 71 of the 1993 Peruvian 
constitution bans foreigners from holding (directly or indirectly) property rights in areas located within 50 
kilometers of the nation’s boundaries, except in cases of public need declared by Supreme Decree and 
approved by the ministries council in accordance with Peruvian law. 
126 These are only two of the regulations. 
127 Evaluaciones Ambientales Territoriales 
128 Programas de Adecuación y Manejo Ambiental (PAMA) 
129 Estudios de Impacto Ambiental (EIA) 
130 38 soles.  The price for a gram in Pucallpa was 15.15 $ U.S. (50 soles). Prices in US$ were calculated 
using 2004 November exchange rate of 3.3 soles to the $ U.S. 
131 Article 71, Chapter 3, Title 3, 1993 Constitution of Peru. 
132 Although local people are increasingly solicited for feedback during the conservation planning stages by 
NGOs, their decision making power at the creation stage is limited. 
133 Zona Reservada is a transitional designation that may soon be upgraded to national park or biological 
reserve status.   
134 David Cleary Director of the Conservancy’s Amazon program, led the greater transboundary effort with 
Claudia Vega of the Conservancy’s Peru program lobbying in Lima. 
135 Francisco Estremadoyro headed the Sierra del Divisor initiative for Pro Naturaleza. 
136 Tedy Tuesta, Gerente Gerencia Regional de Recursos Naturales y Gestión del Medio Ambiente, 
Gobierno Regional de Ucayali, led this effort despite starting his job “without even a chair” just a few years 
earlier. 
137 As described in the previous page many different conservation organizations were involved in the 
proposal.  The proposal was first tendered to INRENA and stayed there for many months before being 
accepted. 
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138 See glossary.  A caserío primarily dedicated to coca cultivation. 
139 See glossary.  Here used primarily in reference to coca farmers. 
140 We were unable to confirm the presence of a coca cultivating region nicknamed narcolandía by the 
Brazilian Asháninka. 
141 See next chapter for more details on the links between illegal logging and drug trafficking. 
142 Apiwtxa actually stands for Associação Ashaninka do rio Amônia (Asháninka Association of the 
Amônia River), but is also used interchangeably by the Asháninka as the name for their village.  The 
normally dispersed Amônia Asháninka organized in this village to advance their goals of self-determination 
and territorial control.  Thus, the name fittingly serves dual functions as both a community organization or 
associação (association) and as community place name for their centralized aldeia (village). 
143 A detailed description of these general methods can be found in Salisbury 2002. 
144 Brazil remains the largest exporter in Latin America. 
145 This approximate percentage was arrived at using ArcGIS area calculations for the associated polygons 
within an Ucayali specific Lambert Conformal Conic Projection.  The region of Ucayali contains portions 
of two National Parks (Cordillera Azul and Alto Purús), two Communal Reserves (El Sira and Alto Purús), 
and one Reserved Zone (Sierra del Divisor) for approximately 22% in conservation units.  The department 
also contains four Territorial Reserves for Indigenous People in Voluntary Isolation (Isconahua, 
Murunahua, Mashco Piro, and Kugapakori y Nahua) or 15% of Ucayali’s area, however, only two 
(Murunahua and Kugapakori y Nahua) exist outside of existing conservation units for 5% of the 
department’s area.  Indigenous territories are the hardest to quantify given the number and area of these 
units change rapidly and geographic databases are still incomplete and largely erroneous (although the 
SICNA department of the Instituto del Bien Común has made great strides here) {Smith, Benavides, et al. 
2003 #2920}.  Using the Regional Government of Ucayali’s 2004 database of 309 Indigenous Territories 
(Both titled and recognized) and their amplifications, I was able to roughly estimate these to cover 
approximately 21% of the Ucayali region.  Thus, 49% of the Ucayali region falls within an indigenous 
territory or conservation unit.  
146 See glossary for further elaboration. 
147 Supreme Decree 051-92-AG, El Peruano, Diario Oficial  12/22/92.   
148 Supreme Decree 10-95-AG, El Peruano, Diario Oficial  4/30/95.   
149 Supreme Decree 013-96-AG, El Peruano, Diario Oficial 8/23/96, p. 141996-7, #5896.   
150 The World Wildlife Fund was instrumental in lobbying for and writing the new sustainably oriented law 
and solicited feedback from a variety of forestry communities through a participatory  process.  Despite 
this, the final written law did not exactly match their draft.  Once the law was in place in 2001, USAID 
provided funds through CEDEFOR (Centro de Desarrollo Forestal), a WWF project, to implement the law 
and improve forestry practices via INRENA, other institutions, or by working directly with 
concessionaires.  These investments in the forest sector were not always used wisely or successfully by 
institutions, NGOs, and concessionaires.  USAID also provided funds and resources through WWF and 
IRG (International Resources Group) to combat illegal logging through working groups and commissions 
(USAID 2005: 49).  Peruvian organizations labored to satisfy USAID’s detailed, and at times unrealistic, 
accounting process and suffered sudden and unpredictable withdrawals of funds (Mariana Montoya 
personal communication).  For example, USAID cut forestry funding to Peru by 1.4 million dollars (almost 
50%) from 2003 to 2004 (USAID 2005: 18).  In 2004, there were over 500 forest concessions covering 
over seven million hectares in five Peruvian departments (USAID 2005: 49).             
151 In the borderlands, the basis for these surveys are natural resource inventories conducted in the late 
1970s by Peru’s national office of natural resource evaluation (ONERN) and while these are excellent 
studies of largely unknown areas, they simply do not represent the current state of these forests. 
152 Caoba, Catahua, Cedro, Copaiba, Cumala, Lagarto Caspi, Lupuna, and Tornillo. 
153 The floods are not always predictable however and can leave logs stranded until the following year. 
154 The cutting of planks by chainsaw is illegal according to the new forestry law of 2000. 
155 All names used in this dissertation are pseudonyms. 
156 300 to 400 soles adjusted for November 2004 exchange rate of 3.3 soles to the dollars US. 
157 Mateiro in Portuguese. 
158 Chorisia integrifolia 
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159 The community shared with the researcher all of the documents they had compiled since they began 
their organizing efforts.  These consisted of 63 documents from March of 2002 to November of 2004. 
160 Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana. 
161 Plata, literally silver, is slang for cash. 
162 The letters were sent to the Defender of the People, the Mayor of the municipality, INRENA, the 
Regional director of Agriculture, CONAPAA and AIDESEP. 
163 Cedrelinga catenaeformis 
164 This sum was arrived at looking at domestic market prices on www.globalwood.com for November of 
2004.  Timber priced as machine dried at international specifications for length and quality. 
165 Self defense committees have a violent history in the region given these committees played key roles in 
defeating the Shining Path in the early 1990s (see chapter on coca). 
166 This same confrontation was also detailed in an open letter to the public from the Apiwtxa leadership in 
August of 2004 (Instituto Socio-Ambiental 2004b). 
167 This capture was documented by the press in Brazil (Sales,V. 2004), but not in Peru.  Ethnographic 
research later proved that one of those captured was a woman. 
168 At 2004 prices and depending on quality these harvests of mahogany and cedar could be worth over 7 
million dollars in Lima. 
169 Images used were both Landsat 7 ETM+: Path 5 Row 66 September 16, 2002, Path 5 Row 67 September 
16. 2002. 
170 Marina Silva is a native of Acre and the daughter of rubber tappers. 
171 Página 20’s article about this landmark event contains a wonderfully illustrative photo of army 
personnel, Governor Viana and Asháninka leaders talking in the Asháninka village of Apiwtxa.  Available 
through Página 20 at  http://www2.uol.com.br/pagina20/22022005/especial.htm 
172 A fascinating photograph of the President of Peru shaking hands with the President of Apiwtxa while 
the Governor of Acre, Brazil looks on is available for viewing through La República (La Republica 2005) 
at http://www.larepublica.com.pe/component/option,com_contentant/task,view/id,70294/Itemid,0/ 
173 In 2005, the UNODC estimated 14 million cocaine users worldwide with two thirds residing in the 
Americas (UNODC 2005b). 
174 97% according to the UNODC’s 2005 report (UNODC 2005b). 
175 Morales is particularly informative on this subject, dedicating an appendix to the topic based on his own 
experience. 
176 UNODC uses remote sensing to estimate coca coverage (UNODC 2005c: 65). 
177 See glossary and section four of this chapter for more details about this organization. 
178 Jen Lipton was instrumental in helping me conduct this specific analysis.  SRTM data is available at < 
http://srtm.usgs.gov/ >. 
179 These millions of dollars are of course relative, given they are a pittance in comparison to the value of 
the coca products they are seeking to control and monitor. 
180 These are police helicopters (Ken Young personal communication). 
181 My thanks to Peter Dana for pointing out to me the irony that the only people in the borderland region 
with the training and resources to build a strong data base of geographic knowledge are the eradicators of 
the coca plant. 
182 Although the lack of collections could be in part due to the inaccessibility of this region.  A region rather 
than point adaptation of this map can be found in Young 1996. 
183 An illegal logging road of at least 140 km does exist from Nueva Italia on the Upper Ucayali to the 
Brazilian border at the Amonia River. 
184 This is by far the lowest estimate of sun dried coca leaf production of all of the coca producing regions 
surveyed in Peru by the UNODC’s Coca Cultivation Survey of Peru (UNODC 2005c). 
185 While this estimate is extremely conservative it also does not incorporate production costs associated 
with weeding or harvesting at approximately 2.1 $ US a day during those work periods.  This daily wage 
also usually includes breakfast and lunch for the laborer. 
186 Coca can be harvested as young as 11 months (Morales 1994). 
187 If these fields had not been eradicated in 2003 and 2004 production of coca leaf in 2004 would come 
from fields over 1 year old in 2003 and over 2 years old in 2004. 
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188 Oven dried leaf is estimated to weigh 70% as much as the same amount sun dried (UNODC 2005c). 
189 2004 wholesale prices are 22,081 US $ per kg in USA (adjusted for inflation) (UNODC 2005a). 
190 2004 wholesale prices are 45,730 US $ per kg in Europe (adjusted for inflation) (UNODC 2005a). 
191 For 2004, UNODC world drug report 2005 states that an inflation adjusted average street price in 
Europe would be US $88 per gram and in USA US$ 77 per gram (UNODC 2005a). 
192 ENACO or the Empresa Nacional de la Coca S.A. was created in 1949 and is a state company 
authorized to commercialize coca leaf and its derivatives.  www.enaco.com.pe 
193 The cocaine smuggling Rodríguez Orejuela brothers listed sixteen ways they moved their illegal product 
into the United States.  Number one on the list was hiding the cocaine in hollowed out planksof mahogany 
(Rodríguez Orejuela 2005:25). 
194 The Amazon is not the only remote Latin American frontier to have demonstrated linkages between 
loggers and the drug trade.  An example that also includes indigenous people is Shoumatoff’s (1997: 206) 
description of the nexus of logging, poppy and marijuana cultivation, and the Tarahumara in the Sierra 
Madre Occidental of Mexico. 
195 I will shorten Shipibo Conibo to the more commonly used Shipibo for the rest of this chapter. 
196 It should be noted that the real overlap of these fields with the indigenous territory should be questioned 
given the poor georeferencing of indigenous communities in the Peruvian Amazon.  The Instituto del Bien 
Comun had not worked on the Utiquinía as of this writing.  For more information on these issues see 
chapter two and also Smith et al. 2003. 
197 This of course would take much longer to reach by paddling. 
198 Two short films exist on the processing of coca leaf to paste < http://colombia-
reports.blogspot.com/2006/09/how-coca-base-is-made.html> and coca paste  to cocaine 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MSOGjQBHa5Y> are available. 
199 Of course a challenge to processing the coca leaf in these remote locations is hauling in the chemicals by 
boat (Ken Young personal communication).  Theoretically, these waterways could be easily controlled by 
the police given the relatively small size of the rivers and the watercraft. 
200 My thanks to Bill Woods for his insight on soil contamination in tropical areas with intense rainfall. 
201 An exception is the important cartographic work of the Instituto del Bien Común. 
202 Santos-Granero and Barclay (2000) do not define remote or the remotest areas in their study.  This is an 
important absence given most of Loreto and Ucayali can be defined as remote due to the absence of 
infrastructure and the size of these regions. 
203 Their archival methodology makes a focus on smaller farms and population centers problematic given 
less documentation exists. 
204 Even Iquitos, the largest city in Loreto, and the center of their research is dependent on externalities 
such as fishmeal from Lima for chicken feed (Ken Young personal communication).  These items must be 
flown in from outside the region given Iquitos has no road connection to Peru.  
205 Other obstacles also exist, most importantly those of political will and governance, but these are beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. 
206 The total list of chapters is geology, geomorphology, climate, hydrography, soils and agroforesty 
aptitude, vegetation, biodiversity, biophysical landscapes, history, land tenure, demography, rural natural 
resource use, indigenous peoples and lands, forestry policy, deforestation, hunting and fishing, social 
indicators, economic indicators, socio-economic infrastructure, conservation units, urbanization, human-
environment conflicts, society and the environment, timber industry indicators, indicators for extractive 
reserves, indicators for indigenous territories, indicators for conservation, indicators for agriculture and 
livestock raising, and tourism. 
207 The work includes over 30 high quality thematic maps of Acre state. 
208 The EEZ combined layers of information focused on the physical geography (vegetation, relief, soils, 
geology, land cover, distribution of ecologically critical species) with layers addressing human geography 
(deforestation, settlement types, economic potential, social demands, threats among others) to identify areas 
suitable for the establishment of conservation units (both centered on protection and sustainable use) 
(personal communication Veronica Rocha de Passos). 
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209 The Comissão Estadual do Zoneamento Ecológico Económico (CEZEE) with its stakeholder 
representatives (indigenous people, rubber tappers, researchers, businessmen etc…) represents the concerns 
of Acre society in relation to the EEZ. 
210 Decreto Supremo N° 045-2001-PCM.  Article 1 Declares of national interest the organization of 
environmental territory throughout all of Peru, and constitutes the National Commission for Organizing 
Environmental Territory to propose iii) the mechanisms to begin strategies for territorial organization and 
ecological-economic zoning.  Article 3 then declares ecological-economic zoning to serve as the spatial 
reference point for regional and sectional planning, as well as to promote and orient private investment.  
Pgs. 201956-8, El Peruano (Normas Legales) Lima, Viernes 27 de Abril de 2001. 






Amazon: See Amazonia 
 
Amazon borderlands: (Also see Borderlands).  This dissertation initially defines these 
borderlands as a 150 km zone parallel to either side of the international boundaries 
contained within the Amazonia sensu stricto subregion (see Amazonia).  This is merely a 
first approximation of the dynamic Amazon borderland region and will surely be refined 
with further research informed by local knowledge.  See for example Central Borderlands 
of Peru and Brazil. 
 
Amazonia:  This dissertation uses Amazon and Amazonia interchangeably unless 
referring directly to the Amazon River.  The Amazon and Amazonia are many things to 
many people and accordingly there are multiple Amazons and Amazonias.  This issue is 
dealt with at length by the Amazon Cooperation Treaty Organization in their book 
Amazonia without Myths (Inter-American Development Bank and Commission on 
Development and Environment for Amazonia 1992).  This dissertation defines Amazonia 
as the Amazonia sensu stricto subregion “representing the area of the Amazon and 
Tocantins river basins dominated by the Amazon lowland rainforest biome (including 
also minor other, forest and non-forest vegetation types and their associated fauna)” (Eva 
and Huber 2005: 10). 
 
 311
Amazonian boundaries: Also Amazonian borders.  The international boundaries 
encapsulated by the Amazonia sensu stricto subregion.  At 1:1 M scale these boundaries 
are approximately 12,000 km in length.   
 
Asháninka: Also called by the name of a closely related group, the Ashéninka (Santos-
Granero and Barclay 2005).  Historically called Campa in Peru and Kampa in Brazil .  
Weiss divides and maps the Campa into the Pajonal Campa of the uplands and the River 
Campa of the Apurímac, Tambo, Ené, and Perené Rivers (Weiss 1975).  While both 
groups are usually lumped under the term Asháninka or more rarely Ashéninka, according 
to Veber there are at least six groups including the Asháninka of the rivers Ené, Perené 
and Tambo, the Pichis Ashéninka, the Pajonal Ashéninka, and the Ashéninka of the 
Ucayali (Veber 2003).  Dialects vary between groups but communication is readily 
possible between them (Veber 1998).  While wars and slaving raids between these groups 
were common in the distant (Fry 1907) and recent (Clark 1954) past, their collusion is 
also very present in the borderlands.  Isolated together in these boundary lands, the 
Asháninka and Ashéninka live together to form the borderland Asháninka treated in this 
dissertation.  Here I use the term Asháninka to refer to both groups. 
 
Borderlands:  (Also Boundary Lands) The term borderlands shares as many territorial 
meanings as there are purposes for its definition (House 1982).  While the metaphorical, 
figurative, and conceptual borderlands of a globalizing world are increasingly studied 
from a postmodern vantage point, this research loosely defines borderlands as the 
territorial regions surrounding nation state boundaries.  These regions vary widely 
between narrow bands of territory along nation state boundaries to whole hybrid cultural 
borderlands with complex histories (Kaplan and Häkli 2002).   
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Boundary Lands: See Borderlands. 
 
Cartas Nacionales: Cartas nacionales is the common Peruvian term used to refer to the 
Peruvian state’s official maps produced by the National Geographic Institute (Instituto 
Geográfico Nacional) at 1:100,000 scale. 
 
Caserío: The direct translation is hamlet in English.  Caserío is the common name used 
by locals for villages or small towns settled primarily by non-indigenous people.  The 
term for indigenous areas is comunidad or community. 
 
Caserío Cocalero: A caserío whose primary agricultural and economic activity is the 
cultivation and sale of coca leaves. 
 
Castilloa ulei: Also Castilloa elastica often commonly called caucho.  Caucho refers 
both to the rubber tree species found in Amazonia and the rubber itself.  Castilloa trees 
could not be sustainably harvested as rubber extraction required the death of the tree.  
Cauchero refers to the nomadic harvester of these trees who would search, find, and fell 
them before extracting the rubber and moving on in search of more of these trees. 
 
Caucho: The rubber or latex of the Castilloa ulei (see glossary) trees.  Sometimes also 
used to refer to the rubber of Hevea brasiliensis (see glossary) although jebe would be the 
correct term.  See related term cauchero. 
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Cauchero: Cauchero refers to the nomadic harvester of Castilloa ulei (see glossary) 
trees.  Caucheros would search, find, and fell castilloa trees before extracting the rubber 
and moving on in search of more of these trees.  Caucheros were integral components in 
the Peruvian state’s quest to claim the Alto Juruá and Alto Purús River regions. 
 
Central Border of Brazil and Peru: The central border of Brazil and Peru refers to the 
central portion of the Brazil-Peru border, specifically this includes the boundary along the 
ridge of the Sierra del Divisor/Serra do Divisor between the headwaters of the Javarí 
(Yavarí in Peru) and the headwaters of the Juruá (Yurua in Peru).   
 
Central Borderlands of Brazil and Peru:  The central borderlands of Brazil and Peru 
refers to the borderlands surrounding the central portion of the Brazil-Peru border, 
specifically this includes the Sierra del Divisor/Serra do Divisor area between the 
headwaters of the Javarí (Yavarí in Peru) and the headwaters of the Juruá (Yurua in 
Peru).  These borderlands can be approximated to extend 150 km into Brazil based on 
their legal principle of faixa de fronteira (see below).  On the Peruvian side fieldwork 
defines the borderlands as extending from the right bank of the Ucayali River, a physical 
line roughly equivalent to the secondary frontier, to the border with Brazil.   
 
Centro de Investigación de Fronteras Amazonicas (CIFA): The Amazon Borderlands 
Research Center was established in 2004 at the Universidad Nacional de Ucayali (UNU), 
Pucallpa, Peru.  UNU initially founded CIFA around the author’s borderland research 
after investing thousands of dollars in the project and providing four university 




Cocalero:  A coca farmer or someone generally involved in coca cultivation, 
consumption, or trafficking.  Here used primarily in reference to coca farmers. 
 
Ecological and Economic Zoning (EEZ): defined as “a dynamic process permitting a 
spatial ordering of areas characterized by physical, biotic, and socio-economic factors 
evaluated in relation to their sustainable use by or tolerance of human intervention” 
(Tratado de Cooperación Amazónica 1994), EEZ shows promise as a geographic 
information tool contributing to the reconciling of conservation, development, and social 
justice in the Amazon borderlands.  
 
Enganche: The hook.  A term to describe the recruitment of labor in the habilitación-
enganche system. 
 
Enganchador:  The patrón, habilitador, or habilitado who recruits labor for resource 
extraction. 
 
Faixa de fronteira: In the 1979 Law #6,634, Brazil declared all of the territory within 
150 kilometers of its terrestrial nation state boundaries to be a frontier zone indispensable 
to the national security of the country (Direito and Justiça Informática Ltda 2006).  This 
150 km wide zone, called the faixa de fronteira, has unique restrictions on industry, 
infrastructure, and titling among other initiatives, requiring approval of the National 
Security Council (Direito and Justiça Informática Ltda 2006). 
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Fronteras vivas:  Roughly translated as living borders, this term refers to the Peruvian 
government’s policy of encouraging colonists to settle in the borderlands as a means of 
protecting national sovereignty along the most remote political boundaries.  One 
manifestation of this policy is the UMARs (Unidades Militares de Asentamiento Rural) 
or military settlement projects. 
 
Frontier: This dissertation’s definition for a frontier is that of a zone of transition distant 
from the center of a (post) colonizing nation (Wendl and Rösler 1999).  This zone of 
transition represents the gap that still exists between the line one can loosely define as the 
settlement frontier, where allochthonous peoples from elsewhere (often the center) have 
become dominant, and the political boundary.  However, sources quoted in this 
dissertation may use the term frontier as a synonym for border or boundary.   
 
Fourth world:  Here, this term refers to Nietschmann’s view (Nietschmann 1994) of a 
fourth world made up of indigenous nations disenfranchised and unrecognized by the 
nation states in which they live and the international community of nation states. 
 
Fundo:  Fundos are family farms, often outposts in the frontier, usually located along 
major rivers (in contrast to the rubber tapping outposts in the interfluvial zones).  
Patrones often used indigenous labor to harvest crops in their fields or harvest natural 
resource both near and far afield.  The fundo owners, or patrones, controlled local labor 
and established enduring links between the frontier and the marketplace (Santos-Granero 
and Barclay 2000). 
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Habilitación-enganche system:  This is a debt peonage system where patrones or 
habilitadores advance financial and logistical support to laborers who then must pay back 
these debts in labor or products (latex or timber being two common examples).  The 
system was common during the rubber boom and has since been adapted to the timber 
trade. 
 
Habilitado: Someone who has been advanced credit, goods, and equipment by a patrón 
or habilitador to harvest timber, latex, or another product. 
 
Habilitadores: Habilitadores are middlemen.  Habilitadores work between sawmill 
owners, concessionaires, patrones, and the laborers.  They provide technical and financial 
support to the laborers in return for tropical timber.  In certain instances they will also 
employ local patrones who serve as another layer of habilitador.  
 
Hevea brasiliensis: The species of rubber tree most coveted by both rubber tappers and 
rubber bosses given its fine quality and the quanitity of rubber that could be extracted 
sustainably.  These trees could be tapped continuously during large portions of the year 
and the search for and control of this economically lucrative plant was at the heart of the 
rubber boom and the political aspirations associated with it.  In Peru the species and 
rubber were called jebe and the rubber tapper a xiringero/shiringero.  In Brazil the rubber 
tree was also called a seringueira and the rubber tapper a seringueiro.  The borderland 
region between Bolivia, Peru and Brazil was historically rich in Hevea brasiliensis. 
 
Instituto del Bien Común (IBC): IBC is a Peruvian non-governmental organization 
(NGO) focused on caring for the ecological and cultural resources held in common by 
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humanity.  One of their central interests involves the accurate mapping of indigenous 
populations.  The author was an associate member of IBC during fieldwork in 2004.  
More information about IBC is available at http://www.ibcperu.org/index.php?lg=EN . 
 
Isconahua:  Also Isco or Iskobakebu are an indigenous group in voluntary isolation 
apparently still roaming the Sierra del Divisor between Peru and Brazil.  They have a 
territorial reserve, Reserva Regional Isconahua, set aside for their protection, although 
this reserve has recently been included in the Zona Reservada Sierra del Divisor 
conservation unit.  More on the Isconahua can be learned in Arbaiza-Guzman et al. 1995, 
Momsen Jr. 1964, Whiton et al. 1964). 
 
Local Knowledge: Local knowledge refers to the knowledge local people gain from 
living in a place and environment for years at a time.  This might include knowledge of 
the curative properties of the area’s plants, knowledge of the courses and headwaters of 
rivers, or knowledge of the cultures of neighboring peoples to just name a few examples. 
 
Local Inhabitants: (See Local People) 
 
Local People: Amazonia, and in particular, the borderlands, are regions of transitive 
peoples and cultures, making the definition of local people problematic.  Even the 
indigenous residents of the borderlands may have arrived only a year, a decade or a 
century before.  Here, local inhabitants refer to people with at least a handful of years in 
the area and an interest in the long term future of their local place or region.  Local 
inhabitants are not nomadic loggers, moving from river to river, but they can be loggers 
and skin hunters who work from a borderland home.    
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Kaxinawá: An indigenous group called Cashinahua in Peru.  These indigenous peoples 
live bisected by the Peru/Brazilian border along the Juruá/Yuruá and Purús watersheds. 
 
Patrón: A boss or patron who controls rural labor with financial backing, personal 
magnetism, and often the lack of alternative options for laborers.  Logging patrons often 
use debt peonage as a means to control scarce labor along Amazonian resource frontiers. 
 
Progressive Contextualization:  A methodology prioritizing causal explanation of 
human-environment interaction and events through the construction (event by event) of 
causal chains by means of asking and answering factual and counterfactual questions of 
environmental events or human actions.  This process begins by identifying possible 
proximate causes of each event and then eliminating possibilities through empirical 
investigation.  One can then work backward in time and outward in space to construct 
causal explanation.  This inductive method seeks to understand the complexity, 
heterogeneity, and diversity present within human-environment interaction rather than 
test simplified and deductive generalizations or theories (Vayda 1983, 2004).    
 
Selva Central: Santos-Granero and Barclay define the selva central as the “central 
jungle”, “central montaña”, or central portion of the Peruvian selva alta or high jungle 
(Santos-Granero and Barclay 1998).  This area lies along the eastern slopes of the Andes.  
Within this selva central region lie the historical and current core homelands of the 
Asháninka/Ashéninka peoples in the Pajonal, and along the Perené, Ené, Tambo, Upper 
Ucayali and Urubamba Rivers.  
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Seringueiros: Rubber tappers who collected the latex of the Hevea brasiliensis trees 
(these trees commonly called seringueiras).  Seringueiros were not nomadic but 
sedentary due to the sustainability of tapping Hevea brasiliensis for much of the year.  
This contrasted with caucheros nomadic harvesting of Castilloa ulei. 
 
State:  State is a problematic term given it can be used to refer to both nation-state or 
sub-national state, or both.  In this dissertation I differentiate where possible between 
nation state, region (the Peruvian term for a sub-national political/administrative unit), 
and the state of Acre, Brazil.  However, I also use the term generally to refer to both the 
national and sub-national state’s relationship with the borderlands.  When I use the 
following general terms I am referring to both national and sub-national states: a weak 
state presence, a weak state, state indifference, state ignorance, and state claims among 
others. 
 
Tabula Rasa: I use this concept in the sense of Susanna Hecht who defines a tabula rasa 
as a blank slate, “a place that is immanent, undefined, and available for the 
transformative civilizing mission…” (Hecht 2004: 45).  This topic has also been 
reviewed by Neumann (Neumann 1998) among others. 
 
Varaderos: Also varadouros (Portuguese) these are portage trails linking the headwaters 
of one watershed to another.  Similar to a crossroads in an Amazonia without roads, 
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